Detection rules › Elastic

Binary Proxy Execution via Runexehelper

Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Identifies the execution of a binary via the Windows RunExeHelper utility. Adversaries may bypass process and signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed, or otherwise trusted, binaries.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body

[rule]
description = """
Identifies the execution of a binary via the Windows RunExeHelper utility. Adversaries may bypass process and
signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed, or otherwise trusted, binaries.
"""
id = "8b1ae402-a41b-485f-8eb6-00ae6144cf8a"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Binary Proxy Execution via Runexehelper"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Runexehelper/"]
version = "1.0.7"

query = '''
process where event.action == "start" and process.parent.name : "runexehelper.exe" and 
 not process.executable :
              ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\conhost.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\powercfg.exe",
               "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wevtutil.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\WSCollect.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\TpmTool.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\MdmDiagnosticsTool.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\dsregcmd.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\stordiag.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\dxdiag.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\logman.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\licensingdiag.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\dispdiag.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\pnputil.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\hcsdiag.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\ddodiag.exe")
'''

min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1218"
name = "System Binary Proxy Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/"


[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: process

process where event.action == "start" and process.parent.name : "runexehelper.exe" and 
 not process.executable :
              ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\conhost.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\powercfg.exe",
               "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wevtutil.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\WSCollect.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\TpmTool.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\MdmDiagnosticsTool.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\dsregcmd.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\stordiag.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\dxdiag.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\logman.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\licensingdiag.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\dispdiag.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\pnputil.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\hcsdiag.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\ddodiag.exe")

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
process.executableeq?:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\powercfg.exe, ?:\WINDOWS\system32\wevtutil.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\WSCollect.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\TpmTool.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\MdmDiagnosticsTool.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\dsregcmd.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\stordiag.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\dxdiag.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\logman.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\licensingdiag.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\dispdiag.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\pnputil.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\hcsdiag.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\ddodiag.exeexcludes:process.executable

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.