Detection rules › Elastic

Potential DLL Hollowing with Transactional NTFS

Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Identifies attempts to load a transacted file. This is a technique that exploits Transactional NTFS to execute arbitrary code in the address space of a running process, without committing the code to disk.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Stealth

Rule body

[rule]
description = """
Identifies attempts to load a transacted file. This is a technique that exploits Transactional NTFS to execute arbitrary
code in the address space of a running process, without committing the code to disk.
"""
id = "7f61cf66-1363-4b2a-8f82-73cc2bd46b17"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Potential DLL Hollowing with Transactional NTFS"
os_list = ["windows"]
version = "1.0.3"

query = '''
library where event.action == "load" and process.pid != 4 and
 dll.Ext.defense_evasions == "Process Tampering: Image belongs to a transaction" and
 dll.Ext.defense_evasions == "Process Tampering: Image has been accessed before mapping"
'''

min_endpoint_version = "8.10.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
tree = true

[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1055"
name = "Process Injection"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/"


[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.10.0"

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: library

library where event.action == "load" and process.pid != 4 and
 dll.Ext.defense_evasions == "Process Tampering: Image belongs to a transaction" and
 dll.Ext.defense_evasions == "Process Tampering: Image has been accessed before mapping"

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
dll.Ext.defense_evasionseq
  • Process Tampering: Image belongs to a transaction
  • Process Tampering: Image has been accessed before mapping
field:"dll.Ext.defense_evasions" kind:eq
event.actioneq
  • load corpus 24 (elastic 24)
field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"load"
process.pidne
  • 4 transforms: number corpus 44 (elastic 44)
field:"process_id" kind:ne value:"4"