Detection rules › YARA-L
Attempted SharePoint Webshell Creation CVE-2025-53770
Detects the attempted creation of a file containing 'spinstall0' in specific SharePoint LAYOUTS directories. This activity is a strong indicator of an attempt to exploit the SharePoint Server vulnerability CVE-2025-53770.
Known false positives
- Extremely Low, as the filename and location are highly specific to this exploit.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence |
References
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 11: FileCreate |
Rule body
// Copyright 2025 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.
rule ttp_windows_sharepoint_cve_2025_53770_webshell_attempted {
meta:
author = "Google Cloud Security"
rule_name = "Attempted SharePoint Webshell Creation CVE-2025-53770"
description = "Detects the attempted creation of a file containing 'spinstall0' in specific SharePoint LAYOUTS directories. This activity is a strong indicator of an attempt to exploit the SharePoint Server vulnerability CVE-2025-53770."
severity = "High"
tactic = "TA0003"
technique = "T1505.003"
false_positives = "Extremely Low, as the filename and location are highly specific to this exploit."
reference = "https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2025/07/customer-guidance-for-sharepoint-vulnerability-cve-2025-53770/"
rule_id = "mr_c174ff49-5dd5-42c5-b41b-8b11b42c0a64"
events:
// Event must be a file creation on a Windows system
(
$e.metadata.event_type = "FILE_CREATION" or
$e.metadata.event_type = "STATUS_UPDATE"
)
// The file path must be within the SharePoint 15 or 16 hive's LAYOUTS directory.
$e.target.file.full_path = /[\x2F\x5C]+(?:Program\ Files|Progra~[1-9])[\x2F\x5C]+(?:Common\ Files|Common~[1-9])[\x2F\x5C]+(?:Microsoft\ Shared|Micros~[1-9])[\x2F\x5C]+(?:Web\ Server\ Extensions|WebSer~[1-9])[\x2F\x5C]+16[\x2F\x5C]+TEMPLATE[\x2F\x5C]+LAYOUTS[\x2F\x5C]+spinstall0\.aspx/ nocase
// Capture hostname for match
$hostname = strings.coalesce($e.principal.asset_id, $e.principal.asset.asset_id, $e.principal.hostname)
match:
$hostname over 5m
outcome:
$risk_score = max(85)
$vendor_name = array_distinct($e.metadata.vendor_name)
$product_name = array_distinct($e.metadata.product_name)
$event_count = count_distinct($e.metadata.id)
$victim_name = array_distinct($hostname)
$victim_asset_id = array_distinct($e.principal.asset.asset_id)
$victim_ip = array_distinct($e.principal.asset.ip)
$result = "attempted"
$result_time = min($e.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds)
$file_paths = array_distinct($e.target.file.full_path)
condition:
$e
}
YARA-L rule structure
Condition
Fires when at least one $e event in the 5m window.
Events
$e
target.file.full_path matches "[\x2F\x5C]+(?:Program\ Files|Progra~[1-9])[\x2F\x5C]+(?:Common\ Files|Common~[1-9])[\x2F\x5C]+(?:Microsoft\ Shared|Micros~[1-9])[\x2F\x5C]+(?:Web\ Server\ Extensions|WebSer~[1-9])[\x2F\x5C]+16[\x2F\x5C]+TEMPLATE[\x2F\x5C]+LAYOUTS[\x2F\x5C]+spinstall0\.aspx"
Match and correlation
Outcome
Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.
| Field | Expression |
|---|---|
risk_score | max(85) |
vendor_name | array_distinct($e.metadata.vendor_name) |
product_name | array_distinct($e.metadata.product_name) |
event_count | count_distinct($e.metadata.id) |
victim_name | array_distinct($hostname) |
victim_asset_id | array_distinct($e.principal.asset.asset_id) |
victim_ip | array_distinct($e.principal.asset.ip) |
result_time | min($e.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds) |
file_paths | array_distinct($e.target.file.full_path) |