Detection rules › YARA-L

Okta Suspicious Use Of A Session Cookie

Severity
medium
Type
Alert
Time window
1h
Match by
dtHash, userid
Author
Google Cloud Security
Source
github.com/chronicle/detection-rules

Detects when an adversary attempts to reuse a stolen web session cookie in a different device that has a different OS, IP, Browser or User Agent.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Credential AccessT1539 Steal Web Session Cookie

References

Event coverage

Rules detecting the same action

Other rules on this platform that filter on the same API call or operation.

Rule body yaral

/*
 * Copyright 2023 Google LLC
 *
 * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
 * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
 * You may obtain a copy of the License at
 *
 *     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
 *
 * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
 * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
 * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 * limitations under the License.
 */

rule okta_suspicious_use_of_a_session_cookie {

  meta:
    author = "Google Cloud Security"
    description = "Detects when an adversary attempts to reuse a stolen web session cookie in a different device that has a different OS, IP, Browser or User Agent."
    rule_id = "mr_913cbc7a-86c9-46a4-b822-023b4aa17106"
    rule_name = "Okta Suspicious Use Of A Session Cookie"
    reference = "https://sec.okta.com/sessioncookietheft"
    mitre_attack_tactic = "Credential Access"
    mitre_attack_technique = "Steal Web Session Cookie"
    mitre_attack_url = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539/"
    mitre_attack_version = "v13.1"
    type = "Alert"
    data_source = "Okta"
    severity = "Medium"
    priority = "Medium"

  events:
    $login.metadata.product_name = "Okta"
    $login.metadata.vendor_name = "Okta"
    $login.metadata.event_type = "USER_UNCATEGORIZED"
    $login.metadata.product_event_type = "policy.evaluate_sign_on"
    (
        $login.security_result.action = "ALLOW" or
        $login.security_result.action = "ALLOW_WITH_MODIFICATION" or
        $login.security_result.action = "CHALLENGE"
    )
    $login.principal.user.userid = $userid
    $login.security_result.detection_fields["dtHash"] = $dtHash

  match:
    $userid, $dtHash over 1h

  outcome:
    $risk_score = max(35)
    $mitre_attack_tactic = "Credential Access"
    $mitre_attack_technique = "Steal Web Session Cookie"
    $target_os = array_distinct($login.network.http.parsed_user_agent.os)
    $dc_target_os = count_distinct($login.network.http.parsed_user_agent.os)
    $target_browser = array_distinct($login.network.http.parsed_user_agent.browser)
    $dc_target_browser = count_distinct($login.network.http.parsed_user_agent.browser)
    $target_user_agent = array_distinct($login.network.http.user_agent)
    $principal_ip = array_distinct($login.principal.ip)
    $dc_principal_ip = count_distinct($login.principal.ip)
    $principal_ip_country = array_distinct($login.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region)
    $principal_ip_state = array_distinct($login.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.state)
    $principal_ip_city = array_distinct($login.principal.location.city)
    $dc_principal_ip_city = count_distinct($login.principal.location.city)
    $security_result_summary = array_distinct($login.security_result.summary)
    $principal_user_managers_email_addresses = array_distinct($login.principal.user.managers.email_addresses)
    $principal_user_userid = array_distinct($login.principal.user.userid)

  condition:
    $login and $dc_principal_ip > 1 and ($dc_target_browser > 1 or $dc_target_os > 1)
}

Detection logic

Fires when at least one $login event in the 1h window and $dc_principal_ip > 1 and $dc_target_browser > 1 or $dc_target_os > 1.

Events

$login USER_UNCATEGORIZED

  • metadata.product_event_type = "policy.evaluate_sign_on"
  • security_result.action = "ALLOW" or "ALLOW_WITH_MODIFICATION" or "CHALLENGE"

Correlation

Match key
$dtHash (security_result.detection_fields["dtHash"]), $userid (principal.user.userid)
Within
1h

Outcome

Fields the detection emits on a match. $risk_score drives alerting; Chronicle surfaces the rest on the detection.

FieldExpression
risk_scoremax(35)
target_osarray_distinct($login.network.http.parsed_user_agent.os)
dc_target_oscount_distinct($login.network.http.parsed_user_agent.os)
target_browserarray_distinct($login.network.http.parsed_user_agent.browser)
dc_target_browsercount_distinct($login.network.http.parsed_user_agent.browser)
target_user_agentarray_distinct($login.network.http.user_agent)
principal_iparray_distinct($login.principal.ip)
dc_principal_ipcount_distinct($login.principal.ip)
principal_ip_countryarray_distinct($login.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.country_or_region)
principal_ip_statearray_distinct($login.principal.ip_geo_artifact.location.state)
principal_ip_cityarray_distinct($login.principal.location.city)
dc_principal_ip_citycount_distinct($login.principal.location.city)
security_result_summaryarray_distinct($login.security_result.summary)
principal_user_managers_email_addressesarray_distinct($login.principal.user.managers.email_addresses)
principal_user_useridarray_distinct($login.principal.user.userid)