Detection rules › Elastic
Indirect Command Execution via ForFiles
Identifies the use of native Windows tool, forfiles to execute a file. Adversaries may abuse utilities that allow for command execution to bypass security restrictions that limit the use of command-line interpreters.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies the use of native Windows tool, forfiles to execute a file. Adversaries may abuse utilities that allow for
command execution to bypass security restrictions that limit the use of command-line interpreters.
"""
id = "78afa378-d1c4-4b83-a261-ce1c90f1cbf9"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Indirect Command Execution via ForFiles"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Forfiles/"]
version = "1.0.28"
query = '''
process where event.action == "start" and
process.parent.name : "forfiles.exe" and process.parent.args : "/c" and
process.parent.args : "/p" and process.parent.args : "/m" and
not process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\conhost.exe" and
not user.id in ("S-1-5-18", "S-1-5-19", "S-1-5-20") and
not (process.name : "cmd.exe" and process.args: ("del", "xcopy", "cmd /c del @PATH", "move")) and
not (process.name : "cmd.exe" and process.command_line : "/c if TRUE==TRUE rmdir /s /q \"nw*\"") and
not (process.name : "cmd.exe" and process.command_line : "*echo *J2A* Autolog*") and
not (process.name : "cmd.exe" and process.args : "echo" and length(process.command_line) <= 25) and
process.working_directory : ("?:\\", "?:\\*\\AppData\\*", "?:\\Windows\\*") and
not (process.name : "cmd.exe" and process.command_line : "*Datei*TempAttachments*") and
not (process.name : "cmd.exe" and process.args : "?:\\Program Files\\CZM\\Tools\\FileCommit.bat") and
not process.parent.args : "cmd /c echo @PATH"
'''
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1202"
name = "Indirect Command Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1202/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: process
process where event.action == "start" and
process.parent.name : "forfiles.exe" and process.parent.args : "/c" and
process.parent.args : "/p" and process.parent.args : "/m" and
not process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\conhost.exe" and
not user.id in ("S-1-5-18", "S-1-5-19", "S-1-5-20") and
not (process.name : "cmd.exe" and process.args: ("del", "xcopy", "cmd /c del @PATH", "move")) and
not (process.name : "cmd.exe" and process.command_line : "/c if TRUE==TRUE rmdir /s /q \"nw*\"") and
not (process.name : "cmd.exe" and process.command_line : "*echo *J2A* Autolog*") and
not (process.name : "cmd.exe" and process.args : "echo" and length(process.command_line) <= 25) and
process.working_directory : ("?:\\", "?:\\*\\AppData\\*", "?:\\Windows\\*") and
not (process.name : "cmd.exe" and process.command_line : "*Datei*TempAttachments*") and
not (process.name : "cmd.exe" and process.args : "?:\\Program Files\\CZM\\Tools\\FileCommit.bat") and
not process.parent.args : "cmd /c echo @PATH"
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start" |
process.parent.args | wildcard |
| field:"process.parent.args" kind:wildcard |
process.parent.name | wildcard |
| field:"parent_process_name" kind:wildcard value:"forfiles.exe" |
process.working_directory | wildcard |
| field:"CurrentDirectory" kind:wildcard |