Detection rules › Elastic

LSA Dump via Windows Error Reporting

Time window
1m
Sequence by
process.entity_id
Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Identifies the creation of LSASS memory crash dump via an unusual parent process. Adversaries may abuse the Windows Error Reporting service to proxy LSASS dumping as a preparation for credential access.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Credential Access

Rule body

[rule]
description = """
Identifies the creation of LSASS memory crash dump via an unusual parent process. Adversaries may abuse the Windows
Error Reporting service to proxy LSASS dumping as a preparation for credential access.
"""
id = "19cd9212-034a-4835-a0a9-617299b94060"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "LSA Dump via Windows Error Reporting"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://github.com/deepinstinct/Lsass-Shtinkering"]
version = "1.0.23"

query = '''
sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=1m
 [process where event.action == "start" and process.name : ("WerFaultSecure.exe", "WerFault.exe") and
  not process.parent.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe" and process.parent.executable != null]
 [file where event.action == "creation" and file.name : "lsass*.dmp"]
'''

min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.parent.entity_id"
state = 0

[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.parent.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1003"
name = "OS Credential Dumping"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1003.001"
name = "LSASS Memory"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0006"
name = "Credential Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"

Stages and Predicates

Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 1m, correlated by process.entity_id.

Stage 1: process

[process where event.action == "start" and process.name : ("WerFaultSecure.exe", "WerFault.exe") and
  not process.parent.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe" and process.parent.executable != null]

Stage 2: file

[file where event.action == "creation" and file.name : "lsass*.dmp"]

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
process.parent.executableeq?:\Windows\System32\lsass.exeexcludes:process.parent.executable field:"process.parent.executable" value:"?:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe"

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
event.actioneq
  • creation corpus 58 (elastic 58)
  • start corpus 391 (elastic 391)
field:"EventType" kind:eq
file.namewildcard
  • lsass*.dmp corpus 2 (elastic 2)
field:"file.name" kind:wildcard value:"lsass*.dmp"
process.namewildcard
  • WerFault.exe corpus 7 (elastic 7)
  • WerFaultSecure.exe corpus 4 (elastic 4)
field:"process_name" kind:wildcard
process.parent.executableis_not_null
  • (no value, null check)
field:"ParentImage" kind:is_not_null