Detection rules › YARA-L
Google Workspace Ownership Transferred On Google Drive
Identifies when a Google Workspace user transfers the ownership of a file.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Collection | T1074.002 Data Staged: Remote Data Staging |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| GoogleWorkspace-admin | CREATE_DATA_TRANSFER_REQUEST | Create Data Transfer Request |
Rules detecting the same action
Other rules on this platform that filter on the same API call or operation.
Rule body yaral
/*
* Copyright 2023 Google LLC
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
rule google_workspace_ownership_transferred_on_google_drive {
meta:
author = "Google Cloud Security"
description = "Identifies when a Google Workspace user transfers the ownership of a file."
rule_id = "mr_05cddcc9-abf6-4c4c-9518-e2218a1f5c84"
rule_name = "Google Workspace Ownership Transferred On Google Drive"
mitre_attack_tactic = "Collection"
mitre_attack_technique = "Data Staged: Remote Data Staging"
mitre_attack_url = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/002/"
mitre_attack_version = "v13.1"
type = "Alert"
data_source = "Workspace Activity"
severity = "High"
priority = "High"
events:
$ws.metadata.vendor_name = "Google Workspace"
$ws.metadata.product_name = "admin"
$ws.metadata.product_event_type = "CREATE_DATA_TRANSFER_REQUEST"
$ws.security_result.category_details = "USER_SETTINGS"
outcome:
$risk_score = max(70)
$mitre_attack_tactic = "Collection"
$mitre_attack_technique = "Data Staged: Remote Data Staging"
$mitre_attack_technique_id = "T1074.002"
$event_count = count_distinct($ws.metadata.id)
$principal_ip = array_distinct($ws.principal.ip)
$principal_country = array_distinct($ws.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region)
$principal_state = array_distinct($ws.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.state)
$principal_user_emails = array_distinct($ws.principal.user.email_addresses)
$target_user_emails = array_distinct($ws.target.user.email_addresses)
$principal_user_id = $ws.principal.user.userid
$target_application = $ws.target.application
$src_user_emails = array_distinct($ws.src.user.email_addresses)
condition:
$ws
}
Detection logic
Fires when at least one $ws event.
Events
$ws
metadata.product_event_type = "CREATE_DATA_TRANSFER_REQUEST"security_result.category_details = "USER_SETTINGS"
Outcome
Fields the detection emits on a match. $risk_score drives alerting; Chronicle surfaces the rest on the detection.
| Field | Expression |
|---|---|
risk_score | max(70) |
event_count | count_distinct($ws.metadata.id) |
principal_ip | array_distinct($ws.principal.ip) |
principal_country | array_distinct($ws.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region) |
principal_state | array_distinct($ws.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.state) |
principal_user_emails | array_distinct($ws.principal.user.email_addresses) |
target_user_emails | array_distinct($ws.target.user.email_addresses) |
principal_user_id | $ws.principal.user.userid |
target_application | $ws.target.application |
src_user_emails | array_distinct($ws.src.user.email_addresses) |