Detection rules › Elastic
Suspicious Outlook Child Process
Identifies suspicious child processes spawned by MS Outlook, which can indicate a potential masquerading or the exploitation of a vulnerability on the application causing it to execute code.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
Rule body elastic
[metadata]
bypass_bbr_timing = true
creation_date = "2025/01/10"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2026/03/24"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
building_block_type = "default"
description = """
Identifies suspicious child processes spawned by MS Outlook, which can indicate a potential masquerading or the
exploitation of a vulnerability on the application causing it to execute code.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.process-*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Outlook Child Process"
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "6cf17149-a8e3-44ec-9ec9-fdc8535547a1"
severity = "low"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Windows",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Defense Evasion",
"Tactic: Persistence",
"Rule Type: BBR",
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
process.parent.name : "outlook.exe" and
not (
(
process.executable : (
"?:\\Program Files\\*",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\system32\\wermgr.exe",
"?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe",
"?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\NewOutlookInstall\\NewOutlookInstaller.exe",
"?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\Application\\chrome.exe",
"?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Island\\Island\\Application\\Island.exe",
"?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox.exe",
"?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Zoom\\bin\\Zoom.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\IME\\SHARED\\IMEWDBLD.EXE",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\prevhost.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\dwwin.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\mspaint.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\mspaint.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\notepad.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\notepad.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\smartscreen.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\explorer.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\splwow64.exe"
) and process.code_signature.trusted == true
) or
(
process.name : "rundll32.exe" and
process.args : "*hpmsn???.dll,MonitorPrintJobStatus*"
)
)
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1036"
name = "Masquerading"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1036.001"
name = "Invalid Code Signature"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/001/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1036.005"
name = "Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005/"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1055"
name = "Process Injection"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1554"
name = "Compromise Host Software Binary"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0003"
name = "Persistence"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1203"
name = "Exploitation for Client Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: process
process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
process.parent.name : "outlook.exe" and
not (
(
process.executable : (
"?:\\Program Files\\*",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\system32\\wermgr.exe",
"?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe",
"?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\NewOutlookInstall\\NewOutlookInstaller.exe",
"?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\Application\\chrome.exe",
"?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Island\\Island\\Application\\Island.exe",
"?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox.exe",
"?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Zoom\\bin\\Zoom.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\IME\\SHARED\\IMEWDBLD.EXE",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\prevhost.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\dwwin.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\mspaint.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\mspaint.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\notepad.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\notepad.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\smartscreen.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\explorer.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\splwow64.exe"
) and process.code_signature.trusted == true
) or
(
process.name : "rundll32.exe" and
process.args : "*hpmsn???.dll,MonitorPrintJobStatus*"
)
)
Exclusions
Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values |
|---|---|---|
process.args | match | hpmsn???.dll,MonitorPrintJobStatus |
process.name | eq | rundll32.exe |
process.code_signature.trusted | eq | true |
process.executable | wildcard | ?:\Program Files\*, ?:\Program Files (x86)\*, ?:\Windows\System32\WerFault.exe, ?:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe, ?:\Windows\system32\wermgr.exe, ?:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe, ?:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Temp\NewOutlookInstall\NewOutlookInstaller.exe, ?:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe, ?:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Island\Island\Application\Island.exe, ?:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe, ?:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Zoom\bin\Zoom.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\IME\SHARED\IMEWDBLD.EXE, ?:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\*, ?:\Windows\System32\prevhost.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\dwwin.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\mspaint.exe, ?:\Windows\SysWOW64\mspaint.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe, ?:\Windows\SysWOW64\notepad.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\smartscreen.exe, ?:\Windows\explorer.exe, ?:\Windows\splwow64.exe |
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
event.type | eq |
|
process.parent.name | wildcard |
|