Detection rules › Elastic
Suspicious VSCode Extension Child Process
Detects when a vscode extension spawns an abnormal or suspicious child process. This activity can indicate that a malicious extension has been installed and is attempting to perform malicious actions on a user's system for initial access, data stealing, etc.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Command & Control |
Telemetry coverage
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Detects when a vscode extension spawns an abnormal or suspicious child process. This activity can indicate that a
malicious extension has been installed and is attempting to perform malicious actions on a user's system for initial
access, data stealing, etc.
"""
id = "9718bd56-a611-4c1e-a934-5145d5377656"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious VSCode Extension Child Process"
os_list = ["macos"]
reference = [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malicious-microsoft-vscode-extensions-steal-passwords-open-remote-shells/",
]
version = "1.0.13"
query = '''
process where event.action == "exec" and
(process.parent.executable like~ "/Users/*/.vscode/extensions/*" or process.Ext.effective_parent.executable like~ "/Users/*/.vscode/extensions/*") and
(
(process.name in ("sh", "bash", "zsh") and
process.args == "-c" and process.args like~ ("*curl*", "*nscurl*", "*osascript*", "*zip*")) or
(process.name in~ ("tclsh*", "osascript", "curl", "nscurl"))
) and not process.parent.code_signature.team_id in ("Q6L2SF6YDW", "2DC432GLL2")
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.11.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1105"
name = "Ingress Tool Transfer"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0011"
name = "Command and Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.11.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: process
process where event.action == "exec" and
(process.parent.executable like~ "/Users/*/.vscode/extensions/*" or process.Ext.effective_parent.executable like~ "/Users/*/.vscode/extensions/*") and
(
(process.name in ("sh", "bash", "zsh") and
process.args == "-c" and process.args like~ ("*curl*", "*nscurl*", "*osascript*", "*zip*")) or
(process.name in~ ("tclsh*", "osascript", "curl", "nscurl"))
) and not process.parent.code_signature.team_id in ("Q6L2SF6YDW", "2DC432GLL2")
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.parent.code_signature.team_id | in | 2DC432GLL2, Q6L2SF6YDW | excludes:process.parent.code_signature.team_id field:"process.parent.code_signature.team_id" value:"2DC432GLL2" field:"process.parent.code_signature.team_id" value:"Q6L2SF6YDW" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"exec" |
process.Ext.effective_parent.executable | wildcard |
| field:"process.Ext.effective_parent.executable" kind:wildcard value:"/Users/*/.vscode/extensions/*" |
process.args | eq |
| field:"process.args" kind:eq value:"-c" |
process.args | wildcard |
| field:"process.args" kind:wildcard |
process.name | in |
| field:"process_name" kind:in |
process.parent.executable | wildcard |
| field:"ParentImage" kind:wildcard value:"/Users/*/.vscode/extensions/*" |