Detection rules › Elastic
LSA Dump via Windows Error Reporting
Identifies the creation of LSASS memory crash dump via an unusual parent process. Adversaries may abuse the Windows Error Reporting service to proxy LSASS dumping as a preparation for credential access.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Credential Access |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies the creation of LSASS memory crash dump via an unusual parent process. Adversaries may abuse the Windows
Error Reporting service to proxy LSASS dumping as a preparation for credential access.
"""
id = "19cd9212-034a-4835-a0a9-617299b94060"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "LSA Dump via Windows Error Reporting"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://github.com/deepinstinct/Lsass-Shtinkering"]
version = "1.0.23"
query = '''
sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=1m
[process where event.action == "start" and process.name : ("WerFaultSecure.exe", "WerFault.exe") and
not process.parent.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe" and process.parent.executable != null]
[file where event.action == "creation" and file.name : "lsass*.dmp"]
'''
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.parent.entity_id"
state = 0
[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.parent.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1003"
name = "OS Credential Dumping"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1003.001"
name = "LSASS Memory"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0006"
name = "Credential Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
Stages and Predicates
Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 1m, correlated by process.entity_id.
Stage 1: process
[process where event.action == "start" and process.name : ("WerFaultSecure.exe", "WerFault.exe") and
not process.parent.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe" and process.parent.executable != null]
Stage 2: file
[file where event.action == "creation" and file.name : "lsass*.dmp"]
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.parent.executable | eq | ?:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe | excludes:process.parent.executable field:"process.parent.executable" value:"?:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq |
file.name | wildcard |
| field:"file.name" kind:wildcard value:"lsass*.dmp" |
process.name | wildcard |
| field:"process_name" kind:wildcard |
process.parent.executable | is_not_null | field:"ParentImage" kind:is_not_null |