Detection rules › YARA-L
YARA-L rules: 3c
| Rule | Severity |
|---|---|
| GCP Successful API Call From Tor Exit Node | high |
| Google Workspace Multiple Files Sent As Email Attachments From Google Drive | high |
| O365 Login Activity To Azure AD PowerShell App | medium |
GCP Successful API Call From Tor Exit Node
#Detects successful API executions from a Tor exit node.
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution |
Rule Body
// Copyright 2024 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.
rule gcp_successful_api_from_tor_exit_node {
meta:
author = "Google Cloud Security"
description = "Detects successful API executions from a Tor exit node."
rule_id = "mr_5912e2be-4366-4f34-a770-0ac8358f2cb9"
rule_name = "GCP Successful API Call From Tor Exit Node"
mitre_attack_tactic = "Execution"
mitre_attack_technique = "User Execution"
mitre_attack_url = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/"
mitre_attack_version = "v14.1"
type = "Alert"
data_source = "GCP Cloud Audit"
platform = "GCP"
severity = "High"
priority = "High"
events:
$gcp.metadata.log_type = "GCP_CLOUDAUDIT"
$gcp.security_result.action = "ALLOW"
$gcp.principal.ip = $ip
// Tor IP listing provided by GCTI Feed
$gcti_feed.graph.entity.artifact.ip = $ip
$gcti_feed.graph.metadata.entity_type = "IP_ADDRESS"
$gcti_feed.graph.metadata.threat.threat_feed_name = "Tor Exit Nodes"
$gcti_feed.graph.metadata.product_name = "GCTI Feed"
$gcti_feed.graph.metadata.source_type = "GLOBAL_CONTEXT"
match:
$ip over 5m
outcome:
$risk_score = max(
//Baseline
35 +
// Unauthorized geographies
if($gcp.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region = "Cuba", 40) +
if($gcp.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region = "Iran", 40) +
if($gcp.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region = "North Korea" , 40) +
if($gcp.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region = "Russia", 40) +
if($gcp.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region = "Syria", 40)
)
$mitre_attack_tactic = "Execution"
$mitre_attack_technique = "User Execution"
$mitre_attack_technique_id = "T1204"
$event_count = count_distinct($gcp.metadata.id)
$network_http_user_agent = array_distinct($gcp.network.http.user_agent)
$principal_ip = array_distinct($gcp.principal.ip)
$principal_ip_country = array_distinct($gcp.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region)
$principal_ip_state = array_distinct($gcp.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.state)
$principal_user_display_name = array_distinct($gcp.principal.user.user_display_name)
$dc_principal_user_display_name = count_distinct($gcp.principal.user.user_display_name)
$target_resource_name = array_distinct($gcp.target.resource.name)
condition:
$gcp and $gcti_feed
}
YARA-L Rule Structure
Condition
Fires when at least one $gcp event in the 5m window and $gcti_feed matches entity context.
Events
$gcp
metadata.log_type = "GCP_CLOUDAUDIT"security_result.action = "ALLOW"
$gcti_feed
graph.metadata.entity_type = "IP_ADDRESS"graph.metadata.threat.threat_feed_name = "Tor Exit Nodes"graph.metadata.product_name = "GCTI Feed"graph.metadata.source_type = "GLOBAL_CONTEXT"
Match and Correlation
Outcome
Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.
| Field | Expression |
|---|---|
risk_score | max( 35 + if($gcp.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region = "Cuba", 40) + if($gcp.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region = "Iran", 40) + if($gcp.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region = "North Korea" , 40) + if($gcp.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region = "Russia", 40) + if($gcp.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region = "Syria", 40) ) |
event_count | count_distinct($gcp.metadata.id) |
network_http_user_agent | array_distinct($gcp.network.http.user_agent) |
principal_ip | array_distinct($gcp.principal.ip) |
principal_ip_country | array_distinct($gcp.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region) |
principal_ip_state | array_distinct($gcp.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.state) |
principal_user_display_name | array_distinct($gcp.principal.user.user_display_name) |
dc_principal_user_display_name | count_distinct($gcp.principal.user.user_display_name) |
target_resource_name | array_distinct($gcp.target.resource.name) |
Google Workspace Multiple Files Sent As Email Attachments From Google Drive
#Identifies when a user sends multiple files from Google Drive as an email attachment to a free email domain, which may indicate data exfiltration.
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Exfiltration |
Telemetry Coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Google Workspace | email_as_attachment: Email as Attachment |
Rule Body
// Copyright 2023 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.
rule google_workspace_multiple_files_sent_as_email_attachment_from_google_drive {
meta:
author = "Google Cloud Security"
description = "Identifies when a user sends multiple files from Google Drive as an email attachment to a free email domain, which may indicate data exfiltration."
