Detection rules › YARA-L
AWS Console Login Without MFA
Detect when a user logs into AWS console without MFA.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access | T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event |
|---|---|
| AWS-signin | ConsoleLogin |
Rule body yaral
/*
* Copyright 2023 Google LLC
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
rule aws_console_login_without_mfa {
meta:
author = "Google Cloud Security"
description = "Detect when a user logs into AWS console without MFA."
rule_id = "mr_b03d1e57-7ed0-49e7-b125-6c18b364ae8c"
rule_name = "AWS Console Login Without MFA"
mitre_attack_tactic = "Initial Access"
mitre_attack_technique = "Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts"
mitre_attack_url = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/"
mitre_attack_version = "v13.1"
type = "Alert"
data_source = "AWS CloudTrail"
platform = "AWS"
severity = "Low"
priority = "Low"
events:
$login.metadata.vendor_name = "AMAZON"
$login.metadata.product_name = "AWS CloudTrail"
$login.metadata.event_type = "USER_LOGIN"
$login.metadata.product_event_type = "ConsoleLogin"
$login.security_result.action= "ALLOW"
$login.extensions.auth.auth_details = "MFAUsed: No"
$login.additional.fields["recipientAccountId"] = $account_id
match:
$account_id over 1h
outcome:
$risk_score = max(
//Baseline
35 +
if($login.principal.resource.type = "Root", 50)
)
$mitre_attack_tactic = "Initial Access"
$mitre_attack_technique = "Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts"
$mitre_attack_technique_id = "T1078.004"
$event_count = count_distinct($login.metadata.id)
$network_http_user_agent = array_distinct($login.network.http.user_agent)
$principal_ip = array_distinct($login.principal.ip)
$principal_ip_country = array_distinct($login.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region)
$principal_ip_state = array_distinct($login.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.state)
$target_user_display_name = array_distinct($login.target.user.user_display_name)
$target_user_userid = array_distinct($login.target.user.userid)
$is_mfa_used = array_distinct($login.extensions.auth.auth_details)
$target_resource_name = array_distinct($login.target.resource.name)
$target_resource_product_object_id = array_distinct($login.target.resource.product_object_id)
condition:
$login
}
Detection logic
Fires when at least one $login event in the 1h window.
Events
$login
metadata.product_event_type = "ConsoleLogin"security_result.action = "ALLOW"extensions.auth.auth_details = "MFAUsed: No"
Correlation
Outcome
Fields the detection emits on a match. $risk_score drives alerting; Chronicle surfaces the rest on the detection.
| Field | Expression |
|---|---|
risk_score | max( 35 + if($login.principal.resource.type = "Root", 50) ) |
event_count | count_distinct($login.metadata.id) |
network_http_user_agent | array_distinct($login.network.http.user_agent) |
principal_ip | array_distinct($login.principal.ip) |
principal_ip_country | array_distinct($login.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region) |
principal_ip_state | array_distinct($login.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.state) |
target_user_display_name | array_distinct($login.target.user.user_display_name) |
target_user_userid | array_distinct($login.target.user.userid) |
is_mfa_used | array_distinct($login.extensions.auth.auth_details) |
target_resource_name | array_distinct($login.target.resource.name) |
target_resource_product_object_id | array_distinct($login.target.resource.product_object_id) |