Detection rules › YARA-L

sap sensitive role authorization modification

Severity
high
Time window
12h
Match by
user
Author
Google Cloud Security
Source
github.com/chronicle/detection-rules

Detects changes to authorization objects within defined sensitive roles. Correlates with login audit logs for session context.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Privilege EscalationT1098 Account Manipulation

Rule body yaral

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 * Copyright 2026 Google LLC
 *
 * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
 * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
 * You may obtain a copy of the License at
 *
 *     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
 *
 * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
 * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
 * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 * limitations under the License.
 */

rule sap_sensitive_role_authorization_modification {

  meta:
    author = "Google Cloud Security"
    description = "Detects changes to authorization objects within defined sensitive roles. Correlates with login audit logs for session context."
    severity = "High"
    tactic = "TA0004"
    technique = "T1098"

  events:
    $change.metadata.log_type = "SAP_CHANGE_DOCUMENT"
    $change.target.resource.name = "PFCG"
    $change.target.resource.attribute.labels["TABNAME"] = /1251/
    $change.target.resource.attribute.labels["CHANGE_IND"] = "U"

    $role_id = $change.target.resource.product_object_id
    $role_id in %sap_sensitive_roles.role

    //join
    $user = $change.principal.user.userid
    $user = $audit.principal.user.userid

    $audit.metadata.log_type = "SAP_SECURITY_AUDIT"
    $audit.additional.fields["msg_1"] = /^AU1$|^AU5$/

    not $user in %sap_admin_users.user

  match:
    $user over 12h

  outcome:
    $risk_score = 85
    $changed_role = array_distinct($role_id)
    $auth_objects = array_distinct($change.target.resource.attribute.labels["TABKEY"])
    $terminal_ip = array_distinct($audit.principal.ip)
    $terminal_host = array_distinct($audit.principal.hostname)
    $transaction = array_distinct($change.target.application)

    $time_diff_minutes = max(timestamp.get_minute($change.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds) - timestamp.get_minute($audit.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds))

  condition:
    $change and $audit
}

Detection logic

Fires when at least one $change event in the 12h window and at least one $audit event in the 12h window.

Events

$audit

  • metadata.log_type = "SAP_SECURITY_AUDIT"
  • additional.fields["msg_1"] matches "^AU1$|^AU5$"

$change

  • metadata.log_type = "SAP_CHANGE_DOCUMENT"
  • target.resource.name = "PFCG"
  • target.resource.attribute.labels["TABNAME"] matches "1251"
  • target.resource.attribute.labels["CHANGE_IND"] = "U"
  • target.resource.product_object_id in "%sap_sensitive_roles.role"
  • principal.user.userid in "%sap_admin_users.user"

Correlation

Match key
$user
Within
12h

Outcome

Fields the detection emits on a match. $risk_score drives alerting; Chronicle surfaces the rest on the detection.

FieldExpression
risk_score85
changed_rolearray_distinct($role_id)
auth_objectsarray_distinct($change.target.resource.attribute.labels["TABKEY"])
terminal_iparray_distinct($audit.principal.ip)
terminal_hostarray_distinct($audit.principal.hostname)
transactionarray_distinct($change.target.application)
time_diff_minutesmax(timestamp.get_minute($change.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds) - timestamp.get_minute($audit.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds))