Detection rules › YARA-L
O365 Login Activity To Azure AD PowerShell App
Logins to Azure AD PowerShell app can have legitimate purposes, but are also abused to gain access to user information. Programmatic access to Entra ID (Azure AD) should generally be through apps, so reviewing these activities is needed.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access | T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event |
|---|---|
| M365-AzureActiveDirectory | UserLoggedIn |
Rules detecting the same action
Other rules on this platform that filter on the same API call or operation.
- Azure Login Bypassing Conditional Access Policies (Sigma)
- Hunt for suspicious sign-in to Entra ID Using Extrnal Call Method (YARA-L)
- M365 Identity OAuth Flow by First-Party Microsoft App from Multiple IPs (Elastic)
- M365 Identity OAuth Flow by User Sign-in to Device Registration (Elastic)
- M365 Identity OAuth Phishing via First-Party Microsoft Application (Elastic)
- M365 Potential AiTM UserLoggedIn via Office App (Tycoon2FA) (Elastic)
- O365 AD PowerShell App Login Subsequent Activity (YARA-L)
- O365 Admin Login Activity To Uncommon Microsoft Cloud Apps (YARA-L)
Rule body yaral
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rule o365_login_activity_to_azure_ad_powershell_app {
meta:
author = "Google Cloud Security"
description = "Logins to Azure AD PowerShell app can have legitimate purposes, but are also abused to gain access to user information. Programmatic access to Entra ID (Azure AD) should generally be through apps, so reviewing these activities is needed."
rule_id = "mr_0cc56eaf-4176-444d-874d-9780bbb29d4f"
rule_name = "O365 Login Activity To Azure AD PowerShell App"
tactic = "TA0001"
technique = "T1078.004"
type = "hunt"
platform = "azure"
data_source = "o365"
severity = "Medium"
priority = "Medium"
events:
$login.metadata.event_type = "USER_LOGIN"
$login.metadata.product_event_type = "UserLoggedIn"
$login.metadata.product_name = "Office 365"
$login.metadata.vendor_name = "Microsoft"
$login.target.resource.product_object_id = "1b730954-1685-4b74-9bfd-dac224a7b894"
$login.security_result.action = "ALLOW"
// Below filters ADFS Sync Account that runs every 30 minutes between AD and Entra ID (for federated environments); can use display name or email address
//$login.target.user.userid != "insert your email address here" and
//$login.target.user.user_display_name != "On-Premises Directory Synchronization Service Account"
$login.target.user.userid = $userid
match:
$userid over 5m
outcome:
$risk_score = 65
$event_count = count_distinct($login.metadata.id)
$security_summary = array_distinct($login.security_result.summary)
$user_agent = array_distinct($login.network.http.user_agent)
$country_region_login_attempt = array_distinct($login.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region)
//added to populate alert graph with additional context
$principal_ip = array_distinct($login.principal.ip)
$target_user_userid = array_distinct($login.target.user.userid)
condition:
$login
}
Detection logic
Fires when at least one $login event in the 5m window.
Events
$login
metadata.product_event_type = "UserLoggedIn"target.resource.product_object_id = "1b730954-1685-4b74-9bfd-dac224a7b894"security_result.action = "ALLOW"
Correlation
Outcome
Fields the detection emits on a match. $risk_score drives alerting; Chronicle surfaces the rest on the detection.
| Field | Expression |
|---|---|
risk_score | 65 |
event_count | count_distinct($login.metadata.id) |
security_summary | array_distinct($login.security_result.summary) |
user_agent | array_distinct($login.network.http.user_agent) |
country_region_login_attempt | array_distinct($login.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region) |
principal_ip | array_distinct($login.principal.ip) |
target_user_userid | array_distinct($login.target.user.userid) |