Detection rules › Elastic
Remote Access to Sensitive Registry Keys
Identifies attempts to query remotely sensitive registry keys containing different credential materials via the remote registry service.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies attempts to query remotely sensitive registry keys containing different credential materials via the remote
registry service.
"""
id = "52741ad7-f7cb-47ae-8ea6-5353e5d0b042"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Remote Access to Sensitive Registry Keys"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/lsa-secrets-revisiting-secretsdump"]
version = "1.0.3"
query = '''
sequence with maxspan=1m
[authentication where event.action == "log_on" and
process.Ext.session_info.logon_type == "Network"] by user.effective.id
[registry where event.action == "query" and
process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe" and
registry.path :
("HKLM\\SAM\\SAM\\Domains\\Account\\*",
"HKLM\\SECURITY\\Policy\\Secrets\\*",
"HKLM\\SECURITY\\CACHE*") and
not registry.path : ("HKLM\\SAM\\SAM\\Domains\\Account\\Users",
"HKLM\\SAM\\SAM\\Domains\\Account\\Users\\Names",
"HKLM\\SAM\\SAM\\Domains\\Account",
"HKLM\\SAM\\SAM\\Domains\\Account\\Aliases\\*")] by user.id
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.15.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1003"
name = "OS Credential Dumping"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1003.002"
name = "Security Account Manager"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1003.004"
name = "LSA Secrets"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/004/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1003.005"
name = "Cached Domain Credentials"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/005/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0006"
name = "Credential Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.15.0"
Stages and Predicates
Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 1m, correlated by user.effective.id, user.id.
Stage 1: authentication
[authentication where event.action == "log_on" and
process.Ext.session_info.logon_type == "Network"] by user.effective.id
Stage 2: registry
[registry where event.action == "query" and
process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe" and
registry.path :
("HKLM\\SAM\\SAM\\Domains\\Account\\*",
"HKLM\\SECURITY\\Policy\\Secrets\\*",
"HKLM\\SECURITY\\CACHE*") and
not registry.path : ("HKLM\\SAM\\SAM\\Domains\\Account\\Users",
"HKLM\\SAM\\SAM\\Domains\\Account\\Users\\Names",
"HKLM\\SAM\\SAM\\Domains\\Account",
"HKLM\\SAM\\SAM\\Domains\\Account\\Aliases\\*")] by user.id
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
registry.path | wildcard | HKLM\SAM\SAM\Domains\Account\Users, HKLM\SAM\SAM\Domains\Account\Users\Names, HKLM\SAM\SAM\Domains\Account, HKLM\SAM\SAM\Domains\Account\Aliases\* | excludes:registry.path |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq |
process.Ext.session_info.logon_type | eq |
| field:"process.Ext.session_info.logon_type" kind:eq value:"Network" |
process.executable | wildcard |
| field:"Image" kind:wildcard value:"?:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe" |
registry.path | wildcard |
| field:"TargetObject" kind:wildcard |