Detection rules › Elastic

Potential DLL SideLoad via a Microsoft Signed Binary

Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Identifies attempts to load an unsigned DLL from a mounted virtual disk (.iso, .vhd) and by a signed Microsoft binary. This may indicate an attempt to sideload a malicious DLL to stealthily execute code.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body

[rule]
description = """
Identifies attempts to load an unsigned DLL from a mounted virtual disk (.iso, .vhd) and by a signed Microsoft binary.
This may indicate an attempt to sideload a malicious DLL to stealthily execute code.
"""
id = "ba802fb2-f183-420e-947b-da5ce0c74dd3"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Potential DLL SideLoad via a Microsoft Signed Binary"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = [
    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/Hunting-for-Suspicious-Windows-Libraries-for-Execution-and-Evasion",
]
version = "1.0.27"

query = '''
/* MS bin used as DLL sideloading target from an ISO/DMG/VHD archive */
library where
  (dll.Ext.device.product_id : ("Virtual DVD-ROM", "Virtual Disk") and not dll.path : "C:\\*") and
  process.code_signature.subject_name : "Microsoft*" and
  not dll.code_signature.status : ("trusted", "errorCode_endpoint*") and
  not process.executable : "C:\\*" and
  not startswith~(dll.name, process.name) and
  not dll.hash.sha256 :
              ("94555c70cf6376c645c6f7277d0cf61f8b50add7fe0b8b17b6d5f222589689b6",
               "9b594093385a5f3f23e8bb2112d0ee5df93b4cf6f95515909d4fbea22e4283aa",
               "d668366c74f476d73fc0e00b00433ce3e2ccff7b18a525cf41758b7c3c495ea3",
               "0924c7a3f02eee3b0b6f1b4d9c22cd3c7e914d57fcd07a707d56e0cb04d66e7a",
               "6ee2c087b7c55b7fea604515fd47eb20a7a531854da8a7c010744743cb937f6a",
               "c048df2f3928f57f27951e5d917f90b788b1881948d98379c8772423d91fc4fb",
               "3c30e83ae1150ae8efd52d652af227948cc8d8107c99d313084a3f4c3a0545c7",
               "0b8094f76dbe2621cef9f6340bf4225d49ac847b8fd5c7b3456256fdb31141de",
               "69326fd2322db837d680d3fd0d61ca4de77eac3ba96306bad8c12b64c922880f",
               "6a6299dc667bedfa449f374931d1990cd19c3b23e2e603562b7f9d2c42e37f62")
'''

min_endpoint_version = "8.10.0"
optional_actions = []
reputation = true
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1574"
name = "Hijack Execution Flow"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1574.001"
name = "DLL"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.10.0"

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: library

library where
  (dll.Ext.device.product_id : ("Virtual DVD-ROM", "Virtual Disk") and not dll.path : "C:\\*") and
  process.code_signature.subject_name : "Microsoft*" and
  not dll.code_signature.status : ("trusted", "errorCode_endpoint*") and
  not process.executable : "C:\\*" and
  not startswith~(dll.name, process.name) and
  not dll.hash.sha256 :
              ("94555c70cf6376c645c6f7277d0cf61f8b50add7fe0b8b17b6d5f222589689b6",
               "9b594093385a5f3f23e8bb2112d0ee5df93b4cf6f95515909d4fbea22e4283aa",
               "d668366c74f476d73fc0e00b00433ce3e2ccff7b18a525cf41758b7c3c495ea3",
               "0924c7a3f02eee3b0b6f1b4d9c22cd3c7e914d57fcd07a707d56e0cb04d66e7a",
               "6ee2c087b7c55b7fea604515fd47eb20a7a531854da8a7c010744743cb937f6a",
               "c048df2f3928f57f27951e5d917f90b788b1881948d98379c8772423d91fc4fb",
               "3c30e83ae1150ae8efd52d652af227948cc8d8107c99d313084a3f4c3a0545c7",
               "0b8094f76dbe2621cef9f6340bf4225d49ac847b8fd5c7b3456256fdb31141de",
               "69326fd2322db837d680d3fd0d61ca4de77eac3ba96306bad8c12b64c922880f",
               "6a6299dc667bedfa449f374931d1990cd19c3b23e2e603562b7f9d2c42e37f62")

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
dll.code_signature.statuswildcardtrusted, errorCode_endpoint*excludes:dll.code_signature.status field:"dll.code_signature.status" value:"trusted" field:"dll.code_signature.status" value:"errorCode_endpoint*"
dll.hash.sha256eq94555c70cf6376c645c6f7277d0cf61f8b50add7fe0b8b17b6d5f222589689b6, 9b594093385a5f3f23e8bb2112d0ee5df93b4cf6f95515909d4fbea22e4283aa, d668366c74f476d73fc0e00b00433ce3e2ccff7b18a525cf41758b7c3c495ea3, 0924c7a3f02eee3b0b6f1b4d9c22cd3c7e914d57fcd07a707d56e0cb04d66e7a, 6ee2c087b7c55b7fea604515fd47eb20a7a531854da8a7c010744743cb937f6a, c048df2f3928f57f27951e5d917f90b788b1881948d98379c8772423d91fc4fb, 3c30e83ae1150ae8efd52d652af227948cc8d8107c99d313084a3f4c3a0545c7, 0b8094f76dbe2621cef9f6340bf4225d49ac847b8fd5c7b3456256fdb31141de, 69326fd2322db837d680d3fd0d61ca4de77eac3ba96306bad8c12b64c922880f, 6a6299dc667bedfa449f374931d1990cd19c3b23e2e603562b7f9d2c42e37f62excludes:dll.hash.sha256
dll.namestarts_withprocess.nameexcludes:dll.name field:"dll.name" value:"process.name"
dll.pathstarts_withC:\excludes:dll.path field:"dll.path" value:"C:\"
process.executablestarts_withC:\excludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"C:\"

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
dll.Ext.device.product_idwildcard
  • Virtual DVD-ROM corpus 5 (elastic 5)
  • Virtual Disk corpus 5 (elastic 5)
field:"dll.Ext.device.product_id" kind:wildcard
process.code_signature.subject_namewildcard
  • Microsoft* corpus 22 (elastic 22)
field:"Signature" kind:wildcard value:"Microsoft*"