Detection rules › Elastic
Attempted Private Key Access
Attackers may try to access private keys, e.g. ssh, in order to gain further authenticated access to the environment.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Credential Access | T1552.004 Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys |
| Collection | T1005 Data from Local System |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
Rule body elastic
[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/08/21"
integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "system"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2026/03/24"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
building_block_type = "default"
description = "Attackers may try to access private keys, e.g. ssh, in order to gain further authenticated access to the environment.\n"
from = "now-119m"
index = [
"endgame-*",
"logs-endpoint.events.process-*",
"logs-system.security*",
"logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*",
"winlogbeat-*",
]
interval = "60m"
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Attempted Private Key Access"
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "c55badd3-3e61-4292-836f-56209dc8a601"
severity = "low"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Windows",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Credential Access",
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
"Rule Type: BBR",
"Data Source: Sysmon",
"Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
"Data Source: Windows Security Event Logs",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
process.command_line : ("*.pem *", "*.pem", "*.id_rsa*") and
not process.args : (
"--rootcert",
"--cert",
"--crlfile"
) and
not process.command_line : (
"*--cacert*",
"*--ssl-cert*",
"*--tls-cert*",
"*--tls_server_certs*"
) and
not process.executable : (
"?:\\ProgramData\\Logishrd\\LogiOptions\\Software\\*\\LogiLuUpdater.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\Elastic\\Agent\\data\\*\\osqueryd.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\Git\\cmd\\git.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\Git\\mingw64\\bin\\git.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\Guardicore\\gc-controller.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\Guardicore\\gc-deception-agent.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\Guardicore\\gc-detection-agent.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\Guardicore\\gc-enforcement-agent.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\Guardicore\\gc-guest-agent.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\Logi\\LogiBolt\\LogiBoltUpdater.exe",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Schneider Electric EcoStruxure\\Building Operation 5.0\\Device Administrator\\Python\\python.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\Splunk\\bin\\openssl.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\SplunkUniversalForwarder\\bin\\openssl.exe",
"?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Logi\\LogiBolt\\LogiBoltUpdater.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\system32\\icacls.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\OpenSSH\\*"
)
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1552"
name = "Unsecured Credentials"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1552.004"
name = "Private Keys"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0006"
name = "Credential Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1005"
name = "Data from Local System"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0009"
name = "Collection"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009/"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: process
process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
process.command_line : ("*.pem *", "*.pem", "*.id_rsa*") and
not process.args : (
"--rootcert",
"--cert",
"--crlfile"
) and
not process.command_line : (
"*--cacert*",
"*--ssl-cert*",
"*--tls-cert*",
"*--tls_server_certs*"
) and
not process.executable : (
"?:\\ProgramData\\Logishrd\\LogiOptions\\Software\\*\\LogiLuUpdater.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\Elastic\\Agent\\data\\*\\osqueryd.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\Git\\cmd\\git.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\Git\\mingw64\\bin\\git.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\Guardicore\\gc-controller.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\Guardicore\\gc-deception-agent.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\Guardicore\\gc-detection-agent.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\Guardicore\\gc-enforcement-agent.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\Guardicore\\gc-guest-agent.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\Logi\\LogiBolt\\LogiBoltUpdater.exe",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Schneider Electric EcoStruxure\\Building Operation 5.0\\Device Administrator\\Python\\python.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\Splunk\\bin\\openssl.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\SplunkUniversalForwarder\\bin\\openssl.exe",
"?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Logi\\LogiBolt\\LogiBoltUpdater.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\system32\\icacls.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\OpenSSH\\*"
)
Exclusions
Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values |
|---|---|---|
process.args | eq | --rootcert, --cert, --crlfile |
process.command_line | match | --cacert, --ssl-cert, --tls-cert, --tls_server_certs |
process.executable | wildcard | ?:\ProgramData\Logishrd\LogiOptions\Software\*\LogiLuUpdater.exe, ?:\Program Files\Elastic\Agent\data\*\osqueryd.exe, ?:\Program Files\Git\cmd\git.exe, ?:\Program Files\Git\mingw64\bin\git.exe, ?:\Program Files\Guardicore\gc-controller.exe, ?:\Program Files\Guardicore\gc-deception-agent.exe, ?:\Program Files\Guardicore\gc-detection-agent.exe, ?:\Program Files\Guardicore\gc-enforcement-agent.exe, ?:\Program Files\Guardicore\gc-guest-agent.exe, ?:\Program Files\Logi\LogiBolt\LogiBoltUpdater.exe, ?:\Program Files (x86)\Schneider Electric EcoStruxure\Building Operation 5.0\Device Administrator\Python\python.exe, ?:\Program Files\Splunk\bin\openssl.exe, ?:\Program Files\SplunkUniversalForwarder\bin\openssl.exe, ?:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Logi\LogiBolt\LogiBoltUpdater.exe, ?:\Windows\system32\icacls.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\OpenSSH\* |
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
event.type | eq |
|
process.command_line | wildcard |
|