Detection rules › YARA-L
YARA-L rules: 3e
| Rule | Severity |
|---|---|
| Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected | high |
| O365 Login Activity To Uncommon Microsoft Cloud Apps | medium |
| PowerShell Web Download | medium |
| Reg Add Suspicious Paths | high |
Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
#Detects usage of the "FromBase64String" function in the commandline which is used to decode a base64 encoded string
Known False Positives
- Administrative script libraries
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution |
References
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule Body
// Copyright 2025 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.
rule base64_encoded_powershell_command_detected {
meta:
author = "Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)"
description = "Detects usage of the \"FromBase64String\" function in the commandline which is used to decode a base64 encoded string"
reference = "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_frombase64string.yml"
license = "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/Detection-Rule-License/blob/main/LICENSE.Detection.Rules.md"
rule_name = "Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected"
sigma_uuid = "e32d4572-9826-4738-b651-95fa63747e8a"
sigma_status = "test"
rule_id = "mr_a3603334-35e3-4050-b94e-f79aeccb899a"
tactic = "TA0002"
technique = "T1059.001"
type = "Detection"
data_source = "Sysmon"
platform = "Windows"
severity = "High"
priority = "High"
false_positives = "Administrative script libraries"
events:
$process.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "::frombase64string(")
$process.principal.hostname = $hostname
match:
$hostname over 5m
outcome:
//example usage of specifying test user and hostname to adjust risk score
$risk_score = max(if($process.principal.user.userid = "user" and $process.principal.hostname = "hostname", 0, 15))
$principal_process_pid = array_distinct($process.principal.process.pid)
$principal_process_command_line = array_distinct($process.principal.process.command_line)
$principal_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.sha256)
$principal_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.full_path)
$principal_process_product_specfic_process_id = array_distinct($process.principal.process.product_specific_process_id)
$principal_process_parent_process_product_specfic_process_id = array_distinct($process.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id)
$target_process_pid = array_distinct($process.target.process.pid)
$target_process_command_line = array_distinct($process.target.process.command_line)
$target_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($process.target.process.file.sha256)
$target_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($process.target.process.file.full_path)
$target_process_product_specfic_process_id = array_distinct($process.target.process.product_specific_process_id)
$principal_user_userid = array_distinct($process.principal.user.userid)
$log_type = array_distinct(strings.concat($process.metadata.log_type,"/",$process.metadata.product_event_type))
condition:
$process
}
YARA-L Rule Structure
Condition
Fires when at least one $process event in the 5m window.
Events
$process
target.process.command_line contains "::frombase64string("
Match and Correlation
Outcome
Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.
| Field | Expression |
|---|---|
risk_score | max(if($process.principal.user.userid = "user" and $process.principal.hostname = "hostname", 0, 15)) |
principal_process_pid | array_distinct($process.principal.process.pid) |
principal_process_command_line | array_distinct($process.principal.process.command_line) |
principal_process_file_sha256 | array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.sha256) |
principal_process_file_full_path | array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.full_path) |
principal_process_product_specfic_process_id | array_distinct($process.principal.process.product_specific_process_id) |
principal_process_parent_process_product_specfic_process_id | array_distinct($process.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id) |
target_process_pid | array_distinct($process.target.process.pid) |
target_process_command_line | array_distinct($process.target.process.command_line) |
target_process_file_sha256 | array_distinct($process.target.process.file.sha256) |
target_process_file_full_path | array_distinct($process.target.process.file.full_path) |
target_process_product_specfic_process_id | array_distinct($process.target.process.product_specific_process_id) |
principal_user_userid | array_distinct($process.principal.user.userid) |
log_type | array_distinct(strings.concat($process.metadata.log_type,"/",$process.metadata.product_event_type)) |
O365 Login Activity To Uncommon Microsoft Cloud Apps
#This rule detects O365 login activity to apps other than a defined list of first party MS Cloud Apps. Note that Azure Active Directory PowerShell and custom Azure apps are not in this list by default
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access |
References
Telemetry Coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Microsoft 365 | UserLoggedIn |
Rules Detecting the Same Action
These rules filter on the same operation.
