Detection rules › Elastic
Network File Unzipped via Unsigned or Untrusted Binary
Detects the decompression of a file into a specified folder directly from a network download using unzip via an unsigned or untrusted binary.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
Telemetry coverage
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Detects the decompression of a file into a specified folder directly from a network download using unzip via an unsigned
or untrusted binary.
"""
id = "28611239-08e6-47d5-a88b-76136670788c"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Network File Unzipped via Unsigned or Untrusted Binary"
os_list = ["macos"]
version = "1.0.6"
query = '''
process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.name == "unzip" and
process.args: "/*/CFNetworkDownload*" and process.args == "-d" and
(process.parent.code_signature.trusted == false or process.parent.code_signature.exists == false) and
not process.parent.name == "figma_agent"
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.12.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.parent.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.004"
name = "Unix Shell"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1027"
name = "Obfuscated Files or Information"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1140"
name = "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.12.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: process
process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.name == "unzip" and
process.args: "/*/CFNetworkDownload*" and process.args == "-d" and
(process.parent.code_signature.trusted == false or process.parent.code_signature.exists == false) and
not process.parent.name == "figma_agent"
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.parent.name | eq | figma_agent | excludes:process.parent.name field:"process.parent.name" value:"figma_agent" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.