Detection rules › YARA-L

Successful SharePoint Webshell Creation CVE-2025-53770

Severity
critical
Time window
5m
Match by
hostname
Author
Google Cloud Security
Source
github.com/chronicle/detection-rules

Detects the creation of a file containing 'spinstall0' in specific SharePoint LAYOUTS directories. This activity is a strong indicator of successful post-exploitation of the SharePoint Server vulnerability CVE-2025-53770, where an attacker has likely placed a web shell for persistent access.

Known false positives

  • Extremely Low, as the filename and location are highly specific to this exploit.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Telemetry coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 11: FileCreate

Rule body

// Copyright 2025 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.

rule ttp_windows_sharepoint_cve_2025_53770_webshell_succeeded {

   meta:
      author = "Google Cloud Security"
      rule_name = "Successful SharePoint Webshell Creation CVE-2025-53770"
      description = "Detects the creation of a file containing 'spinstall0' in specific SharePoint LAYOUTS directories. This activity is a strong indicator of successful post-exploitation of the SharePoint Server vulnerability CVE-2025-53770, where an attacker has likely placed a web shell for persistent access."
      severity = "Critical"
      tactic = "TA0003"
      technique = "T1505.003"
      false_positives = "Extremely Low, as the filename and location are highly specific to this exploit."
      reference = "https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2025/07/customer-guidance-for-sharepoint-vulnerability-cve-2025-53770/"
      rule_id = "mr_91fc647d-5d75-4e06-97a1-8326c9be4488"

   events:
      // Event must be a file creation on a Windows system
      (
         $e.metadata.event_type = "FILE_CREATION" or
         $e.metadata.event_type = "STATUS_UPDATE"
      )
      // The file path must be within the SharePoint 15 or 16 hive's LAYOUTS directory.
      $e.target.file.full_path = /[\x2F\x5C]+(?:Program\ Files|Progra~[1-9])[\x2F\x5C]+(?:Common\ Files|Common~[1-9])[\x2F\x5C]+(?:Microsoft\ Shared|Micros~[1-9])[\x2F\x5C]+(?:Web\ Server\ Extensions|WebSer~[1-9])[\x2F\x5C]+(15|16)[\x2F\x5C]+TEMPLATE[\x2F\x5C]+LAYOUTS[\x2F\x5C]+spinstall0\.aspx/ nocase
      $e.security_result.action = "ALLOW"
      // Capture hostname for match
      $hostname = strings.coalesce($e.principal.asset_id, $e.principal.asset.asset_id, $e.principal.hostname)

   match:
      $hostname over 5m

   outcome:
      $risk_score = max(95)
      $vendor_name = array_distinct($e.metadata.vendor_name)
      $product_name = array_distinct($e.metadata.product_name)
      $event_count = count_distinct($e.metadata.id)
      $victim_name = array_distinct($hostname)
      $victim_asset_id = array_distinct($e.principal.asset.asset_id)
      $victim_ip = array_distinct($e.principal.asset.ip)
      $result = "succeeded"
      $result_time = min($e.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds)
      $file_paths = array_distinct($e.target.file.full_path)

   condition:
      $e
}

YARA-L rule structure

Condition

Fires when at least one $e event in the 5m window.

Events

$e FILE_CREATION (11)

  • target.file.full_path matches "[\x2F\x5C]+(?:Program\ Files|Progra~[1-9])[\x2F\x5C]+(?:Common\ Files|Common~[1-9])[\x2F\x5C]+(?:Microsoft\ Shared|Micros~[1-9])[\x2F\x5C]+(?:Web\ Server\ Extensions|WebSer~[1-9])[\x2F\x5C]+(15|16)[\x2F\x5C]+TEMPLATE[\x2F\x5C]+LAYOUTS[\x2F\x5C]+spinstall0\.aspx"
  • security_result.action = "ALLOW"

Match and correlation

Match key
$hostname
Within
5m

Outcome

Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.

FieldExpression
risk_scoremax(95)
vendor_namearray_distinct($e.metadata.vendor_name)
product_namearray_distinct($e.metadata.product_name)
event_countcount_distinct($e.metadata.id)
victim_namearray_distinct($hostname)
victim_asset_idarray_distinct($e.principal.asset.asset_id)
victim_iparray_distinct($e.principal.asset.ip)
result_timemin($e.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds)
file_pathsarray_distinct($e.target.file.full_path)