Detection rules › YARA-L
YARA-L rules: 37
| Rule | Severity |
|---|---|
| IOC Hash Prevalence | high |
| Okta MFA Bruteforce Attack | medium |
IOC Hash Prevalence
#Detect process/file events that match hashes found in our MISP instance and have low rolling max prevalence
Telemetry Coverage
Rule Body
// Copyright 2023 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.
rule ioc_hash_prevalence {
meta:
author = "Google Cloud Security"
description = "Detect process/file events that match hashes found in our MISP instance and have low rolling max prevalence"
rule_id = "mr_58c661e3-e609-4df8-ae36-e85480e62a50"
rule_name = "IOC Hash Prevalence"
type = "alert"
tags = "prevalence, threat indicators"
assumption = "Assumes MISP data has been ingested into entity graph; this rule can be modified to utilize other TI indicators"
data_source = "microsoft sysmon"
severity = "High"
priority = "High"
events:
$process.metadata.event_type = "FILE_CREATION" or $process.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
$process.target.process.file.sha256 = $sha256
// derived from events ingested by Google SecOps
$prevalence.graph.metadata.entity_type = "FILE"
$prevalence.graph.metadata.source_type = "DERIVED_CONTEXT"
$prevalence.graph.entity.file.prevalence.day_count = 10
$prevalence.graph.entity.file.prevalence.rolling_max <= 3
$prevalence.graph.entity.file.prevalence.rolling_max > 0
$prevalence.graph.entity.file.sha256 = $sha256
// Correlates with MISP data; can be modified based on your MISP parser or other TI
$ioc.graph.metadata.entity_type = "FILE"
$ioc.graph.metadata.source_type = "ENTITY_CONTEXT"
$ioc.graph.metadata.product_name = "MISP"
$ioc.graph.entity.file.sha256 = $sha256
match:
$sha256 over 5m
outcome:
$risk_score = 85
$event_count = count_distinct($process.metadata.id)
// added to populate alert graph with additional context
$principal_hostname = array_distinct($process.principal.hostname)
$principal_process_pid = array_distinct($process.principal.process.pid)
$principal_process_command_line = array_distinct($process.principal.process.command_line)
$principal_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.sha256)
$principal_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.full_path)
$principal_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($process.principal.process.product_specific_process_id)
$principal_process_parent_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($process.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id)
$target_process_pid = array_distinct($process.target.process.pid)
$target_process_command_line = array_distinct($process.target.process.command_line)
// Commented out target.process.file.sha256 because it is already represented in graph as match variable. If match changes, can uncomment to add to results
$target_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($process.target.process.file.sha256)
$target_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($process.target.process.file.full_path)
$target_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($process.target.process.product_specific_process_id)
$principal_user_userid = array_distinct($process.principal.user.userid)
$target_file_sha256 = array_distinct($process.target.file.sha256)
$target_file_full_path = array_distinct($process.target.file.full_path)
condition:
$process and $ioc and $prevalence
}
YARA-L Rule Structure
Condition
Fires when at least one $process event in the 5m window and $ioc matches entity context and $prevalence matches entity context.
Events
$ioc
graph.metadata.entity_type = "FILE"graph.metadata.source_type = "ENTITY_CONTEXT"graph.metadata.product_name = "MISP"
$prevalence
graph.metadata.entity_type = "FILE"graph.metadata.source_type = "DERIVED_CONTEXT"graph.entity.file.prevalence.day_count = "10"graph.entity.file.prevalence.rolling_max <= "3"graph.entity.file.prevalence.rolling_max > "0"
$process
Match and Correlation
Outcome
Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.
| Field | Expression |
|---|---|
risk_score | 85 |
event_count | count_distinct($process.metadata.id) |
principal_hostname | array_distinct($process.principal.hostname) |
principal_process_pid | array_distinct($process.principal.process.pid) |
principal_process_command_line | array_distinct($process.principal.process.command_line) |
principal_process_file_sha256 | array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.sha256) |
principal_process_file_full_path | array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.full_path) |
principal_process_product_specific_process_id | array_distinct($process.principal.process.product_specific_process_id) |
principal_process_parent_process_product_specific_process_id | array_distinct($process.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id) |
target_process_pid | array_distinct($process.target.process.pid) |
target_process_command_line | array_distinct($process.target.process.command_line) |
target_process_file_sha256 | array_distinct($process.target.process.file.sha256) |
target_process_file_full_path | array_distinct($process.target.process.file.full_path) |
target_process_product_specific_process_id | array_distinct($process.target.process.product_specific_process_id) |
principal_user_userid | array_distinct($process.principal.user.userid) |
target_file_sha256 | array_distinct($process.target.file.sha256) |
target_file_full_path | array_distinct($process.target.file.full_path) |
Okta MFA Bruteforce Attack
#Detects a successful login after multiple failed MFA pushes
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Credential Access |
References
Telemetry Coverage
Rules Detecting the Same Action
These rules filter on the same operation.
