Detection rules › Elastic
Suspicious NetSupport Execution
Identifies a suspicious execution of NetSupport remote access software from non-default paths, issuing a DNS query to a non-standard NetSupport domain.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Command & Control |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies a suspicious execution of NetSupport remote access software from non-default paths, issuing a DNS query to a
non-standard NetSupport domain.
"""
id = "ad53a366-161a-4fa7-a75a-cc00658a767f"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious NetSupport Execution"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://www.netsupportsoftware.com/"]
version = "1.0.29"
query = '''
sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=1m
[process where process.pe.original_file_name : "client32.exe" and
process.code_signature.subject_name : "NetSupport Ltd" and
not process.executable : ("?:\\Program Files\\NetSupport*.exe", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\NetSupport*.exe") and
not process.parent.executable : ("?:\\Program Files\\NetSupport*.exe", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\NetSupport*.exe")]
[dns where not dns.question.name : "*.netsupportsoftware.com"]
'''
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1219"
name = "Remote Access Tools"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0011"
name = "Command and Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
Stages and Predicates
Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 1m, correlated by process.entity_id.
Stage 1: process
[process where process.pe.original_file_name : "client32.exe" and
process.code_signature.subject_name : "NetSupport Ltd" and
not process.executable : ("?:\\Program Files\\NetSupport*.exe", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\NetSupport*.exe") and
not process.parent.executable : ("?:\\Program Files\\NetSupport*.exe", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\NetSupport*.exe")]
Stage 2: dns
[dns where not dns.question.name : "*.netsupportsoftware.com"]
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.executable | wildcard | ?:\Program Files\NetSupport*.exe, ?:\Program Files (x86)\NetSupport*.exe | excludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Program Files\NetSupport*.exe" field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Program Files (x86)\NetSupport*.exe" |
process.parent.executable | wildcard | ?:\Program Files\NetSupport*.exe, ?:\Program Files (x86)\NetSupport*.exe | excludes:process.parent.executable field:"process.parent.executable" value:"?:\Program Files\NetSupport*.exe" field:"process.parent.executable" value:"?:\Program Files (x86)\NetSupport*.exe" |
dns.question.name | ends_with | .netsupportsoftware.com | excludes:dns.question.name field:"dns.question.name" value:".netsupportsoftware.com" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.code_signature.subject_name | wildcard |
| field:"Signature" kind:wildcard value:"NetSupport Ltd" |
process.pe.original_file_name | wildcard |
| field:"OriginalFileName" kind:wildcard value:"client32.exe" |