Detection rules › YARA-L

LSASS Process Memory Dump Creation Via Taskmgr.exe

Severity
high
Type
Detection
Time window
5m
Match by
hostname
Author
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
Source
github.com/chronicle/detection-rules

Detects the creation of an lsass.dmp file by the taskmgr process. This indicates a manual dumping of the LSASS.exe process memory using Windows Task Manager

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Credential AccessT1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory

References

Event coverage

ProviderEventTitle
SysmonEvent ID 11FileCreate

Rule body yaral

/*
 * Copyright 2025 Google LLC
 *
 * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
 * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
 * You may obtain a copy of the License at
 *
 *     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
 *
 * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
 * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
 * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 * limitations under the License.
 */

rule lsass_process_memory_dump_file_creation_taskmgr {

  meta:
    author = "Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel"
    description = "Detects the creation of an lsass.dmp file by the taskmgr process. This indicates a manual dumping of the LSASS.exe process memory using Windows Task Manager"
    reference = "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_taskmgr_lsass_dump.yml"
    license = "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/Detection-Rule-License/blob/main/LICENSE.Detection.Rules.md"
    rule_name = "LSASS Process Memory Dump Creation Via Taskmgr.exe"
    sigma_uuid = "69ca12af-119d-44ed-b50f-a47af0ebc364"
    sigma_status = "test"
    rule_id = "mr_d35a4d98-60fb-49bd-bb40-04d985c4e35b"
    tactic = "TA0006"
    technique = "T1003.001"
    type = "Detection"
    data_source = "Sysmon"
    platform = "Windows"
    severity = "High"
    priority = "High"
    false_positives = "Rare case of troubleshooting by an administrator or support that has to be investigated regardless"

  events:
    $file.metadata.event_type = "FILE_CREATION"
    re.regex($file.principal.process.file.full_path, `:\\Windows\\(system32|SysWOW64)\\taskmgr\.exe$`) nocase
    (
        strings.contains(strings.to_lower($file.target.file.full_path), "\\appdata\\local\\temp\\") and
        strings.contains(strings.to_lower($file.target.file.full_path), "\\lsass") and
        re.regex($file.target.file.full_path, `\.dmp$`) nocase
    )
    $file.principal.hostname = $hostname

  match:
    $hostname over 5m

  outcome:
    //example usage of specifying test user and hostname to adjust risk score
    $risk_score = max(if($file.principal.user.userid = "user" and $file.principal.hostname = "hostname", 0, 15))
    $principal_hostname = array_distinct($file.principal.hostname)
    $principal_process_pid = array_distinct($file.principal.process.pid)
    $principal_process_command_line = array_distinct($file.principal.process.command_line)
    $principal_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($file.principal.process.file.sha256)
    $principal_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($file.principal.process.file.full_path)
    $principal_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($file.principal.process.product_specific_process_id)
    $principal_process_parent_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($file.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id)
    $principal_user_userid = array_distinct($file.principal.user.userid)
    $target_file_sha256 = array_distinct($file.target.file.sha256)
    $target_file_full_path = array_distinct($file.target.file.full_path)

  condition:
    $file
}

Detection logic

Fires when at least one $file event in the 5m window.

Events

$file FILE_CREATION (11)

  • principal.process.file.full_path matches ":\\Windows\\(system32|SysWOW64)\\taskmgr\.exe$"
  • target.file.full_path contains "\\appdata\\local\\temp\\"
  • target.file.full_path contains "\\lsass"
  • target.file.full_path matches "\.dmp$"

Correlation

Match key
$hostname (principal.hostname)
Within
5m

Outcome

Fields the detection emits on a match. $risk_score drives alerting; Chronicle surfaces the rest on the detection.

FieldExpression
risk_scoremax(if($file.principal.user.userid = "user" and $file.principal.hostname = "hostname", 0, 15))
principal_hostnamearray_distinct($file.principal.hostname)
principal_process_pidarray_distinct($file.principal.process.pid)
principal_process_command_linearray_distinct($file.principal.process.command_line)
principal_process_file_sha256array_distinct($file.principal.process.file.sha256)
principal_process_file_full_patharray_distinct($file.principal.process.file.full_path)
principal_process_product_specific_process_idarray_distinct($file.principal.process.product_specific_process_id)
principal_process_parent_process_product_specific_process_idarray_distinct($file.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id)
principal_user_useridarray_distinct($file.principal.user.userid)
target_file_sha256array_distinct($file.target.file.sha256)
target_file_full_patharray_distinct($file.target.file.full_path)