Detection rules › Elastic

Potential Google Credentials Phishing

Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Identifies attempts to coerce the victim to enter their google credentials via spawning a browser child process from an unusual parent process pointing to Google signin prompt URL.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body

[rule]
description = """
Identifies attempts to coerce the victim to enter their google credentials via spawning a browser child process from an
unusual parent process pointing to Google signin prompt URL.
"""
id = "ff2c7c15-92ee-4cb5-83be-6c1b0f7dc28f"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Potential Google Credentials Phishing"
os_list = ["windows"]
version = "1.0.2"

query = '''
process where event.type == "start" and
 process.name : ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe") and process.args : "https://youtube.com/account?=https://accounts.google.com/v?/signin/challenge/pwd" and
 process.parent.executable != null and
 not process.parent.executable in~
                     ("c:\\windows\\explorer.exe",
                      "c:\\program files\\google\\chrome\\application\\chrome_proxy.exe",
                      "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Google\\Chrome\\Application\\chrome_proxy.exe",
                      "c:\\program files\\google\\chrome\\application\\chrome.exe",
                      "c:\\Program Files (x86)\\google\\chrome\\application\\chrome.exe") and
 not (process.parent.code_signature.subject_name == "Google LLC" and process.parent.code_signature.trusted == true)
'''

min_endpoint_version = "8.10.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.parent.entity_id"
state = 0
tree = true

[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1566"
name = "Phishing"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/"


[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1555"
name = "Credentials from Password Stores"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1555.003"
name = "Credentials from Web Browsers"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/003/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0006"
name = "Credential Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.10.0"

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: process

process where event.type == "start" and
 process.name : ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe") and process.args : "https://youtube.com/account?=https://accounts.google.com/v?/signin/challenge/pwd" and
 process.parent.executable != null and
 not process.parent.executable in~
                     ("c:\\windows\\explorer.exe",
                      "c:\\program files\\google\\chrome\\application\\chrome_proxy.exe",
                      "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Google\\Chrome\\Application\\chrome_proxy.exe",
                      "c:\\program files\\google\\chrome\\application\\chrome.exe",
                      "c:\\Program Files (x86)\\google\\chrome\\application\\chrome.exe") and
 not (process.parent.code_signature.subject_name == "Google LLC" and process.parent.code_signature.trusted == true)

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
process.parent.code_signature.subject_nameeqGoogle LLCexcludes:process.parent.code_signature.subject_name field:"process.parent.code_signature.subject_name" value:"Google LLC"
process.parent.code_signature.trustedeqtrueexcludes:process.parent.code_signature.trusted field:"process.parent.code_signature.trusted" value:"true"
process.parent.executableinC:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome_proxy.exe, c:\Program Files (x86)\google\chrome\application\chrome.exe, c:\program files\google\chrome\application\chrome.exe, c:\program files\google\chrome\application\chrome_proxy.exe, c:\windows\explorer.exeexcludes:process.parent.executable

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
event.typeeq
  • start corpus 1078 (elastic 1078)
field:"event.type" kind:eq value:"start"
process.argswildcard
  • https://youtube.com/account?=https://accounts.google.com/v?/signin/challenge/pwd
field:"process.args" kind:wildcard value:"https://youtube.com/account?=https://accounts.google.com/v?/signin/challenge/pwd"
process.namewildcard
  • chrome.exe corpus 16 (elastic 14, splunk 2)
  • msedge.exe corpus 12 (elastic 12)
field:"process_name" kind:wildcard
process.parent.executableis_not_null
  • (no value, null check)
field:"ParentImage" kind:is_not_null