Detection rules › Elastic
Execution via Program Compatibility Assistant
Identifies attempts to proxy execution using Microsoft Program Compatibility Assistant binary. Adversaries may use pcalua.exe to evade suspicious parent child process relationships.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies attempts to proxy execution using Microsoft Program Compatibility Assistant binary. Adversaries may use
pcalua.exe to evade suspicious parent child process relationships.
"""
id = "812a9a02-aac3-43b9-873a-70c2882fe19b"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Execution via Program Compatibility Assistant"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Pcalua/"]
version = "1.0.8"
query = '''
process where event.action == "start" and
(
(process.parent.name : "pcalua.exe" and process.parent.args : "-a" and not process.parent.args : "-d") or
(process.name : "pcalua.exe" and process.args : "-a" and not process.args : "-d")
) and
not process.args : ("?:\\Program Files\\*", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*") and
/* excluding signed and non Microsoft binaries */
not (process.code_signature.trusted == true and not process.code_signature.subject_name : "Microsoft*")
'''
min_endpoint_version = "7.16.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1218"
name = "System Binary Proxy Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1218.011"
name = "Rundll32"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.16.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: process
process where event.action == "start" and
(
(process.parent.name : "pcalua.exe" and process.parent.args : "-a" and not process.parent.args : "-d") or
(process.name : "pcalua.exe" and process.args : "-a" and not process.args : "-d")
) and
not process.args : ("?:\\Program Files\\*", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*") and
not (process.code_signature.trusted == true and not process.code_signature.subject_name : "Microsoft*")
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.code_signature.subject_name | starts_with | Microsoft | excludes:process.code_signature.subject_name field:"process.code_signature.subject_name" value:"Microsoft" |
process.code_signature.trusted | eq | true | excludes:process.code_signature.trusted field:"process.code_signature.trusted" value:"true" |
process.args | starts_with | ?:\Program Files\, ?:\Program Files (x86)\ | excludes:process.args field:"process.args" value:"?:\Program Files\" field:"process.args" value:"?:\Program Files (x86)\" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start" |
process.args | wildcard |
| field:"process.args" kind:wildcard value:"-a" |
process.code_signature.subject_name | wildcard |
| field:"Signature" kind:wildcard value:"Microsoft*" |
process.name | wildcard |
| field:"process_name" kind:wildcard value:"pcalua.exe" |
process.parent.args | wildcard |
| field:"process.parent.args" kind:wildcard value:"-a" |
process.parent.name | wildcard |
| field:"parent_process_name" kind:wildcard value:"pcalua.exe" |