Detection rules › Elastic

User Keychain Copied via Suspicious Parent

Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Detects when the copy command is used to copy the user keychain database and the parent process is executing from a suspicious or temporary directory. Threat actors often deploy malware to staging locations such as /tmp, /Library/Caches, or /Users/Shared and then use native macOS utilities to collect sensitive credential files like the keychain database prior to exfiltration. This rule complements shell-interpreter-based detections by covering cases where malware directly spawns the copy utility without an intermediary shell process.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

[rule]
description = """
Detects when the copy command is used to copy the user keychain database and the parent process is executing from a
suspicious or temporary directory. Threat actors often deploy malware to staging locations such as /tmp,
/Library/Caches, or /Users/Shared and then use native macOS utilities to collect sensitive credential files like the
keychain database prior to exfiltration. This rule complements shell-interpreter-based detections by covering cases
where malware directly spawns the copy utility without an intermediary shell process.
"""
id = "2f6d797d-b14a-4f9f-8914-b5b29a0103e2"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "User Keychain Copied via Suspicious Parent"
os_list = ["macos"]
reference = ["https://daylight.ai/blog/prospect-call-microsoft-teams-meetings"]
version = "1.0.1"

query = '''
process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
 process.name == "cp" and
 process.command_line : "*login.keychain-db*" and
 process.parent.executable like ("/tmp/*", "/private/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*",
                                  "/private/var/tmp/*", "/Users/Shared/*", "/Library/Caches/*",
                                  "/Users/*/Library/Caches/*", "/private/var/folders/*", "/var/folders/*")
'''

min_endpoint_version = "8.11.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.parent.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1555"
name = "Credentials from Password Stores"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1555.001"
name = "Keychain"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/001/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0006"
name = "Credential Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.11.0"

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: process

process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
 process.name == "cp" and
 process.command_line : "*login.keychain-db*" and
 process.parent.executable like ("/tmp/*", "/private/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*",
                                  "/private/var/tmp/*", "/Users/Shared/*", "/Library/Caches/*",
                                  "/Users/*/Library/Caches/*", "/private/var/folders/*", "/var/folders/*")

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
event.actioneq
  • exec
field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"exec"
event.typeeq
  • start
field:"event.type" kind:eq value:"start"
process.command_linewildcard
  • *login.keychain-db*
field:"CommandLine" kind:wildcard value:"*login.keychain-db*"
process.nameeq
  • cp
field:"process_name" kind:eq value:"cp"
process.parent.executablewildcard
  • /Library/Caches/*
  • /Users/*/Library/Caches/*
  • /Users/Shared/*
  • /private/tmp/*
  • /private/var/folders/*
  • /private/var/tmp/*
  • /tmp/*
  • /var/folders/*
  • /var/tmp/*
field:"ParentImage" kind:wildcard