Detection rules › YARA-L

Google Workspace Multiple Files Copied From Google Drive

Severity
high
Type
Alert
Time window
1h
Match by
user_id
Author
Google Cloud Security
Source
github.com/chronicle/detection-rules

Identifies when a user copies multiple files from Google Drive, which may indicate data exfiltration.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
ExfiltrationT1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

Event coverage

Rules detecting the same action

Other rules on this platform that filter on the same API call or operation.

Rule body yaral

/*
 * Copyright 2023 Google LLC
 *
 * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
 * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
 * You may obtain a copy of the License at
 *
 *     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
 *
 * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
 * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
 * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 * limitations under the License.
 */

rule google_workspace_multiple_files_copied_from_google_drive {

  meta:
    author = "Google Cloud Security"
    description = "Identifies when a user copies multiple files from Google Drive, which may indicate data exfiltration."
    rule_id = "mr_dc187a73-9ea0-47bf-9a78-9a6f915de0f0"
    rule_name = "Google Workspace Multiple Files Copied From Google Drive"
    mitre_attack_tactic = "Exfiltration"
    mitre_attack_technique = "Exfiltration Over Web Service"
    mitre_attack_url = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/"
    mitre_attack_version = "v13.1"
    type = "Alert"
    data_source = "Workspace Activity"
    severity = "High"
    priority = "High"

  events:
    $ws.metadata.vendor_name = "Google Workspace"
    $ws.metadata.product_name = "drive"
    (
        $ws.metadata.product_event_type = "copy" or
        $ws.metadata.product_event_type = "source_copy"
    )
    $ws.principal.user.userid = $user_id

  match:
    $user_id over 1h

  outcome:
    $risk_score = max(75)
    $mitre_attack_tactic = "Exfiltration"
    $mitre_attack_technique = "Exfiltration Over Web Service"
    $mitre_attack_technique_id = "T1567"
    $event_count = count_distinct($ws.metadata.id)
    $product_event_type = array_distinct($ws.metadata.product_event_type)
    $userid = array_distinct($ws.principal.user.userid)
    $doc_type = array_distinct($ws.src.resource.attribute.labels["doc_type"])
    $owner = array_distinct($ws.target.resource.attribute.labels["owner"])
    $doc_name = array_distinct($ws.target.resource.name)
    $doc_id = array_distinct($ws.target.resource.product_object_id)
    $count_docs = count_distinct($ws.target.resource.product_object_id)

  condition:
    // Customize the value of $count_docs to set the alerting threshold for your environment
    $ws and $count_docs > 10
}

Detection logic

Fires when at least one $ws event in the 1h window and $count_docs > 10.

Events

$ws

  • metadata.product_event_type = "copy" or "source_copy"

Correlation

Match key
$user_id (principal.user.userid)
Within
1h

Outcome

Fields the detection emits on a match. $risk_score drives alerting; Chronicle surfaces the rest on the detection.

FieldExpression
risk_scoremax(75)
event_countcount_distinct($ws.metadata.id)
product_event_typearray_distinct($ws.metadata.product_event_type)
useridarray_distinct($ws.principal.user.userid)
doc_typearray_distinct($ws.src.resource.attribute.labels["doc_type"])
ownerarray_distinct($ws.target.resource.attribute.labels["owner"])
doc_namearray_distinct($ws.target.resource.name)
doc_idarray_distinct($ws.target.resource.product_object_id)
count_docscount_distinct($ws.target.resource.product_object_id)