Detection rules › Elastic
Binary Proxy Execution via AppVLP
Identifies the execution of a binary via the Application Virtualization Utility. Adversaries may bypass process and signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed, or otherwise trusted, binaries.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies the execution of a binary via the Application Virtualization Utility. Adversaries may bypass process and
signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed, or otherwise trusted, binaries.
"""
id = "1fe0df3c-89fd-498a-ac50-28f21d7b0f28"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Binary Proxy Execution via AppVLP"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Appvlp/"]
version = "1.0.6"
query = '''
process where event.action == "start" and process.parent.name : "AppVLP.exe" and
not process.executable : ("?:\\Program Files\\*", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*") and
not (process.name : "rundll32.exe" and process.args : ("?:\\Program Files\\*", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*")) and
process.hash.sha256 != "de40cd43ec9934769c830bd3d4bc4a5a3fd5ed0535fa8ce4fdb17be3301fc120"
'''
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1218"
name = "System Binary Proxy Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: process
process where event.action == "start" and process.parent.name : "AppVLP.exe" and
not process.executable : ("?:\\Program Files\\*", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*") and
not (process.name : "rundll32.exe" and process.args : ("?:\\Program Files\\*", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*")) and
process.hash.sha256 != "de40cd43ec9934769c830bd3d4bc4a5a3fd5ed0535fa8ce4fdb17be3301fc120"
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.args | starts_with | ?:\Program Files\, ?:\Program Files (x86)\ | excludes:process.args field:"process.args" value:"?:\Program Files\" field:"process.args" value:"?:\Program Files (x86)\" |
process.name | eq | rundll32.exe | excludes:process.name field:"process.name" value:"rundll32.exe" |
process.executable | starts_with | ?:\Program Files\, ?:\Program Files (x86)\ | excludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Program Files\" field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Program Files (x86)\" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start" |
process.hash.sha256 | ne |
| field:"Hashes" kind:ne value:"de40cd43ec9934769c830bd3d4bc4a5a3fd5ed0535fa8ce4fdb17be3301fc120" |
process.parent.name | wildcard |
| field:"parent_process_name" kind:wildcard value:"AppVLP.exe" |