- Azure Login Bypassing Conditional Access Policies (Sigma)
- Hunt for suspicious sign-in to Entra ID Using Extrnal Call Method (YARA-L)
- M365 Identity OAuth Flow by First-Party Microsoft App from Multiple IPs (Elastic)
- M365 Identity OAuth Flow by User Sign-in to Device Registration (Elastic)
- M365 Identity OAuth Phishing via First-Party Microsoft Application (Elastic)
- M365 Identity OAuth ROPC Grant via Legacy Authentication Client (Elastic)
- M365 Potential AiTM UserLoggedIn via Office App (Tycoon2FA) (Elastic)
- O365 AD PowerShell App Login Subsequent Activity (YARA-L)
Rule Body
// Copyright 2025 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.
rule o365_login_activity_to_uncommon_mscloud_apps {
meta:
author = "Google Cloud Security"
description = "This rule detects O365 login activity to apps other than a defined list of first party MS Cloud Apps. Note that Azure Active Directory PowerShell and custom Azure apps are not in this list by default"
rule_id = "mr_eca0cd3d-7d65-47f6-9df2-1a16664819ae"
rule_name = "O365 Login Activity To Uncommon Microsoft Cloud Apps"
assumption = "The list first_party_ms_cloud_apps is populated as needed"
tactic = "TA0001"
technique = "T1078.004"
reference = "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/azure/active-directory/verify-first-party-apps-sign-in"
type = "alert"
platform = "azure"
data_source = "o365"
severity = "Medium"
priority = "Medium"
events:
$login.metadata.event_type = "USER_LOGIN"
$login.metadata.product_event_type = "UserLoggedIn"
$login.metadata.product_name = "Office 365"
NOT $login.target.resource.product_object_id in %first_party_ms_cloud_apps
/* Additional AppIds that are not in this list but have appeared benign during testing include the following:
7eadcef8-456d-4611-9480-4fff72b8b9e2 Microsoft Account Controls V2
8e0e8db5-b713-4e91-98e6-470fed0aa4c2 Microsoft Azure Signup Portal
f9818e52-50bd-463e-8932-a1650bd3fad2 MSAL Configuration
There are additional lists on GitHub that are compiled that would be added for additional tuning as needed
*/
$login.metadata.vendor_name = "Microsoft"
$login.security_result.action = "ALLOW"
$login.target.user.userid = $userid
//If you are using ADFS, you may want to consider something like this to filter out Synchronization Login Traffic - Your userid will be different
$login.target.user.userid != /Sync_/ nocase
match:
$userid over 5m
outcome:
$risk_score = 65
$event_count = count_distinct($login.metadata.id)
$target_application = array_distinct($login.target.resource.product_object_id)
$security_summary = array_distinct($login.security_result.summary)
$user_agent = array_distinct($login.network.http.user_agent)
$country_region_login_attempt = array_distinct($login.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region)
//added to populate alert graph with additional context
$principal_ip = array_distinct($login.principal.ip)
$target_user_userid = array_distinct($login.target.user.userid)
condition:
$login
}
YARA-L Rule Structure
Condition
Fires when at least one $login event in the 5m window.
Events
$login
metadata.product_event_type = "UserLoggedIn"target.resource.product_object_id in "%first_party_ms_cloud_apps"security_result.action = "ALLOW"target.user.userid matches "Sync_"
Match and Correlation
Outcome
Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.
| Field | Expression |
|---|---|
risk_score | 65 |
event_count | count_distinct($login.metadata.id) |
target_application | array_distinct($login.target.resource.product_object_id) |
security_summary | array_distinct($login.security_result.summary) |
user_agent | array_distinct($login.network.http.user_agent) |
country_region_login_attempt | array_distinct($login.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region) |
principal_ip | array_distinct($login.principal.ip) |
target_user_userid | array_distinct($login.target.user.userid) |
PowerShell Web Download
#Detects suspicious ways to download files or content using PowerShell
Known False Positives
- Scripts or tools that download files
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution |
References
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule Body
// Copyright 2025 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.
