Detection rules › YARA-L

W3WP Launching Encoded Powershell

Severity
medium
Author
Google Cloud Security
Source
github.com/chronicle/detection-rules

Detects on the execution of an encoded powershell command with a parent process of w3wp.exe.

Known false positives

  • Legitimate administrative actions to the specified URL should be rare. Some penetration testing activity could trigger this rule. In some cases, specific third party applications could generate similar requests, but this should be rare.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

// Copyright 2025 Google LLC. Licensed under Apache-2.0.

rule ttp_windows_w3wp_launching_encoded_powershell {

  meta:
    author = "Google Cloud Security"
    rule_name = "W3WP Launching Encoded Powershell"
    description = "Detects on the execution of an encoded powershell command with a parent process of w3wp.exe."
    severity = "Medium"
    tactic = "TA0002"
    technique = "T1059.001"
    false_positives = "Legitimate administrative actions to the specified URL should be rare. Some penetration testing activity could trigger this rule. In some cases, specific third party applications could generate similar requests, but this should be rare."
    reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-49706, https://research.eye.security/sharepoint-under-siege/"
    rule_id = "mr_83daf64e-25e8-4b6b-8596-3adcc694e781"

  events:
    $e.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
    re.regex($e.principal.process.file.full_path, `(^|\\)w3wp\.exe$`) nocase
    not re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `\\Scripts\\CheckDiskSpace\.ps1'`) nocase
    not re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `DQAKACQARQByAHIAbwByAEEAYwB0AGkAbwBuAFAAcgBlAGYAZQByAGUAbgBjAGUAIAA9ACAAJwBTAHQAbwBwACcADQAKAFsAdgBlAHIAcwBpAG8AbgBdACQAbQBpAG4AaQBtAHUAbQBWAGUAcgBzAGkAbwBuACAAPQAgACcAMgAuADIALgAwACcADQAKAA0ACgAkAG0AIAA9ACAASQBtAHAAbwByAHQALQBNAG8AZAB1AGwAZQAgAEEAegAuAEEAYwBjAG8AdQBuAHQAcwAg`) nocase
    not re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `EncodedCommand JABQAG8AaQBuAHQAZQBlAFIAZQBzAG8AdQByAGMAZQBOAGEAbQBlACAAPQAgACcAVgBEAFAAUgB`) nocase
    (
      (
        re.regex($e.target.process.file.full_path, `(^|\\)(pwsh|powershell)\.exe$`) nocase and
        re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `\s-(e|en|enc|enco|encodedcommand)\s`) nocase
      ) or
      re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(pwsh|powershell).*\s-(e|en|enc|enco|encodedcommand)\s`) nocase
    )

  outcome:
    $principal_hostname = $e.principal.hostname
    $risk_score = 65
    $vendor_name = array($e.metadata.vendor_name)
    $product_name = $e.metadata.product_name
    $victim_uid = $e.principal.asset.asset_id
    $victim_name = $e.principal.asset.hostname
    $victim_netid = array($e.principal.ip)
    $adversary_uid = $e.principal.user.userid
    $adversary_name = $e.principal.user.user_display_name
    $adversary_netid = $e.principal.user.windows_sid
    $tmp1 = max(
        if($e.security_result.action != "BLOCK" and $e.security_result.action != "UNKNOWN_ACTION", 2)
    )
    $tmp2 = max(
        if($e.security_result.action = "BLOCK", 1)
    )
    $result = arrays.index_to_str(strings.split("attempted,failed,succeeded,succeeded"), $tmp1 + $tmp2)
    $result_time = $e.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds
    $event_count = 1

  condition:
    $e
}

YARA-L rule structure

Condition

Fires when at least one $e event.

Events

$e PROCESS_LAUNCH (1, 4688)

  • principal.process.file.full_path matches "(^|\\)w3wp\.exe$"
  • target.process.command_line matches "\\Scripts\\CheckDiskSpace\.ps1'"
  • target.process.command_line matches "DQAKACQARQByAHIAbwByAEEAYwB0AGkAbwBuAFAAcgBlAGYAZQByAGUAbgBjAGUAIAA9ACAAJwBTAHQAbwBwACcADQAKAFsAdgBlAHIAcwBpAG8AbgBdACQAbQBpAG4AaQBtAHUAbQBWAGUAcgBzAGkAbwBuACAAPQAgACcAMgAuADIALgAwACcADQAKAA0ACgAkAG0AIAA9ACAASQBtAHAAbwByAHQALQBNAG8AZAB1AGwAZQAgAEEAegAuAEEAYwBjAG8AdQBuAHQAcwAg"
  • target.process.command_line matches "EncodedCommand JABQAG8AaQBuAHQAZQBlAFIAZQBzAG8AdQByAGMAZQBOAGEAbQBlACAAPQAgACcAVgBEAFAAUgB"
  • target.process.file.full_path matches "(^|\\)(pwsh|powershell)\.exe$"
  • target.process.command_line matches "\s-(e|en|enc|enco|encodedcommand)\s"
  • target.process.command_line matches "(pwsh|powershell).*\s-(e|en|enc|enco|encodedcommand)\s"

Outcome

Outcome variables add context to a detection. When the rule generates an alert, $risk_score is displayed with it.

FieldExpression
principal_hostname$e.principal.hostname
risk_score65
vendor_namearray($e.metadata.vendor_name)
product_name$e.metadata.product_name
victim_uid$e.principal.asset.asset_id
victim_name$e.principal.asset.hostname
victim_netidarray($e.principal.ip)
adversary_uid$e.principal.user.userid
adversary_name$e.principal.user.user_display_name
adversary_netid$e.principal.user.windows_sid
tmp1max( if($e.security_result.action != "BLOCK" and $e.security_result.action != "UNKNOWN_ACTION", 2) )
tmp2max( if($e.security_result.action = "BLOCK", 1) )
resultarrays.index_to_str(strings.split("attempted,failed,succeeded,succeeded"), $tmp1 + $tmp2)
result_time$e.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds
event_count1