Detection rules › Elastic

Microsoft Windows Defender Tampering

Status
production
Severity
medium
Time window
9m
Author
Austin Songer
Source
github.com/elastic/detection-rules

Identifies when one or more features on Microsoft Defender are disabled. Adversaries may disable or tamper with Microsoft Defender features to evade detection and conceal malicious behavior.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body elastic

[metadata]
creation_date = "2021/10/18"
integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "m365_defender", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "crowdstrike"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2026/05/04"

[rule]
author = ["Austin Songer"]
description = """
Identifies when one or more features on Microsoft Defender are disabled. Adversaries may disable or tamper with
Microsoft Defender features to evade detection and conceal malicious behavior.
"""
false_positives = ["Legitimate Windows Defender configuration changes"]
from = "now-9m"
index = [
    "winlogbeat-*",
    "logs-endpoint.events.registry-*",
    "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*",
    "logs-m365_defender.event-*",
    "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
    "endgame-*",
    "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Microsoft Windows Defender Tampering"
note = """## Triage and analysis

### Investigating Microsoft Windows Defender Tampering

Microsoft Windows Defender is an antivirus product built into Microsoft Windows, which makes it popular across multiple environments. Disabling it is a common step in threat actor playbooks.

This rule monitors the registry for modifications that disable Windows Defender features.

#### Possible investigation steps

- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
- Examine which features have been disabled, and check if this operation is done under change management and approved according to the organization's policy.

### False positive analysis

- This mechanism can be used legitimately. Analysts can dismiss the alert if the administrator is aware of the activity, the configuration is justified (for example, it is being used to deploy other security solutions or troubleshooting), and no other suspicious activity has been observed.

### Related rules

- Windows Defender Disabled via Registry Modification - 2ffa1f1e-b6db-47fa-994b-1512743847eb
- Disabling Windows Defender Security Settings via PowerShell - c8cccb06-faf2-4cd5-886e-2c9636cfcb87

### Response and remediation

- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
- Take actions to restore the appropriate Windows Defender antivirus configurations.
- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
- Review the privileges assigned to the user to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
"""

setup = """## Setup

This rule is designed for data generated by [Elastic Defend](https://www.elastic.co/security/endpoint-security), which provides native endpoint detection and response, along with event enrichments designed to work with our detection rules.

Setup instructions: https://ela.st/install-elastic-defend

### Additional data sources

This rule also supports the following third-party data sources. For setup instructions, refer to the links below:

- [CrowdStrike](https://ela.st/crowdstrike-integration)
- [Microsoft Defender XDR](https://ela.st/m365-defender)
- [SentinelOne Cloud Funnel](https://ela.st/sentinel-one-cloud-funnel)
- [Sysmon Registry Events](https://ela.st/sysmon-event-reg-setup)
"""

references = [
    "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/",
    "https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/32236-enable-disable-microsoft-defender-pua-protection-windows-10-a.html",
    "https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/104025-turn-off-core-isolation-memory-integrity-windows-10-a.html",
    "https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/105533-enable-disable-windows-defender-exploit-protection-settings.html",
    "https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/123792-turn-off-tamper-protection-microsoft-defender-antivirus.html",
    "https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/51514-turn-off-microsoft-defender-periodic-scanning-windows-10-a.html",
    "https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/3569-turn-off-real-time-protection-microsoft-defender-antivirus.html",
    "https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/99576-how-schedule-scan-microsoft-defender-antivirus-windows-10-a.html",
    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/invisible-miners-unveiling-ghostengine",
]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "fe794edd-487f-4a90-b285-3ee54f2af2d3"
severity = "medium"
tags = [
    "Domain: Endpoint",
    "OS: Windows",
    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
    "Data Source: Sysmon",
    "Data Source: Microsoft Defender XDR",
    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
    "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"

query = '''
registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "change" and process.executable != null and
  (
    (
      registry.value : (
        "PUAProtection", "DisallowExploitProtectionOverride", "TamperProtection", "EnableControlledFolderAccess",
        "SpynetReporting", "SubmitSamplesConsent"
      ) and registry.data.strings : ("0", "0x00000000")
    ) or
    (
      registry.value : (
        "DisableAntiSpyware", "DisableRealtimeMonitoring", "DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem", "DisableScriptScanning",
        "DisableIOAVProtection", "DisableEnhancedNotifications", "DisableBlockAtFirstSeen", "DisableBehaviorMonitoring"
      ) and registry.data.strings : ("1", "0x00000001")
    )
  ) and
  not process.executable : (
    "?:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe", 
    "?:\\Windows\\CCM\\CcmExec.exe", 
    "?:\\Windows\\System32\\DeviceEnroller.exe", 
    "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Trend Micro\\Security Agent\\tmuninst.exe",
    "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe", 
    "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*\\Windows\\CCM\\CcmExec.exe", 
    "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*\\Windows\\System32\\DeviceEnroller.exe", 
    "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*\\Program Files (x86)\\Trend Micro\\Security Agent\\tmuninst.exe"
  )

