Detection rules › Elastic
Long Base64 Encoded Interpreter Command Line
Identifies attempts to execute commands with long base64 encoded command lines. Adversaries may abuse this technique to execute malicious commands.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | |
| Stealth |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies attempts to execute commands with long base64 encoded command lines. Adversaries may abuse this technique to
execute malicious commands.
"""
id = "389cd325-5e24-4188-8dd3-f9b0ee637ce9"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Long Base64 Encoded Interpreter Command Line"
os_list = ["windows"]
version = "1.0.3"
query = '''
process where event.type == "start" and
(
(
process.name like~ "python*" and
(
process.command_line like~ "*b64decode*" or
(
process.command_line like "*-c *" and
process.command_line like~ "*base64*"
)
)
) or
(
process.name like~ ("node*", "deno*") and
(
process.command_line like~ ("*atob(*", "*eval(*") or
(
process.command_line like~ "*buffer.from*" and
process.command_line like~ "*base64*"
)
)
) or
(
process.name like~ "php*" and
process.command_line like~ ("*base64_decode(*", "*convert.base64-decode*")
) or
(
process.name like~ "java*" and
process.command_line like~ "*base64*decode(*"
) or
(
process.name like~ "lua*" and
process.command_line like~ ("*mime.decode(*base64*", "*mime.unb64(*")
) or
(
process.name like~ "openssl*" and
process.command_line like~ ("*base64 -d*", "*-base64*")
)
) and length(process.command_line) >= 4000 and
not process.parent.executable : ("C:\\Users\\*\\git\\usr\\bin\\bash.exe", "C:\\Program Files\\Git\\usr\\bin\\bash.exe", "C:\\Program Files\\Git\\usr\\bin\\sh.exe")
'''
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
tree = true
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.001"
name = "PowerShell"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.004"
name = "Unix Shell"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.006"
name = "Python"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.007"
name = "JavaScript"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.011"
name = "Lua"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/011/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1027"
name = "Obfuscated Files or Information"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1140"
name = "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: process
process where event.type == "start" and
(
(
process.name like~ "python*" and
(
process.command_line like~ "*b64decode*" or
(
process.command_line like "*-c *" and
process.command_line like~ "*base64*"
)
)
) or
(
process.name like~ ("node*", "deno*") and
(
process.command_line like~ ("*atob(*", "*eval(*") or
(
process.command_line like~ "*buffer.from*" and
process.command_line like~ "*base64*"
)
)
) or
(
process.name like~ "php*" and
process.command_line like~ ("*base64_decode(*", "*convert.base64-decode*")
) or
(
process.name like~ "java*" and
process.command_line like~ "*base64*decode(*"
) or
(
process.name like~ "lua*" and
process.command_line like~ ("*mime.decode(*base64*", "*mime.unb64(*")
) or
(
process.name like~ "openssl*" and
process.command_line like~ ("*base64 -d*", "*-base64*")
)
) and length(process.command_line) >= 4000 and
not process.parent.executable : ("C:\\Users\\*\\git\\usr\\bin\\bash.exe", "C:\\Program Files\\Git\\usr\\bin\\bash.exe", "C:\\Program Files\\Git\\usr\\bin\\sh.exe")
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.parent.executable | wildcard | C:\Users\*\git\usr\bin\bash.exe, C:\Program Files\Git\usr\bin\bash.exe, C:\Program Files\Git\usr\bin\sh.exe | excludes:process.parent.executable field:"process.parent.executable" value:"C:\Users\*\git\usr\bin\bash.exe" field:"process.parent.executable" value:"C:\Program Files\Git\usr\bin\bash.exe" field:"process.parent.executable" value:"C:\Program Files\Git\usr\bin\sh.exe" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.type | eq |
| field:"event.type" kind:eq value:"start" |
process.command_line | wildcard |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:wildcard |
process.name | wildcard |
| field:"process_name" kind:wildcard |