Detection rules › Elastic
Potential Evasion via ClipUp Execution
Identifies the execution of the ClipUp process from an unusual parent and with the -ppl argument. This may indicate an attempt to overwrite protected files to tamper with endpoint security solutions.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Defense Impairment |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies the execution of the ClipUp process from an unusual parent and with the -ppl argument. This may indicate an
attempt to overwrite protected files to tamper with endpoint security solutions.
"""
id = "af6ca1a9-650f-4984-b83d-fc0a3b118c74"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Potential Evasion via ClipUp Execution"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://www.zerosalarium.com/2025/08/countering-edrs-with-backing-of-ppl-protection.html"]
version = "1.0.3"
query = '''
process where event.action == "start" and
process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\ClipUp.exe" and process.args : "-ppl" and process.Ext.protection like "PsProtectedSigner*" and
not process.parent.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\ClipUp.exe", "?:\\Windows\\System32\\smss.exe", "?:\\Windows\\System32\\conhost.exe") and
process.parent.executable != null
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.0.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.parent.entity_id"
state = 0
tree = true
[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1562"
name = "Impair Defenses"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.0.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: process
process where event.action == "start" and
process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\ClipUp.exe" and process.args : "-ppl" and process.Ext.protection like "PsProtectedSigner*" and
not process.parent.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\ClipUp.exe", "?:\\Windows\\System32\\smss.exe", "?:\\Windows\\System32\\conhost.exe") and
process.parent.executable != null
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.parent.executable | eq | ?:\Windows\System32\ClipUp.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\smss.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe | excludes:process.parent.executable field:"process.parent.executable" value:"?:\Windows\System32\ClipUp.exe" field:"process.parent.executable" value:"?:\Windows\System32\smss.exe" field:"process.parent.executable" value:"?:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start" |
process.Ext.protection | wildcard |
| field:"process.Ext.protection" kind:wildcard value:"PsProtectedSigner*" |
process.args | wildcard |
| field:"process.args" kind:wildcard value:"-ppl" |
process.executable | wildcard |
| field:"Image" kind:wildcard value:"?:\Windows\System32\ClipUp.exe" |
process.parent.executable | is_not_null | field:"ParentImage" kind:is_not_null |