Detection rules › Elastic
Suspicious Curl File Download from Raw IP
Detects when Curl makes an outbound network connection to a raw IP address in order to download a script (shell, apple, or python) or unsigned/untrusted binary. Many different types of malware use this in order to download additional payloads to a victim system.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Command & Control |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| macOS | ESF event write (NOTIFY): Fires after a process writes data to a file. |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Detects when Curl makes an outbound network connection to a raw IP address in order to download a script (shell, apple,
or python) or unsigned/untrusted binary. Many different types of malware use this in order to download additional
payloads to a victim system.
"""
id = "19606783-671d-46cb-8a19-b96f96bf596a"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Curl File Download from Raw IP"
os_list = ["macos"]
version = "1.0.5"
query = '''
sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=1m
[network where event.type == "start" and process.name in ("curl", "nscurl") and destination.domain == null and
not cidrmatch(destination.ip,
"240.0.0.0/4", "233.252.0.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "198.19.0.0/16", "192.18.0.0/15",
"192.0.0.0/24", "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12",
"192.0.2.0/24", "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24",
"100.64.0.0/10", "192.175.48.0/24", "198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24",
"::1", "FE80::/10", "FF00::/8")]
[file where event.action == "modification" and file.extension in ("sh", "py", "scpt") and
not Effective_process.executable like "/Library/Application Support/JAMF/Jamf.app/Contents/MacOS/JamfDaemon.app/Contents/MacOS/JamfDaemon"]
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.16.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "Effective_process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1105"
name = "Ingress Tool Transfer"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0011"
name = "Command and Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.16.0"
Stages and Predicates
Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 1m, correlated by process.entity_id.
Stage 1: network
[network where event.type == "start" and process.name in ("curl", "nscurl") and destination.domain == null and
not cidrmatch(destination.ip,
"240.0.0.0/4", "233.252.0.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "198.19.0.0/16", "192.18.0.0/15",
"192.0.0.0/24", "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12",
"192.0.2.0/24", "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24",
"100.64.0.0/10", "192.175.48.0/24", "198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24",
"::1", "FE80::/10", "FF00::/8")]
Stage 2: file
[file where event.action == "modification" and file.extension in ("sh", "py", "scpt") and
not Effective_process.executable like "/Library/Application Support/JAMF/Jamf.app/Contents/MacOS/JamfDaemon.app/Contents/MacOS/JamfDaemon"]
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
destination.ip | cidr_match | 240.0.0.0/4, 233.252.0.0/24, 224.0.0.0/4, 198.19.0.0/16, 192.18.0.0/15, 192.0.0.0/24, 10.0.0.0/8, 127.0.0.0/8, 169.254.0.0/16, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.0.2.0/24, 192.31.196.0/24, 192.52.193.0/24, 192.168.0.0/16, 192.88.99.0/24, 100.64.0.0/10, 192.175.48.0/24, 198.18.0.0/15, 198.51.100.0/24, 203.0.113.0/24, ::1, FE80::/10, FF00::/8 | excludes:destination.ip |
Effective_process.executable | eq | /Library/Application Support/JAMF/Jamf.app/Contents/MacOS/JamfDaemon.app/Contents/MacOS/JamfDaemon | excludes:Effective_process.executable field:"Effective_process.executable" value:"/Library/Application Support/JAMF/Jamf.app/Contents/MacOS/JamfDaemon.app/Contents/MacOS/JamfDaemon" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
destination.domain | is_null | field:"DestinationHostname" kind:is_null | |
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"modification" |
event.type | eq |
| field:"event.type" kind:eq value:"start" |
file.extension | in |
| field:"file.extension" kind:in |
process.name | in |
| field:"process_name" kind:in |