Detection rules › YARA-L
MITRE ATT&CK T1090 Port Proxy Forwarding CISA Report
Detects port forwarding being enabled using netsh command and registry settings created or modified in support of portproxy v4tov4
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Command & Control | T1090 Proxy |
References
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
| Sysmon | Event ID 12 | RegistryEvent (Object create and delete) |
| Sysmon | Event ID 13 | RegistryEvent (Value Set) |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4656 | A handle to an object was requested. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4657 | A registry value was modified. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
Rule body yaral
/*
* Copyright 2023 Google LLC
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
rule port_proxy_forwarding_T1090_cisa_report {
meta:
author = "Google Cloud Security"
description = "Detects port forwarding being enabled using netsh command and registry settings created or modified in support of portproxy v4tov4"
rule_id = "mr_4c6f2d66-ed6f-4dda-bd2f-7c545898468b"
rule_name = "MITRE ATT&CK T1090 Port Proxy Forwarding CISA Report"
type = "hunt"
platform = "Windows"
data_source = "microsoft sysmon, windows event log"
tactic = "TA0011"
technique = "T1090"
reference = "https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/24/2003229517/-1/-1/0/CSA_Living_off_the_Land.PDF"
severity = "Low"
priority = "Low"
events:
(
$process.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" and
// cisa report referenced cmd /c in their report throughout, can filter this in/out for tuning as needed
re.regex($process.target.process.command_line, `(|cmd.*/c).*netsh.*interface.*portproxy.*add.*v4tov4`) nocase
// For greater precision to align with the report, comment out the above line and uncomment the below line to incorporate exact ports referenced
//re.regex($process.target.process.command_line, `(|cmd.*/c).*netsh.*interface.*portproxy.*add.*v4tov4.*port\=(9999|50100).*port\=(8443|1433)`) nocase
)
or
(
// Looks for the actual registry creation or modification that would accompany portproxy command executing
(
$process.metadata.event_type = "REGISTRY_CREATION" or
$process.metadata.event_type = "REGISTRY_MODIFICATION"
) and
$process.target.registry.registry_key = "HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\PortProxy\\v4tov4"
)
$process.principal.hostname = $hostname
match:
$hostname over 5m
outcome:
$risk_score = 35
$event_count = count_distinct($process.metadata.id)
// added to populate alert graph with additional context
// Commented out principal.hostname because it is already represented in graph as match variable. If match changes, can uncomment to add to results
//$principal_hostname = array_distinct($process.principal.hostname)
$principal_process_pid = array_distinct($process.principal.process.pid)
$principal_process_command_line = array_distinct($process.principal.process.command_line)
$principal_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.sha256)
$principal_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.full_path)
$principal_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($process.principal.process.product_specific_process_id)
$principal_process_parent_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($process.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id)
$target_process_pid = array_distinct($process.target.process.pid)
$target_process_command_line = array_distinct($process.target.process.command_line)
$target_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($process.target.process.file.sha256)
$target_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($process.target.process.file.full_path)
$target_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($process.target.process.product_specific_process_id)
$principal_user_userid = array_distinct($process.principal.user.userid)
condition:
$process
}
Detection logic
Fires when at least one $process event in the 5m window.
Events
$process
target.process.command_line matches "(|cmd.*/c).*netsh.*interface.*portproxy.*add.*v4tov4"target.registry.registry_key = "HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\PortProxy\\v4tov4"
Correlation
Outcome
Fields the detection emits on a match. $risk_score drives alerting; Chronicle surfaces the rest on the detection.
| Field | Expression |
|---|---|
risk_score | 35 |
event_count | count_distinct($process.metadata.id) |
principal_process_pid | array_distinct($process.principal.process.pid) |
principal_process_command_line | array_distinct($process.principal.process.command_line) |
principal_process_file_sha256 | array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.sha256) |
principal_process_file_full_path | array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.full_path) |
principal_process_product_specific_process_id | array_distinct($process.principal.process.product_specific_process_id) |
principal_process_parent_process_product_specific_process_id | array_distinct($process.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id) |
target_process_pid | array_distinct($process.target.process.pid) |
target_process_command_line | array_distinct($process.target.process.command_line) |
target_process_file_sha256 | array_distinct($process.target.process.file.sha256) |
target_process_file_full_path | array_distinct($process.target.process.file.full_path) |
target_process_product_specific_process_id | array_distinct($process.target.process.product_specific_process_id) |
principal_user_userid | array_distinct($process.principal.user.userid) |