Detection rules › YARA-L

YARA-L rules: 3i

Okta User Suspicious Activity Reported

#
Severity
medium
Type
Alert
Time window
1h
Match by
userid
Author
Google Cloud Security
Source
github.com/chronicle/detection-rules

An Okta user reports suspicious activity in response to an end user security notification.

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
Initial Access
Persistence
Privilege Escalation
Stealth

References

Telemetry Coverage

Rules Detecting the Same Action

These rules filter on the same operation.

Rule Body

// Copyright 2023 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.

rule okta_user_suspicious_activity_reported {

  meta:
    author = "Google Cloud Security"
    description = "An Okta user reports suspicious activity in response to an end user security notification."
    rule_id = "mr_09eaaa93-be5e-4b7f-9d6b-8675e63291a0"
    rule_name = "Okta User Suspicious Activity Reported"
    reference = "https://help.okta.com/en-us/Content/Topics/Security/suspicious-activity-reporting.htm"
    mitre_attack_tactic = "Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access"
    mitre_attack_technique = "Valid Accounts"
    mitre_attack_url = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/"
    mitre_attack_version = "v13.1"
    type = "Alert"
    data_source = "Okta"
    severity = "Medium"
    priority = "Medium"

  events:
    $suspicious.metadata.product_name = "Okta"
    $suspicious.metadata.vendor_name = "Okta"
    $suspicious.metadata.event_type = "USER_UNCATEGORIZED"
    $suspicious.metadata.product_event_type = "user.account.report_suspicious_activity_by_enduser"
    $suspicious.security_result.summary = "User report suspicious activity"
    $suspicious.target.user.userid = $userid

  match:
    $userid over 1h

  outcome:
    $risk_score = max(
      35 +
      // Increase Risk based on suspiciousActivityEventType
      if($suspicious.security_result.detection_fields["suspiciousActivityEventType"] = "system.email.mfa_enroll_notification.sent_message", 30)
    )
    $mitre_attack_tactic = "Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access"
    $mitre_attack_technique = "Valid Accounts"
    $target_user_agent = array_distinct($suspicious.network.http.user_agent)
    $principal_ip = array_distinct($suspicious.principal.ip)
    $principal_ip_country = array_distinct($suspicious.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region)
    $principal_ip_state = array_distinct($suspicious.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.state)
    $principal_ip_city = array_distinct($suspicious.principal.location.city)
    $principal_user_email_addresses = array_distinct ($suspicious.principal.user.email_addresses)
    $security_result_summary = array_distinct($suspicious.security_result.summary)
    $target_user_email_addresses = array_distinct($suspicious.target.user.email_addresses)
    $target_user_userid = array_distinct($suspicious.target.user.userid)

  condition:
    $suspicious
}

YARA-L Rule Structure

Condition

Fires when at least one $suspicious event in the 1h window.

Events

$suspicious USER_UNCATEGORIZED

  • metadata.product_event_type = "user.account.report_suspicious_activity_by_enduser"
  • security_result.summary = "User report suspicious activity"

Match and Correlation

Match key
$userid (target.user.userid)
Within
1h

Outcome

Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.

FieldExpression
risk_scoremax( 35 + if($suspicious.security_result.detection_fields["suspiciousActivityEventType"] = "system.email.mfa_enroll_notification.sent_message", 30) )
target_user_agentarray_distinct($suspicious.network.http.user_agent)
principal_iparray_distinct($suspicious.principal.ip)
principal_ip_countryarray_distinct($suspicious.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region)
principal_ip_statearray_distinct($suspicious.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.state)
principal_ip_cityarray_distinct($suspicious.principal.location.city)
principal_user_email_addressesarray_distinct ($suspicious.principal.user.email_addresses)
security_result_summaryarray_distinct($suspicious.security_result.summary)
target_user_email_addressesarray_distinct($suspicious.target.user.email_addresses)
target_user_useridarray_distinct($suspicious.target.user.userid)

VT Relationships File Executes File

#
Severity
high
Type
alert
Time window
5m
Match by
hostname
Author
Google Cloud Security
Source
github.com/chronicle/detection-rules

Alert on known File Hash executing known File Hash with VT Relationships.