rule powershell_web_download {
meta:
author = "Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)"
description = "Detects suspicious ways to download files or content using PowerShell"
reference = "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_download_cradles.yml"
license = "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/Detection-Rule-License/blob/main/LICENSE.Detection.Rules.md"
rule_name = "PowerShell Web Download"
sigma_uuid = "6e897651-f157-4d8f-aaeb-df8151488385"
sigma_status = "test"
rule_id = "mr_942ed146-8046-4623-bae9-03bb4aaaf7d7"
tactic = "TA0002"
technique = "T1059.001"
type = "Detection"
data_source = "Sysmon"
platform = "Windows"
severity = "Medium"
priority = "Medium"
false_positives = "Scripts or tools that download files"
events:
$process.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
(
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), ".downloadstring(") or
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), ".downloadfile(") or
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "invoke-webrequest ") or
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "iwr ")
)
$process.principal.hostname = $hostname
match:
$hostname over 5m
outcome:
//example usage of specifying test user and hostname to adjust risk score
$risk_score = max(if($process.principal.user.userid = "user" and $process.principal.hostname = "hostname", 0, 15))
$principal_process_pid = array_distinct($process.principal.process.pid)
$principal_process_command_line = array_distinct($process.principal.process.command_line)
$principal_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.sha256)
$principal_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.full_path)
$principal_process_product_specfic_process_id = array_distinct($process.principal.process.product_specific_process_id)
$principal_process_parent_process_product_specfic_process_id = array_distinct($process.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id)
$target_process_pid = array_distinct($process.target.process.pid)
$target_process_command_line = array_distinct($process.target.process.command_line)
$target_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($process.target.process.file.sha256)
$target_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($process.target.process.file.full_path)
$target_process_product_specfic_process_id = array_distinct($process.target.process.product_specific_process_id)
$principal_user_userid = array_distinct($process.principal.user.userid)
$log_type = array_distinct(strings.concat($process.metadata.log_type,"/",$process.metadata.product_event_type))
condition:
$process
}
YARA-L Rule Structure
Condition
Fires when at least one $process event in the 5m window.
Events
$process
target.process.command_line contains ".downloadstring("target.process.command_line contains ".downloadfile("target.process.command_line contains "invoke-webrequest "target.process.command_line contains "iwr "
Match and Correlation
Outcome
Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.
| Field | Expression |
|---|---|
risk_score | max(if($process.principal.user.userid = "user" and $process.principal.hostname = "hostname", 0, 15)) |
principal_process_pid | array_distinct($process.principal.process.pid) |
principal_process_command_line | array_distinct($process.principal.process.command_line) |
principal_process_file_sha256 | array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.sha256) |
principal_process_file_full_path | array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.full_path) |
principal_process_product_specfic_process_id | array_distinct($process.principal.process.product_specific_process_id) |
principal_process_parent_process_product_specfic_process_id | array_distinct($process.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id) |
target_process_pid | array_distinct($process.target.process.pid) |
target_process_command_line | array_distinct($process.target.process.command_line) |
target_process_file_sha256 | array_distinct($process.target.process.file.sha256) |
target_process_file_full_path | array_distinct($process.target.process.file.full_path) |
target_process_product_specfic_process_id | array_distinct($process.target.process.product_specific_process_id) |
principal_user_userid | array_distinct($process.principal.user.userid) |
log_type | array_distinct(strings.concat($process.metadata.log_type,"/",$process.metadata.product_event_type)) |
Reg Add Suspicious Paths
#Detects when an adversary uses the reg.exe utility to add or modify new keys or subkeys
Known False Positives
- Rare legitimate add to registry via cli (to these locations)
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Defense Impairment |
References
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule Body
// Copyright 2025 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.