- First Occurrence of Okta User Session Started via Proxy (Elastic)
- MFA Fatigue (OKTA) (Kusto)
- Okta AiTM Phishing Attempt Blocked by FastPass (Panther)
- Okta Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge (Splunk)
- Okta Fast Pass phishing Detection (Kusto)
- Okta FastPass Phishing Detection (Sigma)
- Okta FastPass Phishing Detection (Elastic)
- Okta MFA Exhaustion Hunt (Splunk)
Rule Body
// Copyright 2023 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.
rule okta_mfa_brute_force_attack {
meta:
author = "Google Cloud Security"
description = "Detects a successful login after multiple failed MFA pushes"
rule_id = "mr_61d8d679-bf4d-4441-bbbb-65f82a37e3c5"
rule_name = "Okta MFA Bruteforce Attack"
reference = "https://sec.okta.com/pushfatigueworkflows"
mitre_attack_tactic = "Credential Access"
mitre_attack_technique = "Brute Force"
mitre_attack_url = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/"
mitre_attack_version = "v13.1"
type = "Hunt"
data_source = "Okta"
severity = "Medium"
priority = "Medium"
events:
$push.metadata.product_name = "Okta"
$push.metadata.vendor_name = "Okta"
$push.metadata.event_type = "USER_UNCATEGORIZED"
$push.metadata.product_event_type = "system.push.send_factor_verify_push"
$push.network.parent_session_id = $parent_session_id
$auth.metadata.event_type = "USER_LOGIN"
$auth.metadata.product_event_type = "user.authentication.auth_via_mfa"
$auth.metadata.product_name = "Okta"
$auth.metadata.vendor_name = "Okta"
$auth.security_result.action = "ALLOW"
$auth.network.parent_session_id = $parent_session_id
$push.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds <= $auth.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds
match:
$parent_session_id over 15m
outcome:
$risk_score = max(35)
$mitre_attack_tactic = "Credential Access"
$mitre_attack_technique = "Brute Force"
$push_target_user_agent = array_distinct($push.network.http.user_agent)
$push_principal_ip = array_distinct($push.principal.ip)
$push_principal_ip_country = array_distinct($push.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region)
$push_principal_ip_state = array_distinct($push.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.state)
//$push_principal_ip_city = array_distinct($push.principal.location.city)
$push_principal_user_email_addresses = array_distinct ($push.principal.user.email_addresses)
$push_security_result_summary = array_distinct($push.security_result.summary)
$push_target_user_email_addresses = array_distinct($push.target.user.email_addresses)
$push_target_user_userid = array_distinct($push.target.user.userid)
$push_security_result_risk_reason = array_distinct($push.security_result.detection_fields["Risk Reasons"])
$dc_push_network_session_id = count_distinct($push.network.parent_session_id)
$auth_target_user_agent = array_distinct($auth.network.http.user_agent)
$auth_principal_ip = array_distinct($auth.principal.ip)
$auth_principal_ip_country = array_distinct($auth.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region)
//$auth_principal_ip_state = array_distinct($auth.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.state)
//$auth_principal_ip_city = array_distinct($auth.principal.location.city)
$auth_principal_user_email_addresses = array_distinct ($auth.principal.user.email_addresses)
$auth_security_result_summary = array_distinct($auth.security_result.summary)
$auth_target_user_email_addresses = array_distinct($auth.target.user.email_addresses)
$auth_target_user_userid = array_distinct($auth.target.user.userid)
condition:
#push > 4 and $auth
}
YARA-L Rule Structure
Condition
Fires when $push occurs more than 4 times in the 15m window and at least one $auth event in the 15m window.
Events
$push
metadata.product_event_type = "system.push.send_factor_verify_push"
$auth
metadata.product_event_type = "user.authentication.auth_via_mfa"security_result.action = "ALLOW"
Match and Correlation
Outcome
Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.
| Field | Expression |
|---|---|
risk_score | max(35) |
push_target_user_agent | array_distinct($push.network.http.user_agent) |
push_principal_ip | array_distinct($push.principal.ip) |
push_principal_ip_country | array_distinct($push.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region) |
push_principal_ip_state | array_distinct($push.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.state) |
push_principal_user_email_addresses | array_distinct ($push.principal.user.email_addresses) |
push_security_result_summary | array_distinct($push.security_result.summary) |
push_target_user_email_addresses | array_distinct($push.target.user.email_addresses) |
push_target_user_userid | array_distinct($push.target.user.userid) |
push_security_result_risk_reason | array_distinct($push.security_result.detection_fields["Risk Reasons"]) |
dc_push_network_session_id | count_distinct($push.network.parent_session_id) |
auth_target_user_agent | array_distinct($auth.network.http.user_agent) |
auth_principal_ip | array_distinct($auth.principal.ip) |
auth_principal_ip_country | array_distinct($auth.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region) |
auth_principal_user_email_addresses | array_distinct ($auth.principal.user.email_addresses) |
auth_security_result_summary | array_distinct($auth.security_result.summary) |
auth_target_user_email_addresses | array_distinct($auth.target.user.email_addresses) |
auth_target_user_userid | array_distinct($auth.target.user.userid) |