Detection rules › YARA-L

RestrictedAdminMode Registry Value Tampering

Severity
high
Type
Detection
Time window
5m
Match by
hostname
Author
frack113
Source
github.com/chronicle/detection-rules

Detects changes to the "DisableRestrictedAdmin" registry value in order to disable or enable RestrictedAdmin mode.\nRestrictedAdmin mode prevents the transmission of reusable credentials to the remote system to which you connect using Remote Desktop.\nThis prevents your credentials from being harvested during the initial connection process if the remote server has been compromise

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
PersistenceT1112 Modify Registry
Defense ImpairmentT1112 Modify Registry

References

Event coverage

Rule body yaral

/*
 * Copyright 2025 Google LLC
 *
 * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
 * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
 * You may obtain a copy of the License at
 *
 *     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
 *
 * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
 * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
 * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 * limitations under the License.
 */

rule restrictedadminmode_registry_value_tampering {

  meta:
    author = "frack113"
    description = "Detects changes to the \"DisableRestrictedAdmin\" registry value in order to disable or enable RestrictedAdmin mode.\nRestrictedAdmin mode prevents the transmission of reusable credentials to the remote system to which you connect using Remote Desktop.\nThis prevents your credentials from being harvested during the initial connection process if the remote server has been compromise"
    reference = "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_lsa_disablerestrictedadmin.yml"
    license = "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/Detection-Rule-License/blob/main/LICENSE.Detection.Rules.md"
    rule_name = "RestrictedAdminMode Registry Value Tampering"
    rule_id = "mr_c996dba7-ebc0-4472-849c-d6ddebffa601"
    sigma_uuid = "d6ce7ebd-260b-4323-9768-a9631c8d4db2"
    sigma_status = "test"
    tactic = "TA0005"
    technique = "T1112"
    type = "Detection"
    data_source = "Sysmon Windows Registry"
    platform = "Windows"
    severity = "High"
    priority = "High"
    false_positives = "Unknown"

  events:
    $reg.metadata.event_type = "REGISTRY_MODIFICATION"
    re.regex($reg.target.registry.registry_key, `System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\DisableRestrictedAdmin$`) nocase

    $reg.principal.hostname = $hostname

  match:
    $hostname over 5m

  outcome:
    //example usage of specifying test user and hostname to adjust risk score
    $risk_score = max(if($reg.principal.user.userid = "user" and $reg.principal.hostname = "hostname", 0, 15))
    $principal_hostname = array_distinct($reg.principal.hostname)
    $principal_process_pid = array_distinct($reg.principal.process.pid)
    $principal_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($reg.principal.process.file.full_path)
    $principal_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($reg.principal.process.product_specific_process_id)
    $principal_user_userid = array_distinct($reg.principal.user.userid)
    $target_registry_key = array_distinct($reg.target.registry.registry_key)
    $target_registry_value_data = array_distinct($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data)
    $log_type = array_distinct(strings.concat($reg.metadata.log_type,"/",$reg.metadata.product_event_type))

  condition:
    $reg
}

Detection logic

Fires when at least one $reg event in the 5m window.

Events

$reg REGISTRY_MODIFICATION (13, 4657)

  • target.registry.registry_key matches "System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\DisableRestrictedAdmin$"

Correlation

Match key
$hostname (principal.hostname)
Within
5m

Outcome

Fields the detection emits on a match. $risk_score drives alerting; Chronicle surfaces the rest on the detection.

FieldExpression
risk_scoremax(if($reg.principal.user.userid = "user" and $reg.principal.hostname = "hostname", 0, 15))
principal_hostnamearray_distinct($reg.principal.hostname)
principal_process_pidarray_distinct($reg.principal.process.pid)
principal_process_file_full_patharray_distinct($reg.principal.process.file.full_path)
principal_process_product_specific_process_idarray_distinct($reg.principal.process.product_specific_process_id)
principal_user_useridarray_distinct($reg.principal.user.userid)
target_registry_keyarray_distinct($reg.target.registry.registry_key)
target_registry_value_dataarray_distinct($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data)
log_typearray_distinct(strings.concat($reg.metadata.log_type,"/",$reg.metadata.product_event_type))