Detection rules › Elastic
File and Directory Permissions Modification
Identifies the change of permissions/ownership of files/folders through built-in Windows utilities. Threat actors may require permission modification of files/folders to change, modify or delete them.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Defense Impairment | T1222.001 File and Directory Permissions Modification: Windows Permissions |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
Rule body elastic
[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/07/12"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2024/05/21"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
building_block_type = "default"
description = """
Identifies the change of permissions/ownership of files/folders through built-in Windows utilities. Threat actors may
require permission modification of files/folders to change, modify or delete them.
"""
from = "now-119m"
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.process-*"]
interval = "60m"
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "File and Directory Permissions Modification"
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "bc9e4f5a-e263-4213-a2ac-1edf9b417ada"
severity = "low"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Windows",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Defense Evasion",
"Rule Type: BBR",
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where event.type == "start" and host.os.type == "windows" and
(
((process.name: "icacls.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "iCACLS.EXE") and process.args: ("*:F", "/reset", "/setowner", "*grant*")) or
((process.name: "cacls.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "CACLS.EXE") and process.args: ("/g", "*:f")) or
((process.name: "takeown.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "takeown.exe") and process.args: ("/F")) or
((process.name: "attrib.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name== "ATTRIB.EXE") and process.args: "-r")
) and not user.id : "S-1-5-18" and
not (
process.args : ("C:\\ProgramData\\Lenovo\\*", "C:\\ProgramData\\Adobe\\*", "C:\\ProgramData\\ASUS\\ASUS*")
)
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1222"
name = "File and Directory Permissions Modification"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1222.001"
name = "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/001/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: process
process where event.type == "start" and host.os.type == "windows" and
(
((process.name: "icacls.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "iCACLS.EXE") and process.args: ("*:F", "/reset", "/setowner", "*grant*")) or
((process.name: "cacls.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "CACLS.EXE") and process.args: ("/g", "*:f")) or
((process.name: "takeown.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "takeown.exe") and process.args: ("/F")) or
((process.name: "attrib.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name== "ATTRIB.EXE") and process.args: "-r")
) and not user.id : "S-1-5-18" and
not (
process.args : ("C:\\ProgramData\\Lenovo\\*", "C:\\ProgramData\\Adobe\\*", "C:\\ProgramData\\ASUS\\ASUS*")
)
Exclusions
Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values |
|---|---|---|
process.args | starts_with | C:\ProgramData\Lenovo\, C:\ProgramData\Adobe\, C:\ProgramData\ASUS\ASUS |
user.id | eq | S-1-5-18 |
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
event.type | eq |
|
process.args | wildcard |
|
process.name | wildcard |
|
process.pe.original_file_name | eq |
|