rule_id = "mr_125c517c-3ef9-4687-8af6-d71eff83d0e9"
rule_name = "Google Workspace Multiple Files Sent As Email Attachments From Google Drive"
mitre_attack_tactic = "Exfiltration"
mitre_attack_technique = "Exfiltration Over Web Service"
mitre_attack_url = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/"
mitre_attack_version = "v13.1"
type = "Alert"
data_source = "Workspace Activity"
severity = "High"
priority = "High"
events:
$email.metadata.vendor_name = "Google Workspace"
$email.metadata.product_name = "drive"
$email.metadata.event_type = "EMAIL_TRANSACTION"
$email.metadata.product_event_type = "email_as_attachment"
$email.target.user.email_addresses = /.*@gmail\.com|.*@aol\.com|.*@ymail\.com|.*@ymail\.com|.*@hotmail\.com|.*@outlook\.com|.*@icloud\.com/
$email.principal.user.userid = $user_id
match:
$user_id over 1h
outcome:
$risk_score = max(75)
$mitre_attack_tactic = "Exfiltration"
$mitre_attack_technique = "Exfiltration Over Web Service"
$mitre_attack_technique_id = "T1567"
$event_count = count_distinct($email.metadata.id)
$product_event_type = array_distinct($email.metadata.product_event_type)
$userid = array_distinct($email.principal.user.userid)
$doc_type = array_distinct($email.src.resource.attribute.labels["doc_type"])
$owner = array_distinct($email.target.resource.attribute.labels["owner"])
$target_emails = array_distinct($email.target.user.email_addresses)
$doc_name = array_distinct($email.target.resource.name)
$doc_id = array_distinct($email.target.resource.product_object_id)
$count_docs = count_distinct($email.target.resource.product_object_id)
condition:
// Customize the value of $count_docs to set the alerting threshold for your environment
$email and $count_docs > 10
}
YARA-L Rule Structure
Condition
Fires when at least one $email event in the 1h window and $count_docs > 10.
Events
$email
metadata.product_event_type = "email_as_attachment"target.user.email_addresses matches ".*@gmail\.com|.*@aol\.com|.*@ymail\.com|.*@ymail\.com|.*@hotmail\.com|.*@outlook\.com|.*@icloud\.com"
Match and Correlation
Outcome
Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.
| Field | Expression |
|---|---|
risk_score | max(75) |
event_count | count_distinct($email.metadata.id) |
product_event_type | array_distinct($email.metadata.product_event_type) |
userid | array_distinct($email.principal.user.userid) |
doc_type | array_distinct($email.src.resource.attribute.labels["doc_type"]) |
owner | array_distinct($email.target.resource.attribute.labels["owner"]) |
target_emails | array_distinct($email.target.user.email_addresses) |
doc_name | array_distinct($email.target.resource.name) |
doc_id | array_distinct($email.target.resource.product_object_id) |
count_docs | count_distinct($email.target.resource.product_object_id) |
O365 Login Activity To Azure AD PowerShell App
#Logins to Azure AD PowerShell app can have legitimate purposes, but are also abused to gain access to user information. Programmatic access to Entra ID (Azure AD) should generally be through apps, so reviewing these activities is needed.
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access |
Telemetry Coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Microsoft 365 | UserLoggedIn |
Rules Detecting the Same Action
These rules filter on the same operation.
- Azure Login Bypassing Conditional Access Policies (Sigma)
- Hunt for suspicious sign-in to Entra ID Using Extrnal Call Method (YARA-L)
- M365 Identity OAuth Flow by First-Party Microsoft App from Multiple IPs (Elastic)
- M365 Identity OAuth Flow by User Sign-in to Device Registration (Elastic)
- M365 Identity OAuth Phishing via First-Party Microsoft Application (Elastic)
- M365 Identity OAuth ROPC Grant via Legacy Authentication Client (Elastic)
- M365 Potential AiTM UserLoggedIn via Office App (Tycoon2FA) (Elastic)
- O365 AD PowerShell App Login Subsequent Activity (YARA-L)
Rule Body
// Copyright 2025 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.
rule o365_login_activity_to_azure_ad_powershell_app {
meta:
author = "Google Cloud Security"
description = "Logins to Azure AD PowerShell app can have legitimate purposes, but are also abused to gain access to user information. Programmatic access to Entra ID (Azure AD) should generally be through apps, so reviewing these activities is needed."
rule_id = "mr_0cc56eaf-4176-444d-874d-9780bbb29d4f"
rule_name = "O365 Login Activity To Azure AD PowerShell App"
tactic = "TA0001"
technique = "T1078.004"
type = "hunt"
platform = "azure"
data_source = "o365"
severity = "Medium"
priority = "Medium"
events:
$login.metadata.event_type = "USER_LOGIN"
$login.metadata.product_event_type = "UserLoggedIn"
$login.metadata.product_name = "Office 365"
$login.metadata.vendor_name = "Microsoft"
$login.target.resource.product_object_id = "1b730954-1685-4b74-9bfd-dac224a7b894"
$login.security_result.action = "ALLOW"
// Below filters ADFS Sync Account that runs every 30 minutes between AD and Entra ID (for federated environments); can use display name or email address
//$login.target.user.userid != "insert your email address here" and
//$login.target.user.user_display_name != "On-Premises Directory Synchronization Service Account"
$login.target.user.userid = $userid
match:
$userid over 5m
outcome:
$risk_score = 65
$event_count = count_distinct($login.metadata.id)
$security_summary = array_distinct($login.security_result.summary)
$user_agent = array_distinct($login.network.http.user_agent)
$country_region_login_attempt = array_distinct($login.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region)
//added to populate alert graph with additional context
$principal_ip = array_distinct($login.principal.ip)
$target_user_userid = array_distinct($login.target.user.userid)
condition:
$login
}
YARA-L Rule Structure
Condition
Fires when at least one $login event in the 5m window.
Events
$login
metadata.product_event_type = "UserLoggedIn"target.resource.product_object_id = "1b730954-1685-4b74-9bfd-dac224a7b894"security_result.action = "ALLOW"
Match and Correlation
Outcome
Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.
| Field | Expression |
|---|---|
risk_score | 65 |
event_count | count_distinct($login.metadata.id) |
security_summary | array_distinct($login.security_result.summary) |
user_agent | array_distinct($login.network.http.user_agent) |
country_region_login_attempt | array_distinct($login.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region) |
principal_ip | array_distinct($login.principal.ip) |
target_user_userid | array_distinct($login.target.user.userid) |