Detection rules › YARA-L
Potential Remote PowerShell Session Initiated
Detects a process that initiated a network connection over ports 5985 or 5986 from a non-network service account. This could potentially indicates a remote PowerShell connection.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Lateral Movement | T1021.006 Remote Services: Windows Remote Management |
References
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 3 | Network connection |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 5156 | The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted a connection. |
Rule body yaral
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* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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rule potential_remote_powershell_session_initiated {
meta:
author = "Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g"
description = "Detects a process that initiated a network connection over ports 5985 or 5986 from a non-network service account. This could potentially indicates a remote PowerShell connection."
reference = "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_susp_remote_powershell_session.yml"
license = "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/Detection-Rule-License/blob/main/LICENSE.Detection.Rules.md"
rule_name = "Potential Remote PowerShell Session Initiated"
sigma_uuid = "c539afac-c12a-46ed-b1bd-5a5567c9f045"
sigma_status = "test"
rule_id = "mr_7186feaf-ab01-4c41-b17f-994b08b5bc33"
tactic = "TA0008"
technique = "T1021.006"
type = "Hunt"
data_source = "Sysmon"
platform = "Windows"
severity = "High"
priority = "High"
false_positives = "Legitimate usage of remote PowerShell, e.g. remote administration and monitoring. Network Service user name of a not-covered localization"
events:
$net.metadata.event_type = "NETWORK_CONNECTION"
$net.metadata.product_event_type = "3"
$net.metadata.product_name = "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
$net.metadata.vendor_name = "Microsoft"
(
$net.target.port = 5985 or
$net.target.port = 5986
)
//Parser extension added for Initiated/true field/value, not currently in Sysmon parser
//Initiated: 'true'
$net.additional.fields["Initiated"] = "true"
net.ip_in_range_cidr($net.principal.ip, "0.0.0.0/0")
NOT (
strings.contains(strings.to_upper($net.principal.user.userid), "NETWORK SERVICE") or
strings.contains(strings.to_upper($net.principal.user.userid), "NETZWERKDIENST") or
strings.contains(strings.to_upper($net.principal.user.userid), "SERVICIO DE RED") or
strings.contains(strings.to_upper($net.principal.user.userid), "SERVIZIO DI RETE")
or
(
strings.contains(strings.to_upper($net.principal.user.userid), "SERVICE R") and
strings.contains(strings.to_upper($net.principal.user.userid), "SEAU")
)
)
NOT (
$net.principal.ip = "::1" or
$net.principal.ip = "127.0.0.1" or
$net.target.ip = "::1" or
$net.target.ip = "127.0.0.1"
)
NOT (
$net.principal.process.file.full_path = "C:\\Program Files\\Avast Software\\Avast\\AvastSvc.exe" nocase or
$net.principal.process.file.full_path = "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Avast Software\\Avast\\AvastSvc.exe" nocase
)
$net.principal.hostname = $hostname
match:
$hostname over 5m
outcome:
//example usage of specifying test user and hostname to adjust risk score
$risk_score = max(if($net.principal.user.userid = "user" and $net.principal.hostname = "hostname", 0, 15))
$principal_ip = array_distinct($net.principal.ip)
$principal_port = array_distinct($net.principal.port)
$principal_process_pid = array_distinct($net.principal.process.pid)
$principal_process_command_line = array_distinct($net.principal.process.command_line)
$principal_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($net.principal.process.file.sha256)
$principal_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($net.principal.process.file.full_path)
$principal_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($net.principal.process.product_specific_process_id)
$principal_process_parent_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($net.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id)
$principal_user_userid = array_distinct($net.principal.user.userid)
$target_ip = array_distinct($net.target.ip)
$target_port = array_distinct($net.target.port)
condition:
$net
}
Detection logic
Fires when at least one $net event in the 5m window.
Events
$net
metadata.product_event_type = "3"target.port = "5985" or "5986"additional.fields["Initiated"] = "true"principal.ip cidr_match "0.0.0.0/0"principal.user.userid contains "NETWORK SERVICE"principal.user.userid contains "NETZWERKDIENST"principal.user.userid contains "SERVICIO DE RED"principal.user.userid contains "SERVIZIO DI RETE"principal.user.userid contains "SERVICE R"principal.user.userid contains "SEAU"principal.ip = "::1"principal.ip = "127.0.0.1"target.ip = "::1"target.ip = "127.0.0.1"principal.process.file.full_path = "C:\\Program Files\\Avast Software\\Avast\\AvastSvc.exe" or "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Avast Software\\Avast\\AvastSvc.exe"
Correlation
Outcome
Fields the detection emits on a match. $risk_score drives alerting; Chronicle surfaces the rest on the detection.
| Field | Expression |
|---|---|
risk_score | max(if($net.principal.user.userid = "user" and $net.principal.hostname = "hostname", 0, 15)) |
principal_ip | array_distinct($net.principal.ip) |
principal_port | array_distinct($net.principal.port) |
principal_process_pid | array_distinct($net.principal.process.pid) |
principal_process_command_line | array_distinct($net.principal.process.command_line) |
principal_process_file_sha256 | array_distinct($net.principal.process.file.sha256) |
principal_process_file_full_path | array_distinct($net.principal.process.file.full_path) |
principal_process_product_specific_process_id | array_distinct($net.principal.process.product_specific_process_id) |
principal_process_parent_process_product_specific_process_id | array_distinct($net.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id) |
principal_user_userid | array_distinct($net.principal.user.userid) |
target_ip | array_distinct($net.target.ip) |
target_port | array_distinct($net.target.port) |