Detection rules › Elastic
Suspicious File Download via Google Drive
Detects a network connection to a Google Drive domain followed immediately by the creation of a suspicious file like a Mach-O binary, Python Script, or Shell script via the same Process. Threat actors, especially the DPRK, have utilized Google Drive heavily in their campaigns in order to host and deliver second-stage payloads. A binary downloading these file types from Google Drive on macOS is highly un-common and unusual.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | |
| Command & Control |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| macOS | ESF event write (NOTIFY): Fires after a process writes data to a file. |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Detects a network connection to a Google Drive domain followed immediately by the creation of a suspicious file like a
Mach-O binary, Python Script, or Shell script via the same Process. Threat actors, especially the DPRK, have utilized
Google Drive heavily in their campaigns in order to host and deliver second-stage payloads. A binary downloading these
file types from Google Drive on macOS is highly un-common and unusual.
"""
id = "54ba4259-4bc0-4c86-ab7b-a009c6517603"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious File Download via Google Drive"
os_list = ["macos"]
reference = [
"https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/bluenoroff-hidden-risk-threat-actor-targets-macs-with-fake-crypto-news-and-novel-persistence/",
"https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/elastic-catches-dprk-passing-out-kandykorn",
]
version = "1.0.5"
query = '''
sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=30s
[network where event.type == "start" and destination.domain in ("drive.usercontent.google.com", "drive.usercontent.google.com.", "drive.google.com", "drive.google.com.", "script.google.com", "script.google.com.")]
[file where event.action == "modification" and (file.Ext.header_bytes like~ ("cffaedfe*", "cafebabe*") or
file.extension in ("py", "sh", "scpt"))]
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.16.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.parent.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.006"
name = "Python"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.007"
name = "JavaScript"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1105"
name = "Ingress Tool Transfer"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0011"
name = "Command and Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.16.0"
Stages and Predicates
Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 30s, correlated by process.entity_id.
Stage 1: network
[network where event.type == "start" and destination.domain in ("drive.usercontent.google.com", "drive.usercontent.google.com.", "drive.google.com", "drive.google.com.", "script.google.com", "script.google.com.")]
Stage 2: file
[file where event.action == "modification" and (file.Ext.header_bytes like~ ("cffaedfe*", "cafebabe*") or
file.extension in ("py", "sh", "scpt"))]
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
destination.domain | in |
| field:"DestinationHostname" kind:in |
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"modification" |
event.type | eq |
| field:"event.type" kind:eq value:"start" |
file.Ext.header_bytes | wildcard |
| field:"file.Ext.header_bytes" kind:wildcard |
file.extension | in |
| field:"file.extension" kind:in |