Telemetry Coverage

Rule Body

// Copyright 2023 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.

rule vt_relationships_file_executes_file {

  meta:
    author = "Google Cloud Security"
    description = "Alert on known File Hash executing known File Hash with VT Relationships."
    rule_id = "mr_9250a0b5-b671-4c63-bb78-d7fda0ac2cf4"
    rule_name = "VT Relationships File Executes File"
    type = "alert"
    tags = "vt"
    data_source = "microsoft sysmon"
    severity = "High"
    priority = "High"

  events:
    $process.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
    $process.principal.process.file.sha256 = $p_file_hash
    $process.target.process.file.sha256 = $t_file_hash
    $process.principal.hostname = $hostname

    // Uses VirusTotal integration via entity graph, this section maps to principal process file hash
    $vt.graph.metadata.entity_type = "FILE"
    $vt.graph.metadata.source_type = "GLOBAL_CONTEXT"
    $vt.graph.metadata.vendor_name = "VirusTotal"
    $vt.graph.metadata.product_name = "VirusTotal Relationships"
    $vt.graph.entity.file.sha256 = $p_file_hash

    // Uses VirusTotal integration via entity graph, this section maps the hash to a hash it executes
    $vt.graph.relations.entity_type = "FILE"
    $vt.graph.relations.relationship = "EXECUTES"
    $vt.graph.relations.entity.file.sha256 = $t_file_hash

  match:
    $hostname over 5m

  outcome:
    $risk_score = 85
    $event_count = count_distinct($process.metadata.id)
    //added to populate alert graph with additional context
    // Commented out principal.hostname because it is already represented in graph as match variable. If match changes, can uncomment to add to results
    //$principal_hostname = array_distinct($process.principal.hostname)
    $principal_process_pid = array_distinct($process.principal.process.pid)
    $principal_process_command_line = array_distinct($process.principal.process.command_line)
    $principal_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.sha256)
    $principal_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.full_path)
    $principal_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($process.principal.process.product_specific_process_id)
    $principal_process_parent_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($process.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id)
    $target_process_pid = array_distinct($process.target.process.pid)
    $target_process_command_line = array_distinct($process.target.process.command_line)
    $target_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($process.target.process.file.sha256)
    $target_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($process.target.process.file.full_path)
    $target_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($process.target.process.product_specific_process_id)
    $principal_user_userid = array_distinct($process.principal.user.userid)

  condition:
    $process and $vt
}

YARA-L Rule Structure

Condition

Fires when at least one $process event in the 5m window and $vt matches entity context.

Events

$process PROCESS_LAUNCH (1, 4688)

No field filters (binds the event for correlation only).

$vt entity context (FILE)

  • graph.metadata.entity_type = "FILE"
  • graph.metadata.source_type = "GLOBAL_CONTEXT"
  • graph.metadata.vendor_name = "VirusTotal"
  • graph.metadata.product_name = "VirusTotal Relationships"
  • graph.relations.entity_type = "FILE"
  • graph.relations.relationship = "EXECUTES"

Match and Correlation

Match key
$hostname (principal.hostname)
Within
5m

Outcome

Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.

FieldExpression
risk_score85
event_countcount_distinct($process.metadata.id)
principal_process_pidarray_distinct($process.principal.process.pid)
principal_process_command_linearray_distinct($process.principal.process.command_line)
principal_process_file_sha256array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.sha256)
principal_process_file_full_patharray_distinct($process.principal.process.file.full_path)
principal_process_product_specific_process_idarray_distinct($process.principal.process.product_specific_process_id)
principal_process_parent_process_product_specific_process_idarray_distinct($process.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id)
target_process_pidarray_distinct($process.target.process.pid)
target_process_command_linearray_distinct($process.target.process.command_line)
target_process_file_sha256array_distinct($process.target.process.file.sha256)
target_process_file_full_patharray_distinct($process.target.process.file.full_path)
target_process_product_specific_process_idarray_distinct($process.target.process.product_specific_process_id)
principal_user_useridarray_distinct($process.principal.user.userid)

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