/*
    Full registry key paths omitted due to data source variations:
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\DisableAntiSpyware"
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableRealtimeMonitoring"
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem"
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableScriptScanning"
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableIOAVProtection"
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Reporting\\DisableEnhancedNotifications"
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\SpyNet\\DisableBlockAtFirstSeen"
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableBehaviorMonitoring"
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\PUAProtection"
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender Security Center\\App and Browser protection\\DisallowExploitProtectionOverride"
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Features\\TamperProtection"
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\\Controlled Folder Access\\EnableControlledFolderAccess"
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\SpyNet\\SpynetReporting"
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\SpyNet\\SubmitSamplesConsent"
*/
'''


[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"

[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1112"
name = "Modify Registry"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/"

[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1562"
name = "Impair Defenses"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/"

[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1562.001"
name = "Disable or Modify Tools"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/"

[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: registry

registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "change" and process.executable != null and
  (
    (
      registry.value : (
        "PUAProtection", "DisallowExploitProtectionOverride", "TamperProtection", "EnableControlledFolderAccess",
        "SpynetReporting", "SubmitSamplesConsent"
      ) and registry.data.strings : ("0", "0x00000000")
    ) or
    (
      registry.value : (
        "DisableAntiSpyware", "DisableRealtimeMonitoring", "DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem", "DisableScriptScanning",
        "DisableIOAVProtection", "DisableEnhancedNotifications", "DisableBlockAtFirstSeen", "DisableBehaviorMonitoring"
      ) and registry.data.strings : ("1", "0x00000001")
    )
  ) and
  not process.executable : (
    "?:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe", 
    "?:\\Windows\\CCM\\CcmExec.exe", 
    "?:\\Windows\\System32\\DeviceEnroller.exe", 
    "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Trend Micro\\Security Agent\\tmuninst.exe",
    "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe", 
    "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*\\Windows\\CCM\\CcmExec.exe", 
    "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*\\Windows\\System32\\DeviceEnroller.exe", 
    "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*\\Program Files (x86)\\Trend Micro\\Security Agent\\tmuninst.exe"
  )

/*
    Full registry key paths omitted due to data source variations:
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\DisableAntiSpyware"
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableRealtimeMonitoring"
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem"
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableScriptScanning"
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableIOAVProtection"
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Reporting\\DisableEnhancedNotifications"
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\SpyNet\\DisableBlockAtFirstSeen"
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableBehaviorMonitoring"
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\PUAProtection"
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender Security Center\\App and Browser protection\\DisallowExploitProtectionOverride"
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Features\\TamperProtection"
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\\Controlled Folder Access\\EnableControlledFolderAccess"
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\SpyNet\\SpynetReporting"
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\SpyNet\\SubmitSamplesConsent"
*/

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

FieldKindExcluded values
process.executablewildcard?:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe, ?:\Windows\CCM\CcmExec.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\DeviceEnroller.exe, ?:\Program Files (x86)\Trend Micro\Security Agent\tmuninst.exe, \Device\HarddiskVolume*\Windows\system32\svchost.exe, \Device\HarddiskVolume*\Windows\CCM\CcmExec.exe, \Device\HarddiskVolume*\Windows\System32\DeviceEnroller.exe, \Device\HarddiskVolume*\Program Files (x86)\Trend Micro\Security Agent\tmuninst.exe

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
event.typeeq
  • change corpus 77 (elastic 77)
process.executableis_not_null
  • (no value, null check)
registry.data.stringswildcard
  • 0 corpus 12 (elastic 8, sigma 3, splunk 1)
  • 0x00000000 corpus 43 (splunk 35, elastic 8)
  • 0x00000001 corpus 63 (splunk 54, elastic 9)
  • 1 corpus 13 (elastic 9, splunk 2, kusto 2)
registry.valuewildcard
  • DisableAntiSpyware corpus 2 (elastic 1, splunk 1)
  • DisableBehaviorMonitoring
  • DisableBlockAtFirstSeen corpus 2 (elastic 1, splunk 1)
  • DisableEnhancedNotifications corpus 2 (elastic 1, splunk 1)
  • DisableIOAVProtection
  • DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem
  • DisableRealtimeMonitoring
  • DisableScriptScanning
  • DisallowExploitProtectionOverride
  • EnableControlledFolderAccess
  • PUAProtection
  • SpynetReporting corpus 2 (elastic 1, splunk 1)
  • SubmitSamplesConsent corpus 2 (elastic 1, splunk 1)
  • TamperProtection