Detection rules › Elastic
Memory File Descriptor Child Process Execution
This rule detects when a child process is executed from a memory file descriptor (memfd). Attackers may use memfd to create and execute code directly in memory, bypassing traditional file-based detection mechanisms. The use of memfd for child process execution is uncommon and may indicate an attempt to evade security controls.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | |
| Stealth |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
This rule detects when a child process is executed from a memory file descriptor (memfd). Attackers may use memfd to
create and execute code directly in memory, bypassing traditional file-based detection mechanisms. The use of memfd for
child process execution is uncommon and may indicate an attempt to evade security controls.
"""
id = "edc713a8-f352-4b12-ba50-b24944dfbd2d"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Memory File Descriptor Child Process Execution"
os_list = ["linux"]
reference = ["https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/memfd_create.2.html"]
version = "1.0.6"
query = '''
process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.parent.executable like "?memfd:*" and
not (
process.executable in ("/usr/bin/fusermount", "/usr/bin/fusermount3", "/usr/sbin/logrotate") or
(
process.working_directory == "/run/nordlayer" and
process.parent.command_line in (
"/proc/self/fd/4 -config /etc/nordlayer/config.hcl",
"/dev/fd/4 -config /etc/nordlayer/config.hcl"
)
)
)
'''
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.parent.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1106"
name = "Native API"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1055"
name = "Process Injection"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1055.009"
name = "Proc Memory"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/009/"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1620"
name = "Reflective Code Loading"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: process
process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.parent.executable like "?memfd:*" and
not (
process.executable in ("/usr/bin/fusermount", "/usr/bin/fusermount3", "/usr/sbin/logrotate") or
(
process.working_directory == "/run/nordlayer" and
process.parent.command_line in (
"/proc/self/fd/4 -config /etc/nordlayer/config.hcl",
"/dev/fd/4 -config /etc/nordlayer/config.hcl"
)
)
)
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.parent.command_line | in | /dev/fd/4 -config /etc/nordlayer/config.hcl, /proc/self/fd/4 -config /etc/nordlayer/config.hcl | excludes:process.parent.command_line field:"process.parent.command_line" value:"/dev/fd/4 -config /etc/nordlayer/config.hcl" field:"process.parent.command_line" value:"/proc/self/fd/4 -config /etc/nordlayer/config.hcl" |
process.working_directory | eq | /run/nordlayer | excludes:process.working_directory field:"process.working_directory" value:"/run/nordlayer" |
process.executable | in | /usr/bin/fusermount, /usr/bin/fusermount3, /usr/sbin/logrotate | excludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"/usr/bin/fusermount" field:"process.executable" value:"/usr/bin/fusermount3" field:"process.executable" value:"/usr/sbin/logrotate" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"exec" |
event.type | eq |
| field:"event.type" kind:eq value:"start" |
process.parent.executable | wildcard |
| field:"ParentImage" kind:wildcard value:"?memfd:*" |