Detection rules › YARA-L
Potential Credential Dumping Via LSASS SilentProcessExit Technique
Detects changes to the Registry in which a monitor program gets registered to dump the memory of the lsass.exe process
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Credential Access | T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory |
References
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 13 | RegistryEvent (Value Set) |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4657 | A registry value was modified. |
Rule body yaral
/*
* Copyright 2025 Google LLC
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
rule potential_cred_dumping_via_lsass_silentprocessexit_technique {
meta:
author = "Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)"
description = "Detects changes to the Registry in which a monitor program gets registered to dump the memory of the lsass.exe process"
reference = "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_silentprocessexit_lsass.yml"
license = "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/Detection-Rule-License/blob/main/LICENSE.Detection.Rules.md"
rule_name = "Potential Credential Dumping Via LSASS SilentProcessExit Technique"
sigma_uuid = "55e29995-75e7-451a-bef0-6225e2f13597"
sigma_status = "test"
rule_id = "mr_bc2279f0-9b27-485d-b392-ff6f13ae68df"
tactic = "TA0006"
technique = "T1003.001"
type = "Detection"
data_source = "Sysmon"
platform = "Windows"
severity = "Critical"
priority = "Critical"
false_positives = "Unlikely"
events:
$registry.metadata.event_type = "REGISTRY_MODIFICATION"
//$registry.metadata.product_event_type = "13"
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($registry.target.registry.registry_key), "microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\silentprocessexit\\lsass.exe")
$registry.principal.hostname = $hostname
match:
$hostname over 5m
outcome:
//example usage of specifying test user and hostname to adjust risk score
$risk_score = max(if($registry.principal.user.userid = "user" and $registry.principal.hostname = "hostname", 0, 15))
$principal_hostname = array_distinct($registry.principal.hostname)
$principal_process_pid = array_distinct($registry.principal.process.pid)
$principal_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($registry.principal.process.file.full_path)
$principal_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($registry.principal.process.product_specific_process_id)
$principal_user_userid = array_distinct($registry.principal.user.userid)
$target_registry_key = array_distinct($registry.target.registry.registry_key)
$target_registry_value = array_distinct($registry.target.registry.registry_value_data)
condition:
$registry
}
Detection logic
Fires when at least one $registry event in the 5m window.
Events
$registry
target.registry.registry_key contains "microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\silentprocessexit\\lsass.exe"
Correlation
Outcome
Fields the detection emits on a match. $risk_score drives alerting; Chronicle surfaces the rest on the detection.
| Field | Expression |
|---|---|
risk_score | max(if($registry.principal.user.userid = "user" and $registry.principal.hostname = "hostname", 0, 15)) |
principal_hostname | array_distinct($registry.principal.hostname) |
principal_process_pid | array_distinct($registry.principal.process.pid) |
principal_process_file_full_path | array_distinct($registry.principal.process.file.full_path) |
principal_process_product_specific_process_id | array_distinct($registry.principal.process.product_specific_process_id) |
principal_user_userid | array_distinct($registry.principal.user.userid) |
target_registry_key | array_distinct($registry.target.registry.registry_key) |
target_registry_value | array_distinct($registry.target.registry.registry_value_data) |