Detection rules › Elastic
Execution via Internet Explorer Exporter
Identifies the execution of the built-in Windows program, ExtExport, which can be used for execution via side-loading a malicious DLL with one of the following names: mozcrt19.dll, mozsqlite3.dll, or sqlite.dll.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies the execution of the built-in Windows program, ExtExport, which can be used for execution via side-loading a
malicious DLL with one of the following names: mozcrt19.dll, mozsqlite3.dll, or sqlite.dll.
"""
id = "e13a65b7-f46f-4c7f-85cf-7e59170071fa"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Execution via Internet Explorer Exporter"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Extexport/"]
version = "1.0.31"
query = '''
sequence by user.id with maxspan=5m
[file where event.action != "deletion" and
file.name : ("sqlite3.dll", "mozcrt19.dll", "mozsqlite3.dll") and
not file.path : ("?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.dll", "?:\\Program Files\\*.dll")]
[process where event.action == "start" and process.pe.original_file_name : "extexport.exe" and
not process.executable : ("?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Internet Explorer\\ExtExport.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\ExtExport.exe")]
'''
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 1
[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 1
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1218"
name = "System Binary Proxy Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
Stages and Predicates
Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 5m, correlated by user.id.
Stage 1: file
[file where event.action != "deletion" and
file.name : ("sqlite3.dll", "mozcrt19.dll", "mozsqlite3.dll") and
not file.path : ("?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.dll", "?:\\Program Files\\*.dll")]
Stage 2: process
[process where event.action == "start" and process.pe.original_file_name : "extexport.exe" and
not process.executable : ("?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Internet Explorer\\ExtExport.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\ExtExport.exe")]
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
file.path | wildcard | ?:\Program Files (x86)\*.dll, ?:\Program Files\*.dll | excludes:file.path field:"file.path" value:"?:\Program Files (x86)\*.dll" field:"file.path" value:"?:\Program Files\*.dll" |
process.executable | eq | ?:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\ExtExport.exe, ?:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\ExtExport.exe | excludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\ExtExport.exe" field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\ExtExport.exe" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start" |
event.action | ne |
| field:"EventType" kind:ne value:"deletion" |
file.name | wildcard |
| field:"file.name" kind:wildcard |
process.pe.original_file_name | wildcard |
| field:"OriginalFileName" kind:wildcard value:"extexport.exe" |