Detection rules › Elastic
Potential Data Collection in Temporary Directory by Hidden Executable
Detects when a hidden executable creates and then immediately deletes a temporary file within a temporary directory like /tmp. We have observed threat actors doing this for data collection, exfiltration and prompt deletion.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Collection |
Telemetry coverage
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Detects when a hidden executable creates and then immediately deletes a temporary file within a temporary directory like
/tmp. We have observed threat actors doing this for data collection, exfiltration and prompt deletion.
"""
id = "a6994646-d314-4ee0-be1f-1d694dc969e7"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Potential Data Collection in Temporary Directory by Hidden Executable"
os_list = ["macos"]
version = "1.0.8"
query = '''
sequence by process.entity_id, file.path with maxspan=30s
[file where event.action == "modification" and process.name like~ ".*" and
file.path like ("/private/tmp/*", "/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*") and
not process.executable like "/nix/store/*" and
not Effective_process.executable == "/Applications/Visual Studio Code - Insiders.app/Contents/MacOS/Code - Insiders"]
[file where event.action == "deletion" and process.name like~ ".*" and
file.path like ("/private/tmp/*", "/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*") and
not process.executable like "/nix/store/*" and
not Effective_process.executable == "/Applications/Visual Studio Code - Insiders.app/Contents/MacOS/Code - Insiders"]
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.11.1"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "Effective_process.executable"
state = 0
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1560"
name = "Archive Collected Data"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1560.003"
name = "Archive via Custom Method"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/003/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0009"
name = "Collection"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.11.1"
Stages and Predicates
Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 30s, correlated by file.path, process.entity_id.
Stage 1: file
[file where event.action == "modification" and process.name like~ ".*" and
file.path like ("/private/tmp/*", "/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*") and
not process.executable like "/nix/store/*" and
not Effective_process.executable == "/Applications/Visual Studio Code - Insiders.app/Contents/MacOS/Code - Insiders"]
Stage 2: file
[file where event.action == "deletion" and process.name like~ ".*" and
file.path like ("/private/tmp/*", "/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*") and
not process.executable like "/nix/store/*" and
not Effective_process.executable == "/Applications/Visual Studio Code - Insiders.app/Contents/MacOS/Code - Insiders"]
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Effective_process.executable | eq | /Applications/Visual Studio Code - Insiders.app/Contents/MacOS/Code - Insiders | excludes:Effective_process.executable field:"Effective_process.executable" value:"/Applications/Visual Studio Code - Insiders.app/Contents/MacOS/Code - Insiders" |
process.executable | starts_with | /nix/store/ | excludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"/nix/store/" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq |
file.path | wildcard |
| field:"TargetFilename" kind:wildcard |
process.name | wildcard |
| field:"process_name" kind:wildcard value:".*" |