Detection rules › YARA-L

SharePoint CVE-2025-49706 Exploitation

Severity
high
Time window
5m
Match by
prnc_ip, trgt_ip
Author
Google Cloud Security
Source
github.com/chronicle/detection-rules

This rule detects attempts to exploit CVE-2025-49706 in SharePoint by observing POST requests to a vulnerable aspx path, which could result in code execution or server compromise.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Lateral MovementT1210 Exploitation of Remote Services

References

Rule body yaral

/*
 * Copyright 2025 Google LLC
 *
 * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
 * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
 * You may obtain a copy of the License at
 *
 *     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
 *
 * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
 * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
 * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 * limitations under the License.
 */

rule ttp_sharepoint_cve_2025_49706_exploitation {

  meta:
    author = "Google Cloud Security"
    rule_name = "SharePoint CVE-2025-49706 Exploitation"
    description = "This rule detects attempts to exploit CVE-2025-49706 in SharePoint by observing POST requests to a vulnerable aspx path, which could result in code execution or server compromise."
    severity = "High"
    tactic = "TA0002"
    technique = "T1210"
    false_positives = "Legitimate administrative actions to the specified URL should be rare. Some penetration testing activity could trigger this rule. In some cases, specific third party applications could generate similar requests, but this should be rare."
    reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-49706, https://research.eye.security/sharepoint-under-siege/"
    rule_id = "mr_661defd1-34e0-47ef-8073-a761244714e3"

 events:
    $e.network.http.method = "POST"
    $e.target.url = /_layouts\/1(5|6)\/ToolPane\.aspx/ nocase
    $e.target.url = /DisplayMode=Edit/ nocase
    $e.target.url = /a=\/ToolPane\.aspx/ nocase
    $e.network.http.referral_url = /^\S*\/_layouts\/1(5|6)\/signout\.aspx(\?.*)?$/ nocase
    $e.network.application_protocol = "HTTP" // Prefilter for HTTP protocol

    $prnc_ip = $e.principal.ip
    $trgt_ip = $e.target.ip

 match:
    $prnc_ip, $trgt_ip over 5m

 outcome:
    $risk_score = max(90)
    $vendor_name = array_distinct($e.metadata.vendor_name)
    $product_name = array_distinct($e.metadata.product_name)
    $result = "attempted"
    $result_time = max($e.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds)
    $target_url = array_distinct($e.target.url)
    $user_agent = array_distinct($e.network.http.user_agent)
    $referrer = array_distinct($e.network.http.referral_url)
    $principal_ip = array($prnc_ip)
    $target_ip = array($trgt_ip)
    $event_count = count($e.metadata.id)
    $target_application = array_distinct($e.target.application)

 condition:
    $e
}

Detection logic

Fires when at least one $e event in the 5m window.

Events

$e

  • network.http.method = "POST"
  • target.url matches "_layouts\/1(5|6)\/ToolPane\.aspx"
  • target.url matches "DisplayMode=Edit"
  • target.url matches "a=\/ToolPane\.aspx"
  • network.http.referral_url matches "^\S*\/_layouts\/1(5|6)\/signout\.aspx(\?.*)?$"
  • network.application_protocol = "HTTP"

Correlation

Match key
$prnc_ip, $trgt_ip
Within
5m

Outcome

Fields the detection emits on a match. $risk_score drives alerting; Chronicle surfaces the rest on the detection.

FieldExpression
risk_scoremax(90)
vendor_namearray_distinct($e.metadata.vendor_name)
product_namearray_distinct($e.metadata.product_name)
result_timemax($e.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds)
target_urlarray_distinct($e.target.url)
user_agentarray_distinct($e.network.http.user_agent)
referrerarray_distinct($e.network.http.referral_url)
principal_iparray($prnc_ip)
target_iparray($trgt_ip)
event_countcount($e.metadata.id)
target_applicationarray_distinct($e.target.application)