Detection rules › YARA-L
Hacktool - SharpSuccessor Execution
SharpSuccessor is a .NET-based post-exploitation tool designed to weaponize the BadSuccessor attack discovered by Yuval Gordon (@YuG0rd) from Akamai. It allows a low-privileged user with 'CreateChild' permissions over any Organizational Unit (OU) in an Active Directory domain to escalate privileges to Domain Administrator. This detection rule identifies execution patterns or behavioral indicators linked to SharpSuccessor activity, which may signal privilege escalation attempts in Active Directory environments.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation | T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation |
References
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
Rule body yaral
/*
* Copyright 2025 Google LLC
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* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
rule hacktool_sharp_successor_execution {
meta:
author = "Georg Lauenstein - suresecure GmbH, Mohamed Abdelfattah - suresecure GmbH"
description = "SharpSuccessor is a .NET-based post-exploitation tool designed to weaponize the BadSuccessor attack discovered by Yuval Gordon (@YuG0rd) from Akamai. It allows a low-privileged user with 'CreateChild' permissions over any Organizational Unit (OU) in an Active Directory domain to escalate privileges to Domain Administrator. This detection rule identifies execution patterns or behavioral indicators linked to SharpSuccessor activity, which may signal privilege escalation attempts in Active Directory environments."
rule_id = "mr_be51aa7d-b4b8-4d8c-9998-0aa3194e98c3"
rule_name = "Hacktool - SharpSuccessor Execution"
tactic = "TA0004"
technique = "T1068"
references = "https://academy.bluraven.io/blog/detecting-badsuccessor, https://github.com/logangoins/SharpSuccessor"
type = "alert"
platform = "Windows, EDR"
data_source = "Microsoft Sysmon, Windows Security Event Log, Microsoft Defender XDR"
severity = "High"
priority = "High"
events:
(
$sharp_successor_execution.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
and (
$sharp_successor_execution.src.process.file.full_path = "SharpSuccessor.exe" nocase or
$sharp_successor_execution.target.asset.software.description = "SharpSuccessor" nocase or
$sharp_successor_execution.target.process.file.full_path = /\\SharpSuccessor\.exe/ nocase or
$sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.file.full_path = /\\SharpSuccessor\.exe/ nocase or
$sharp_successor_execution.target.process.command_line = /SharpSuccessor/ nocase
)
)
or
( // Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing -- EventCode: 4673
$sharp_successor_execution.metadata.event_type = "SERVICE_UNSPECIFIED"
and (
$sharp_successor_execution.metadata.description = "A privileged service was called" and
$sharp_successor_execution.target.process.command_line = /SharpSuccessor/ nocase
)
)
// Capture the hostname where the event occurred
$sharp_successor_execution.principal.hostname = $hostname
match:
$hostname over 10m
outcome:
$risk_score = 65
$event_count = count_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.metadata.id)
$principal_process_pid = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.pid)
$principal_process_command_line = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.command_line)
$principal_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.file.sha256)
$principal_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.file.full_path)
$principal_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.product_specific_process_id)
$principal_process_parent_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id)
$target_process_pid = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.target.process.pid)
$target_process_command_line = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.target.process.command_line)
$target_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.target.process.file.sha256)
$target_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.target.process.file.full_path)
$target_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.target.process.product_specific_process_id)
$principal_user_userid = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.user.userid)
condition:
$sharp_successor_execution
}
Detection logic
Fires when at least one $sharp_successor_execution event in the 10m window.
Events
$sharp_successor_execution
src.process.file.full_path = "SharpSuccessor.exe"target.asset.software.description = "SharpSuccessor"target.process.file.full_path matches "\\SharpSuccessor\.exe"principal.process.file.full_path matches "\\SharpSuccessor\.exe"target.process.command_line matches "SharpSuccessor"metadata.description = "A privileged service was called"target.process.command_line matches "SharpSuccessor"
Correlation
Outcome
Fields the detection emits on a match. $risk_score drives alerting; Chronicle surfaces the rest on the detection.
| Field | Expression |
|---|---|
risk_score | 65 |
event_count | count_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.metadata.id) |
principal_process_pid | array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.pid) |
principal_process_command_line | array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.command_line) |
principal_process_file_sha256 | array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.file.sha256) |
principal_process_file_full_path | array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.file.full_path) |
principal_process_product_specific_process_id | array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.product_specific_process_id) |
principal_process_parent_process_product_specific_process_id | array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id) |
target_process_pid | array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.target.process.pid) |
target_process_command_line | array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.target.process.command_line) |
target_process_file_sha256 | array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.target.process.file.sha256) |
target_process_file_full_path | array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.target.process.file.full_path) |
target_process_product_specific_process_id | array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.target.process.product_specific_process_id) |
principal_user_userid | array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.user.userid) |