Detection rules › YARA-L
MITRE ATT&CK T1003.003 RW Utilities Associated With Ntds.dit
Detects process launches from processes related to ntds against key servers
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Credential Access | T1003.003 OS Credential Dumping: NTDS |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
Rule body yaral
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* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
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* https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
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rule rw_utilities_associated_with_ntdsdit_T1003_003 {
meta:
author = "Google Cloud Security"
description = "Detects process launches from processes related to ntds against key servers"
rule_id = "mr_03db3339-09ba-4c9c-b3d6-1b81998a1de4"
rule_name = "MITRE ATT&CK T1003.003 RW Utilities Associated With Ntds.dit"
type = "alert"
tags = "list"
assumption = "Assumes lists for key servers and ntds suspicious processes have been created"
data_source = "microsoft sysmon, microsoft windows events"
platform = "Windows"
tactic = "TA0006"
technique = "T1003.003"
severity = "High"
priority = "High"
events:
$process.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
// ntds_suspicious_processes includes values like ntdsutil, vssadmin, diskshadow, esentutl
// Parses full_path for the file name to match list (excluding .exe)
re.capture($process.target.process.file.full_path, /.*\\(.*).exe/) in %ntds_suspicious_processes
// Replace .stackedpad.local with your domain if your key_servers list just contains hostname versus fqdn
// If using fqdn in your list, this re.replace function can be removed and a string match could be used instead
re.replace($process.principal.hostname, ".stackedpads.local", "") in %key_servers
$process.metadata.event_type = $event_type
match:
$event_type over 5m
outcome:
$risk_score = 85
$event_count = count_distinct($process.metadata.id)
// added to populate alert graph with additional context
$principal_hostname = array_distinct($process.principal.hostname)
$principal_process_pid = array_distinct($process.principal.process.pid)
$principal_process_command_line = array_distinct($process.principal.process.command_line)
$principal_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.sha256)
$principal_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.full_path)
$principal_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($process.principal.process.product_specific_process_id)
$principal_process_parent_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($process.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id)
$target_process_pid = array_distinct($process.target.process.pid)
$target_process_command_line = array_distinct($process.target.process.command_line)
$target_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($process.target.process.file.sha256)
$target_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($process.target.process.file.full_path)
$target_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($process.target.process.product_specific_process_id)
$principal_user_userid = array_distinct($process.principal.user.userid)
condition:
$process
}
Detection logic
Fires when at least one $process event in the 5m window.
Events
$process
Correlation
Outcome
Fields the detection emits on a match. $risk_score drives alerting; Chronicle surfaces the rest on the detection.
| Field | Expression |
|---|---|
risk_score | 85 |
event_count | count_distinct($process.metadata.id) |
principal_hostname | array_distinct($process.principal.hostname) |
principal_process_pid | array_distinct($process.principal.process.pid) |
principal_process_command_line | array_distinct($process.principal.process.command_line) |
principal_process_file_sha256 | array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.sha256) |
principal_process_file_full_path | array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.full_path) |
principal_process_product_specific_process_id | array_distinct($process.principal.process.product_specific_process_id) |
principal_process_parent_process_product_specific_process_id | array_distinct($process.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id) |
target_process_pid | array_distinct($process.target.process.pid) |
target_process_command_line | array_distinct($process.target.process.command_line) |
target_process_file_sha256 | array_distinct($process.target.process.file.sha256) |
target_process_file_full_path | array_distinct($process.target.process.file.full_path) |
target_process_product_specific_process_id | array_distinct($process.target.process.product_specific_process_id) |
principal_user_userid | array_distinct($process.principal.user.userid) |