rule reg_add_suspicious_paths {
meta:
author = "frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)"
description = "Detects when an adversary uses the reg.exe utility to add or modify new keys or subkeys"
reference = "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_reg_susp_paths.yml"
license = "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/Detection-Rule-License/blob/main/LICENSE.Detection.Rules.md"
rule_name = "Reg Add Suspicious Paths"
rule_id = "mr_f9cc16b8-8177-483a-acb6-ce30cdd02181"
sigma_uuid = "b7e2a8d4-74bb-4b78-adc9-3f92af2d4829"
sigma_status = "test"
tactic = "TA0005"
technique = "T1562.001"
//technique = "T1112"
type = "Detection"
data_source = "Windows Event Logs"
platform = "Windows"
severity = "High"
priority = "High"
false_positives = "Rare legitimate add to registry via cli (to these locations)"
events:
$process.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
(
re.regex($process.target.process.file.full_path, `\\reg\.exe$`) nocase or
$process.src.process.file.full_path = "reg.exe" nocase
)
(
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "\\appdatalow\\software\\microsoft\\") or
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "\\policies\\microsoft\\windows\\oobe") or
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "\\policies\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\winlogon") or
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\winlogon") or
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "\\currentcontrolset\\control\\securityproviders\\wdigest") or
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "\\microsoft\\windows defender\\")
)
$process.principal.hostname = $hostname
match:
$hostname over 5m
outcome:
//example usage of specifying test user and hostname to adjust risk score
$risk_score = max(if($process.principal.user.userid = "user" and $process.principal.hostname = "hostname", 0, 15))
$principal_process_pid = array_distinct($process.principal.process.pid)
$principal_process_command_line = array_distinct($process.principal.process.command_line)
$principal_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.sha256)
$principal_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.full_path)
$principal_process_product_specfic_process_id = array_distinct($process.principal.process.product_specific_process_id)
$principal_process_parent_process_product_specfic_process_id = array_distinct($process.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id)
$target_process_pid = array_distinct($process.target.process.pid)
$target_process_command_line = array_distinct($process.target.process.command_line)
$target_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($process.target.process.file.sha256)
$target_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($process.target.process.file.full_path)
$target_process_product_specfic_process_id = array_distinct($process.target.process.product_specific_process_id)
$principal_user_userid = array_distinct($process.principal.user.userid)
$log_type = array_distinct(strings.concat($process.metadata.log_type,"/",$process.metadata.product_event_type))
condition:
$process
}
YARA-L Rule Structure
Condition
Fires when at least one $process event in the 5m window.
Events
$process
target.process.file.full_path matches "\\reg\.exe$"src.process.file.full_path = "reg.exe"target.process.command_line contains "\appdatalow\software\microsoft\"target.process.command_line contains "\policies\microsoft\windows\oobe"target.process.command_line contains "\policies\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\winlogon"target.process.command_line contains "\software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\winlogon"target.process.command_line contains "\currentcontrolset\control\securityproviders\wdigest"target.process.command_line contains "\microsoft\windows defender\"
Match and Correlation
Outcome
Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.
| Field | Expression |
|---|---|
risk_score | max(if($process.principal.user.userid = "user" and $process.principal.hostname = "hostname", 0, 15)) |
principal_process_pid | array_distinct($process.principal.process.pid) |
principal_process_command_line | array_distinct($process.principal.process.command_line) |
principal_process_file_sha256 | array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.sha256) |
principal_process_file_full_path | array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.full_path) |
principal_process_product_specfic_process_id | array_distinct($process.principal.process.product_specific_process_id) |
principal_process_parent_process_product_specfic_process_id | array_distinct($process.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id) |
target_process_pid | array_distinct($process.target.process.pid) |
target_process_command_line | array_distinct($process.target.process.command_line) |
target_process_file_sha256 | array_distinct($process.target.process.file.sha256) |
target_process_file_full_path | array_distinct($process.target.process.file.full_path) |
target_process_product_specfic_process_id | array_distinct($process.target.process.product_specific_process_id) |
principal_user_userid | array_distinct($process.principal.user.userid) |
log_type | array_distinct(strings.concat($process.metadata.log_type,"/",$process.metadata.product_event_type)) |