Detection rules › YARA-L

Google Workspace Suspicious Login and Google Drive File Download

Severity
high
Type
Alert
Time window
1h
Match by
principal_ip, target_userid
Author
Google Cloud Security
Source
github.com/chronicle/detection-rules

Identifies when a Google Workspace user downloads a file from Google Drive after a suspicious login event occurred.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Exfiltration

Telemetry coverage

Rules detecting the same action

These rules filter on the same operation.

Rule body

// Copyright 2023 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.

rule google_workspace_suspicious_login_and_google_drive_file_download {

  meta:
    author = "Google Cloud Security"
    description = "Identifies when a Google Workspace user downloads a file from Google Drive after a suspicious login event occurred."
    rule_id = "mr_3c55c930-d9be-4d34-a90e-baf92c22ae40"
    rule_name = "Google Workspace Suspicious Login and Google Drive File Download"
    mitre_attack_tactic = "Exfiltration"
    mitre_attack_technique = "Exfiltration Over Web Service"
    mitre_attack_url = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/"
    mitre_attack_version = "v13.1"
    type = "Alert"
    data_source = "Workspace Activity"
    severity = "High"
    priority = "High"

  events:
    // Suspicious Login Event
    $login.metadata.vendor_name = "Google Workspace"
    $login.metadata.product_name = "login"
    $login.metadata.product_event_type = "login_success"
    $login.about.labels["is_suspicious"] = "true"

    // Document Download Event
    $download.metadata.vendor_name = "Google Workspace"
    $download.metadata.product_name = "drive"
    $download.metadata.product_event_type = "download"

    // Joining login and download events using userid
    $login.target.user.userid = $download.principal.user.userid

    // Placeholders for match section
    $login.principal.ip = $principal_ip
    $login.target.user.userid = $target_userid

    // First login event occurs later a download event
    $login.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds < $download.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds

  match:
    $target_userid, $principal_ip over 1h

  outcome:

    $risk_score = max(75)
    $mitre_attack_tactic = "Exfiltration"
    $mitre_attack_technique = "Exfiltration Over Web Service"
    $mitre_attack_technique_id = "T1567"
    $event_count = count_distinct($download.metadata.id)
    $product_event_type = array_distinct($download.metadata.product_event_type)
    $userid = array_distinct($download.principal.user.userid)
    $doc_type = array_distinct($download.src.resource.attribute.labels["doc_type"])
    $owner = array_distinct($download.target.resource.attribute.labels["owner"])
    $doc_name = array_distinct($download.target.resource.name)
    $doc_id = array_distinct($download.target.resource.product_object_id)

  condition:
    $login and $download
}

YARA-L rule structure

Condition

Fires when at least one $login event in the 1h window and at least one $download event in the 1h window.

Events

$login

  • metadata.product_event_type = "login_success"
  • about.labels["is_suspicious"] = "true"

$download

  • metadata.product_event_type = "download"

Match and correlation

Joined on
$login.target.user.userid = $download.principal.user.userid
Order
$login before $download
Match key
$principal_ip (principal.ip), $target_userid (target.user.userid)
Within
1h

Outcome

Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.

FieldExpression
risk_scoremax(75)
event_countcount_distinct($download.metadata.id)
product_event_typearray_distinct($download.metadata.product_event_type)
useridarray_distinct($download.principal.user.userid)
doc_typearray_distinct($download.src.resource.attribute.labels["doc_type"])
ownerarray_distinct($download.target.resource.attribute.labels["owner"])
doc_namearray_distinct($download.target.resource.name)
doc_idarray_distinct($download.target.resource.product_object_id)