Detection rules › Elastic
Linux Hidden File Mounted
Detects when a hidden file gets mounted. This is suspicious behavior, and has been observed in MacOS and Linux malware samples.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | |
| Stealth |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Detects when a hidden file gets mounted. This is suspicious behavior, and has been observed in MacOS and Linux malware
samples.
"""
id = "5b544dbb-2c66-42cd-a4ee-8d1e5afe9903"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Linux Hidden File Mounted"
os_list = ["linux"]
version = "1.0.6"
query = '''
process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and (
process.name in ("mount", "pmount", "lsblk") or
(process.name == "udisksctl" and process.args == "mount")
) and process.args like ("/media/.*", "/mnt/.*", "/tmp/mnt/.*") and
not process.parent.command_line == "/usr/sbin/automount --pid-file /var/run/autofs.pid"
'''
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.004"
name = "Unix Shell"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1211"
name = "Exploitation for Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: process
process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and (
process.name in ("mount", "pmount", "lsblk") or
(process.name == "udisksctl" and process.args == "mount")
) and process.args like ("/media/.*", "/mnt/.*", "/tmp/mnt/.*") and
not process.parent.command_line == "/usr/sbin/automount --pid-file /var/run/autofs.pid"
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.parent.command_line | eq | /usr/sbin/automount --pid-file /var/run/autofs.pid | excludes:process.parent.command_line field:"process.parent.command_line" value:"/usr/sbin/automount --pid-file /var/run/autofs.pid" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"exec" |
event.type | eq |
| field:"event.type" kind:eq value:"start" |
process.args | eq |
| field:"process.args" kind:eq value:"mount" |
process.args | wildcard |
| field:"process.args" kind:wildcard |
process.name | eq |
| field:"process_name" kind:eq value:"udisksctl" |
process.name | in |
| field:"process_name" kind:in |