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Detection rules › YARA-L

sap break glass account login

Severity
low
Time window
1h
Match by
userid
Author
Google Cloud Security
Source
github.com/chronicle/detection-rules

Alerts whenever a default SAP administrative account (e.g., SAP*, DDIC, TMSADM) logs into the system. These accounts should be locked and used only for emergency 'break-glass' scenarios

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Initial AccessT1078 Valid Accounts

Event coverage

ProviderEventTitle
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4624An account was successfully logged on.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4625An account failed to log on.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4648A logon was attempted using explicit credentials.

Rule body yaral

/*
 * Copyright 2026 Google LLC
 *
 * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
 * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
 * You may obtain a copy of the License at
 *
 *     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
 *
 * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
 * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
 * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 * limitations under the License.
 */

rule sap_break_glass_account_login {

  meta:
    author = "Google Cloud Security"
    description = "Alerts whenever a default SAP administrative account (e.g., SAP*, DDIC, TMSADM) logs into the system. These accounts should be locked and used only for emergency 'break-glass' scenarios"
    severity = "Low"
    tactic = "TA0001"
    technique = "T1078"

  events:
    $e.metadata.log_type = "SAP_SECURITY_AUDIT"
    (
        $e.additional.fields["msg_1"] = /^AU1$|^AU5$/ or
        $e.metadata.event_type = "USER_LOGIN"
    )
    $e.principal.user.userid = $userid
    $userid = /^DDIC$|^EARLYWATCH$|^SAP\*$|^TMSADM$/ nocase

  match:
    $userid over 1h

  outcome:
    $event_count = count_distinct($e.metadata.id)
    $risk_score = if($event_count < 10, 20, 40)
    $vendor_name = array_distinct($e.metadata.vendor_name)
    $product_name = array_distinct($e.metadata.product_name)
    $product_severity = array_distinct($e.security_result.severity)
    $event_description = array_distinct($e.metadata.description)
    $victim_name = array_distinct($e.target.user.userid)
    $adversary_name = array_distinct($e.principal.user.userid)
    $result_time = min($e.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds)

  condition:
    $e
}

Detection logic

Fires when at least one $e event in the 1h window.

Events

$e USER_LOGIN (4624, 4625, 4648)

  • metadata.log_type = "SAP_SECURITY_AUDIT"
  • additional.fields["msg_1"] matches "^AU1$|^AU5$"
  • principal.user.userid matches "^DDIC$|^EARLYWATCH$|^SAP\*$|^TMSADM$"

Correlation

Match key
$userid (principal.user.userid)
Within
1h

Outcome

Fields the detection emits on a match. $risk_score drives alerting; Chronicle surfaces the rest on the detection.

FieldExpression
event_countcount_distinct($e.metadata.id)
risk_scoreif($event_count < 10, 20, 40)
vendor_namearray_distinct($e.metadata.vendor_name)
product_namearray_distinct($e.metadata.product_name)
product_severityarray_distinct($e.security_result.severity)
event_descriptionarray_distinct($e.metadata.description)
victim_namearray_distinct($e.target.user.userid)
adversary_namearray_distinct($e.principal.user.userid)
result_timemin($e.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds)