Detection rules › YARA-L
MITRE ATT&CK T1110.001 Windows Repeated Authentication Failures Before Successful One With User Entity
Detect Multiple Failed Login Attempts followed by Successful Login
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Credential Access | T1110.001 Brute Force: Password Guessing |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4624 | An account was successfully logged on. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4625 | An account failed to log on. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4648 | A logon was attempted using explicit credentials. |
Rule body yaral
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* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
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* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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rule win_repeatedAuthFailure_thenSuccess_T1110_001_user_asset_entity {
meta:
author = "Google Cloud Security"
description = "Detect Multiple Failed Login Attempts followed by Successful Login"
rule_id = "mr_2a9dc1d2-d4b8-4b80-a494-3369c681da60"
rule_name = "MITRE ATT&CK T1110.001 Windows Repeated Authentication Failures Before Successful One With User Entity"
type = "alert"
tags = "user entity, asset entity"
assumption = "Assumes ingestion of Windows users and assets to entity graph to entity graph"
data_source = "microsoft windows events"
platform = "Windows"
severity = "Medium"
priority = "Medium"
tactic = "TA0006"
technique = "T1110.001"
events:
$fail.metadata.event_type = "USER_LOGIN"
$fail.metadata.vendor_name = "Microsoft"
$fail.principal.hostname = $hostname
$fail.target.user.userid = $target_user
$fail.security_result.action = "BLOCK"
$fail.metadata.product_event_type = "4625"
$fail.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds < $success.metadata.event_timestamp.seconds
$success.metadata.event_type = "USER_LOGIN"
$success.metadata.vendor_name = "Microsoft"
$success.target.user.userid = $target_user
$success.principal.hostname = $hostname
$success.security_result.action = "ALLOW"
$success.metadata.product_event_type = "4624"
// Correlate with user entity data
$user.graph.entity.user.userid = $target_user
$user.graph.metadata.entity_type = "USER"
$user.graph.metadata.source_type = "ENTITY_CONTEXT"
// Can modify the following line to focus the rule on different user groups
any $user.graph.relations.entity.group.group_display_name = "Domain Admins"
// Correlate with asset entity data
$asset.graph.entity.asset.hostname = $hostname
$asset.graph.metadata.entity_type = "ASSET"
$asset.graph.metadata.source_type = "ENTITY_CONTEXT"
// Can modify the following line to focus the rule on different computer groups
any $asset.graph.relations.entity.group.group_display_name = "Domain Controllers"
match:
$target_user, $hostname over 15m
outcome:
//increment risk score if the system targeted is active directory server, can modify as you see fit, using this as an example
$risk_score = max(if($hostname = /activedir/, 75, 50))
$failed_login_threshold = 5
$impacted_systems = array_distinct($hostname)
$impacted_users = array_distinct($target_user)
$alert_type = "Successful Brute Force Attack"
$tlp = "red"
// added to populate alert graph with additional context
// Commented out principal.hostname because it is already represented in graph as match variable. If match changes, can uncomment to add to results
//$principal_hostname = array_distinct($success.principal.hostname)
$principal_ip = array_distinct($success.principal.ip)
$target_hostname = array_distinct($success.target.hostname)
$src_hostname = array_distinct($success.src.hostname)
$target_ip = array_distinct($success.target.ip)
$principal_user_userid = array_distinct($success.principal.user.userid)
// Commented out target.user.userid because it is already represented in graph as match variable. If match changes, can uncomment to add to results
//$target_user_userid = array_distinct($success.target.user.userid)
$principal_resource_name = array_distinct($success.principal.resource.name)
$target_resource_name = array_distinct($success.target.resource.name)
$target_url = array_distinct($success.target.url)
condition:
#fail > 4 and $success and $user and $asset
}
Detection logic
Fires when $fail occurs more than 4 times in the 15m window and at least one $success event in the 15m window and $user matches entity context and $asset matches entity context.
Events
$asset
graph.metadata.entity_type = "ASSET"graph.metadata.source_type = "ENTITY_CONTEXT"graph.relations.entity.group.group_display_name = "Domain Controllers"
$fail
security_result.action = "BLOCK"metadata.product_event_type = "4625"
$success
security_result.action = "ALLOW"metadata.product_event_type = "4624"
$user
graph.metadata.entity_type = "USER"graph.metadata.source_type = "ENTITY_CONTEXT"graph.relations.entity.group.group_display_name = "Domain Admins"
Correlation
Outcome
Fields the detection emits on a match. $risk_score drives alerting; Chronicle surfaces the rest on the detection.
| Field | Expression |
|---|---|
risk_score | max(if($hostname = /activedir/, 75, 50)) |
failed_login_threshold | 5 |
impacted_systems | array_distinct($hostname) |
impacted_users | array_distinct($target_user) |
principal_ip | array_distinct($success.principal.ip) |
target_hostname | array_distinct($success.target.hostname) |
src_hostname | array_distinct($success.src.hostname) |
target_ip | array_distinct($success.target.ip) |
principal_user_userid | array_distinct($success.principal.user.userid) |
principal_resource_name | array_distinct($success.principal.resource.name) |
target_resource_name | array_distinct($success.target.resource.name) |
target_url | array_distinct($success.target.url) |