Detection rules › YARA-L

Hacktool - WinPEAS Execution Patterns

Type
alert
Time window
10m
Match by
hostname
Author
Georg Lauenstein - suresecure GmbH
Source
github.com/chronicle/detection-rules

This detection rule identifies the execution of WinPEAS (Windows Privilege Escalation Awesome Script), a post-exploitation reconnaissance tool used to discover privilege escalation paths on Windows systems. WinPEAS performs a wide range of local enumeration checks, including service misconfigurations, permission issues, token privileges, and more. Its usage is commonly observed during red team assessments and by adversaries seeking to elevate privileges after gaining initial access. WinPEAS checks are well-documented in the HackTricks knowledge base.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Discovery

References

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

// Copyright 2025 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.

rule hacktool_winpeas_execution_patterns {

    meta:
      author = "Georg Lauenstein - suresecure GmbH"
      description = "This detection rule identifies the execution of WinPEAS (Windows Privilege Escalation Awesome Script), a post-exploitation reconnaissance tool used to discover privilege escalation paths on Windows systems. WinPEAS performs a wide range of local enumeration checks, including service misconfigurations, permission issues, token privileges, and more. Its usage is commonly observed during red team assessments and by adversaries seeking to elevate privileges after gaining initial access. WinPEAS checks are well-documented in the HackTricks knowledge base."
      rule_id = "mr_9c9ad668-485a-4b10-b85d-36ba63546304"
      rule_name = "Hacktool - WinPEAS Execution Patterns"
      tactic = "TA0007"
      technique = "T1082"
      references = "https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng, https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022-10-14/new-prestige-ransomware-impacts-organizations-in-ukraine-and-poland/, https://www.logpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/emerging-threats-the-play-report.pdf"
      type = "alert"
      platform = "Windows, EDR"
      data_source = "Microsoft Sysmon, Windows Event Logs"
      severity = "Medium"  // Adjust based on your risk assessment
      priority = "Medium"  // Adjust based on your incident response process

    events:
      $winpeas_execution.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
      and
        (
          $winpeas_execution.src.process.file.full_path = /winPEAS.exe|winPEASany.exe|winPEASany_ofs.exe|winPEASx64.exe|winPEASx64_ofs.exe|winPEASx86.exe|winPEASx86_ofs.exe/ nocase or
          $winpeas_execution.target.process.file.full_path = /\\winPEAS\.exe|\\winPEASany\.exe|\\winPEASany_ofs\.exe|\\winPEASx64\.exe|\\winPEASx64_ofs\.exe|\\winPEASx86\.exe|\\winPEASx86_ofs\.exe/ nocase or
          $winpeas_execution.target.process.command_line = /processinfo|servicesinfo|applicationsinfo|networkinfo|windowscreds|browserinfo|filesinfo|fileanalysis|eventsinfo/ nocase

          or
            (
              $winpeas_execution.target.process.command_line = /raw\.githubusercontent\.com/ nocase and
              $winpeas_execution.target.process.command_line = /carlospolop/ nocase and
              $winpeas_execution.target.process.command_line = /winPEAS\.ps1/ nocase
            )

          or
            (
              $winpeas_execution.principal.process.command_line = / -linpeas$/ nocase or
              $winpeas_execution.target.process.command_line = / -linpeas$/ nocase
            )
        )

      not
        (
          // Exclusion: Microsoft Defender Threat Protection Sensor Updates
          $winpeas_execution.additional.fields["current_directory"] = "C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\\Downloads\\"
        )

      // Capture the hostname where the event occurred
      $winpeas_execution.principal.hostname = $hostname

    match:
      $hostname over 10m

    outcome:
      $risk_score = max(65)
      $event_count = count_distinct($winpeas_execution.metadata.id)
      $principal_process_pid = array_distinct($winpeas_execution.principal.process.pid)
      $principal_process_command_line = array_distinct($winpeas_execution.principal.process.command_line)
      $principal_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($winpeas_execution.principal.process.file.sha256)
      $principal_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($winpeas_execution.principal.process.file.full_path)
      $principal_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($winpeas_execution.principal.process.product_specific_process_id)
      $principal_process_parent_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($winpeas_execution.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id)
      $target_process_pid = array_distinct($winpeas_execution.target.process.pid)
      $target_process_command_line = array_distinct($winpeas_execution.target.process.command_line)
      $target_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($winpeas_execution.target.process.file.sha256)
      $target_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($winpeas_execution.target.process.file.full_path)
      $target_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($winpeas_execution.target.process.product_specific_process_id)
      $principal_user_userid = array_distinct($winpeas_execution.principal.user.userid)

    condition:
      $winpeas_execution
}

YARA-L rule structure

Condition

Fires when at least one $winpeas_execution event in the 10m window.

Events

$winpeas_execution PROCESS_LAUNCH (1, 4688)

  • src.process.file.full_path matches "winPEAS.exe|winPEASany.exe|winPEASany_ofs.exe|winPEASx64.exe|winPEASx64_ofs.exe|winPEASx86.exe|winPEASx86_ofs.exe"
  • target.process.file.full_path matches "\\winPEAS\.exe|\\winPEASany\.exe|\\winPEASany_ofs\.exe|\\winPEASx64\.exe|\\winPEASx64_ofs\.exe|\\winPEASx86\.exe|\\winPEASx86_ofs\.exe"
  • target.process.command_line matches "processinfo|servicesinfo|applicationsinfo|networkinfo|windowscreds|browserinfo|filesinfo|fileanalysis|eventsinfo"
  • target.process.command_line matches "raw\.githubusercontent\.com"
  • target.process.command_line matches "carlospolop"
  • target.process.command_line matches "winPEAS\.ps1"
  • principal.process.command_line matches " -linpeas$"
  • target.process.command_line matches " -linpeas$"
  • additional.fields["current_directory"] = "C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\\Downloads\\"

Match and correlation

Match key
$hostname (principal.hostname)
Within
10m

Outcome

Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.

FieldExpression
risk_scoremax(65)
event_countcount_distinct($winpeas_execution.metadata.id)
principal_process_pidarray_distinct($winpeas_execution.principal.process.pid)
principal_process_command_linearray_distinct($winpeas_execution.principal.process.command_line)
principal_process_file_sha256array_distinct($winpeas_execution.principal.process.file.sha256)
principal_process_file_full_patharray_distinct($winpeas_execution.principal.process.file.full_path)
principal_process_product_specific_process_idarray_distinct($winpeas_execution.principal.process.product_specific_process_id)
principal_process_parent_process_product_specific_process_idarray_distinct($winpeas_execution.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id)
target_process_pidarray_distinct($winpeas_execution.target.process.pid)
target_process_command_linearray_distinct($winpeas_execution.target.process.command_line)
target_process_file_sha256array_distinct($winpeas_execution.target.process.file.sha256)
target_process_file_full_patharray_distinct($winpeas_execution.target.process.file.full_path)
target_process_product_specific_process_idarray_distinct($winpeas_execution.target.process.product_specific_process_id)
principal_user_useridarray_distinct($winpeas_execution.principal.user.userid)